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2“We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.”
Albert Einstein
Abstract
Applications which are both context-aware and adapting, enhance users’ experience by anticipating their
need in relation with their environment and adapt their behavior according to environmental changes.
Being by definition both context-aware and adaptive these applications suffer both from faults related to
their context-awareness and to their adaptive nature plus from a novel variety of faults originated by the
combination of the two. This research work analyzes, classifies, detects, and reports faults belonging
to this novel class aiming to improve the robustness of these Context-Aware Adaptive Applications
(CAAAs).
To better understand the peculiar dynamics driving the CAAAs adaptation mechanism a general
high-level architectural model has been designed. This architectural model clearly depicts the stream of
information coming from sensors and being computed all the way to the adaptation mechanism. The
model identifies a stack of common components representing increasing abstractions of the context and
their general interconnections. Known faults involving context data can be re-examined according to this
architecture and can be classified in terms of the component in which they are happening and in terms
of their abstraction from the environment. Resulting from this classification is a CAAA-oriented fault
taxonomy.
Our architectural model also underlines that there is a common evolutionary path for CAAAs and
shows the importance of the adaptation logic. Indeed most of the adaptation failures are caused by
invalid interpretations of the context by the adaptation logic. To prevent such faults we defined a model,
the Adaptation Finite-State Machine (A-FSM), describing how the application adapts in response to
changes in the context. The A-FSM model is a powerful instrument which allows developers to focus in
those context-aware and adaptive aspects in which faults reside.
In this model we have identified a set of patterns of faults representing the most common faults in
this application domain. Such faults are represented as violation of given properties in the A-FSM. We
have created four techniques to detect such faults. Our proposed algorithms are based on three different
technologies: enumerative, symbolic and goal planning. Such techniques compensate each other. We
have evaluated them by comparing them to each other using both crafted models and models extracted
from existing commercial and free applications. In the evaluation we observe the validity, the readability
of the reported faults, the scalability and their behavior in limited memory environments. We conclude
this Thesis by suggesting possible extensions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The growing popularity of handheld devices such as cellphones, PDAs and portable consoles, and the
increasing availability of infrastructures that support mobility such as GPS satellites, WiFi networks and
Bluetooth services, together create a market for new kinds of applications that constantly monitor and
react to contextual information. Users start relying to portable and wearable devices in an increasing
number of situations. Applications running on such portable devices need to be properly configured, to
be able to react to different environmental inputs and to proactively adapt. For example, among the top
ten awardees of Google’s Android Developer Challenge conducted in 2008, five applications are heavily
influenced by their environment: one application relies on ambient noise and on location obtained from
WiFi and cell towers to adjust a phone’s configuration [Two09]. Another uses acceleration to determine
if a collision occurred [lif]. Still others use GPS location to measure how much a user has covered in
a race [sof] and to estimate personal carbon footprint [eco]. The fifth relies on the detection of nearby
users in order to establish social connections [wer]. Key characteristics of these emerging Context-Aware
Adaptive Applications (CAAAs) are that they are intensely context-aware and continually adaptive to
changes in context.
This modern applications present a unique characteristic: alongside with the normal execution flow,
in which the application interacts with the user, there is an additional, often independent, execution
flow in which the application monitors the surrounding environment looking for certain situations. This
parallel execution waits for updates from one of the monitoring sensors. By means of dedicated routines,
APIs or middlewares refreshed values are read and computed. Such a computation aims to chose whether
the application has to adapt or not. If not, nothing happens and the application continues its current
behavior, otherwise an adaptation is performed. During each adaptation the application applies a new
behavior by changing its features, by modifying part of its configuration or by loading or unloading
required components.
Adaptations resulting from environmental changes create new challenges in terms of testing and
validation due to a novel class of failures from which they suffer. Since the application behavior depends
on adaptations, unpredicted or incorrect adaptations may apply behaviors which, for a certain environ-
ment, may prove undesirable, faulty or even dangerous. The perception of the surrounding environment
depends on sensors and components which can be enabled or disabled both by adaptations and users.
12 1.1. Background
Certain behaviors may fail because the user interfered with one of the required components. Sequential
behaviors may perceive the same environment differently and may start interfering with each other. De-
velopers design adaptations to be triggered when certain conditions are met. However, there may exist
borderline environmental conditions that create interferences between multiple adaptations resulting in
undesired or incorrect adaptations.
In this Thesis we describe, compare and evaluate validation methodologies for Context-Aware
Adaptive Applications (CAAAs). The acronym CAAA has been introduced in one of our initial pub-
lications to identify applications which constantly monitor and react to their environment [SRWE08a].
The nature of such applications may vary from small standalone mobile applications to peer intercon-
nected nodes of a pervasive system. Our main focus is on standalone applications but the techniques we
propose also apply to single nodes of infrastructured systems.
Independently from its purpose, each CAAA adapts as a result of computations based on values
read from its context of execution. Such context includes various kinds of informations spacing from
sensor readings from the surrounding environments to internal configuration parameters. In this Thesis
we aim to validate the correctness of such adaptations by means of novel context-driven techniques. We
define our techniques as context-driven, meaning that the validation is driven by context information
also available to the application itself. Although some of the presented techniques may be successfully
applied to different problems [CSRR09], they are not meant to be general purpose validation techniques,
therefore they may not be effective in validating other aspects. In particular, even if an application has
been flagged as correct, it does not mean that the application is bug-free but simply that its adaptation
mechanism has passed certain fault detection criteria.
The remaining of this Chapter fixes boundaries and assumptions on which this research is based
and enumerates all the contributions produced by this work. A running example, PhoneAdapter, is also
presented to help the reader through the rest of the manuscript.
1.1 Background
Sensor readings are discretization of physical values sampled with a certain refresh rate depending on
the sensor or on its configurations. Following the notation introduced in [LCT06, WER07a] we name
context variables those holding values obtained by sensor readings. The refresh rate with which the
context variables are updated vary from sensor to sensor, from few milliseconds to few minutes. Nor-
mally a CAAA relies on multiple sensors to better understand its surrounding environment. Each of
such sensors will read the context and notify the application asynchronously. Information provided by
different sensors are normally redundant in order to avoid errors in sensor readings and in order to be
able to recognize certain situations even if some of the used sensors are off. If both the sensors are on
and their readings are similar then the application can consider the reading safe. Contrarily if they show
discordant values, because the context is changed and not all of them have refreshed or because they
have reading errors, the CAAA may misinterpret such readings and adapt incorrectly.
Beside asynchronous refresh problems, which are an intrinsic issue of this category of applications,
CAAAs also suffer from faults caused by problems in their logic. Such problems normally are caused by
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human mistakes in defining the application’s reaction to contextual changes and, in most of the situations,
are implementation independent, meaning that any implementation using the same logic will suffer from
the same fault.
As any other class of application, CAAAs have evolved through the time following the increase
of their popularity and the availability of new technologies. We have identified five different evolution-
ary steps which still coexist depending on the application domain. Knowing and understanding these
evolutionary steps is important to identify potential sources of faults.
1. At first, coping with proprietary and custom hardware, CAAAs were implemented as hard-coded
applications targeting exactly the device in which they were being executed. Developers were
implementing all the components starting from drivers through the adaptation
logic to the user interface. This is still the case for some industrial applications or for small
embedded proprietary applications such as simple house monitoring systems. In this Thesis, in
Section 4.1.4 we consider one such application, the Conveyor Belt [LCT08].
2. With the standardization of certain sensors and with the rise of wireless communication protocols
such as WiFi, Bluetooth and Zigbee, sensor manufacturers have embedded their sensors in small
multipurpose external units, such as handsfree or GPS. Those external units were then connected
to industrial handheld devices such as PDAs. This change in the hardware platform lead to a
second stage in the development of CAAAs. Developers were provided with proprietary API to
control available sensors, and with frameworks for the user interface. At this stage the complexity
moved from directly controlling the sensors to implementing the application logic, leading to more
complex logics. Applications belonging to this second stage are commonly proprietary and tightly
bounded to a certain driver.
3. With the advent of modern Smartphones, such as Android [All09], iPhone [App09], Open-
Moko [Ope09], Blackberries [Res09] and modern PalmOS devices [Pal09], application develop-
ers could benefit from large frameworks encapsulating all the sensors with standard APIs [Sun09,
Pro06a, Pro06b, Jav00, Ope08b, Ope08a]. This increased further more the portability of CAAAs
and contributed to their diffusion to the public. As an example of this in Section 4.1.2 we introduce
TourApp [SDA99].
4. The availability of standard framework built with high level languages made it possible the rise
of context-awareness middlewares [BC04, CEM03a, FC04, Flo06, GPZ04, RC03, SRa]. These
context-awareness middleware took care of most of the synchronization and adaptation problems
and let the developer focus on the logic behind the adaptations instead of in its implementation.
CAAAs’ developers stopped designing the adaptation logic with imperative languages and started
describing them in terms of adaptation rules. Such rules define triggers to which the application
reacts and adapts. Rule based middlewares are the most diffuse, however other implementations
exist, for instance middlewares using neural networks or support vector machines. For instance,
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in Section 4.1.3 we discuss SeNIE which provides a gesture recognition tool based on a neural
networks.
Adaptation rules can be simple enough to be understood and designed by end users. In fact adap-
tation rules can also be represented as a human readable description of the application’s behavior
(e.g. “if the battery is low turn off bluetooth”). With the increase of popularity of Smartphones and
with the need to provide more ubiquitous and pervasive applications, developers allowed end users
to specify custom configurations by providing graphical user interface to redefine at runtime the
adaptation logic. This describes the current state of the art of CAAAs. The increased number of
scenarios in which CAAAs are now used and the complexity which such adaptation rules can reach
also increase the number of faults caused by an incorrect or fault prone adaptation logic. This is
caused by two factors: first users are not really aware of problems behind rules definition, second,
the adaptation logic which was once tested by application developers before releasing the product,
is now not tested because it is defined at runtime. In Section 2.5 we mention Locale [Two09], a
CAAA belonging to this category. In Locale, for instance, a set of rules is used to raise events that
change the phone’s behavior or notify external applications based on predefined situations (e.g.,
low battery) and on situations that a user can define (e.g., being in a meeting).
5. Since now CAAAs are distributed to multiple platforms the next evolutionary step would be the
definition of a standard language to define such application rules. PhoneAdapter [SRWE08a],
described in Section 1.2 is an example of how a platform independent, in this case, XML based,
definition of a CAAA may look like.
In middleware based applications CAAAs’ validation should be limited to rules validation, leaving
the middleware testing to middleware developers. When an incorrect rule is triggered, or the correct one
is not, a CAAA fails to adapt properly or behaves improperly. Again, in applications like Locale, failure
reports often refer to issues associated with rules that trigger undesired behavior (e.g., the wrong location
is set when sensor data is not available, leading to a phone ringing loudly in a meeting) or fail to trigger
appropriate behavior (e.g., not turning GPS off, which may quickly drain the battery).
Discovering such adaptation faults in CAAAs is challenging because of various confounding fac-
tors:
1. The space of rules becomes complex to analyze in the presence of shared context variables, con-
current triggering of rules, and priority ordering of rules.
2. The context variables are refreshed asynchronously at different rates by the middleware, causing
artificial, transient inconsistencies between the external physical context and its internal represen-
tation within the application.
3. It is becoming increasingly common for CAAAs to let their users configure their behavior; this
can lead to runtime failures due to buggy user-defined configurations.
In practice, we have observed that developers attempt to control these factors and the associated
introduction of faults by constraining the rule space (e.g., disallowing disjunctions in rules), enforcing
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stronger priority orderings (e.g, requiring that each rule has a unique priority), restricting the adaptation
actions that can be taken based on rules (e.g., disabling the power-off feature on GPS because it may be
used by other rules), and reducing the number or type of sensor information that can be considered (e.g.,
not letting the end user turn off particular services).
All of these practices are attempts to address an unsolved problem: human defined rules may be
faulty and, before they can be applied, they need to be validated.
1.2 A Running Example: PhoneAdapter
In this section we present PhoneAdapter, an application that suffers from the kinds of faults peculiar to
CAAAs that our approach is able to detect. To help the reader, PhoneAdapter will be used as running
example across the manuscript and as a benchmark in the evaluations.
PhoneAdapter adapts a phone’s profile according to context information. Phone profiles are a set of
parameters that determine a phone’s behavior, such as settings for display intensity, ring tone volume and
vibration. Instead of requiring the user to select a profile manually, PhoneAdapter uses a set of adaptation
rules to trigger automatic selection of a profile suitable to the user’s current context. The selected profile
prevails until a more suitable one is chosen through the triggering of other rules. The rule predicates are
expressed over context readings from Bluetooth and GPS sensors on the phone plus the phone’s internal
clock. As we shall see, however, the selected profile is not always the most appropriate one.
The application is implemented on top of ContextNotifier, a J2ME rule-based adaptation framework
and middleware we have built for CAAAs [SRa], and targeted for deployment on the Nokia N95 mobile
phone. Originally we run the application and its adaptation rules within an emulation environment called
TestingEmulator [SRb].
By means of a user created XML configuration file, PhoneAdapter defines which behavior exists
and under which circumstances it should be applied.
The setup used in the remaining of this thesis defines nine profiles:
1. General: the initial profile, which defines a user-specified default configuration, and which is
applied by default when the phone’s sensors are unable to detect any activity related to one of the
remaining profiles;
2. Home: increases the ring tone volume and removes vibration when the user is at home;
3. Office: mutes the ring tone and activates vibration when the user is in his office;
4. Meeting: mutes the ring tone and disables vibration when the user is in a meeting;
5. Outdoor: increases the backlight intensity and speaker volume when the user is outdoors;
6. Jogging: increases the backlight intensity and speaker volume and also activates vibration when
the user is jogging;
7. Driving: connects to the car’s handsfree communication system when the user is driving;
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8. DrivingFast: diverts calls when the user is driving fast;
9. Sync: periodically synchronizes personal information on the phone with the user’s home or office
PC when the phone is not in use and the PC is discovered via Bluetooth.
Some profiles are more important than others for safety or social reasons, so it is possible to sort the
order with which they will be applied with a weak priority order. In this scenario DrivingFast and Driving
are applied with high priority, Meeting, Home, Outdoor, Jogging, and Office with medium priority, and,
since synchronization can be performed after other activities have been accounted for, Sync is applied
with low priority.
Over several executions, we observed a number of non-obvious problems with PhoneAdapter. For
instance, the profile Sync is never applied when the phone is adapted to Home or Office. Also, the rules
that trigger adaptation to Home and Office can be satisfied simultaneously—which is possible if the
user’s office PC is discovered in the home location, or vice versa—causing nondeterministic adaptation
to one of the two profiles.
But there are even more subtle problems. While the phone is in the process of adapting according
to one rule, if some other rules are satisfied, the phone can pass through a sequence of different profiles
within the same context. This chain of adaptation causes multiple problems. In particular, the user can
be annoyed by the multiple adaptations, and through the sequence of adaptations the desired profile can
become unreachable. For instance, when the user has left his office or house and has entered his car, the
phone is supposed to adapt to Driving. However, if the Bluetooth sensor does not detect the handsfree
system fast enough, the phone can adapt to General, and then to Outdoor. Then when the user starts
driving, the speed increases and the phone adapts from Outdoor to Jogging. From Jogging the phone
cannot adapt to Driving even when the handsfree system finally is detected, because the application
cannot adapt from Jogging to Driving directly according to the rules.
It can also happen that, through a chain of adaptations, the predicates of contradictory rules are
satisfied and keep activating each other. For instance, from Meeting, when the meeting is over, the
application adapts to Office, in which another rule restores Meeting, leading to a loop, because there
exist particular inputs that can satisfy the necessary predicates simultaneously. For instance, the predicate
time > meeting start is always true after the meeting.
The timing of context updates can affect the triggering of rules in other ways. Since context up-
dates occur asynchronously, the internal view of the context can become inconsistent temporarily, which
causes the evaluation of rules to produce incorrect results or to trigger in a manner that violates their
priorities. For instance, if a meeting is scheduled but the user is going from the office to his car, the
higher refresh rate of time relative to Bluetooth can force an adaptation to Meeting instead of Driving.
Existing analysis techniques do not differentiate predicates based on asynchronous input signals
such as GPS and Bluetooth. Such predicates could cause abnormal adaptation when updated asyn-
chronously. Also, the space of rules becomes complex and non-trivial to analyze in the presence of
shared context variables, of rules that can be concurrently triggered, and of rules with priorities. Al-
though these problems can be fixed manually, we have no guarantee that we have discovered all possible
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faults of this nature. We therefore need systematic ways of discovering adaptation faults like the kinds
described above. Our approach aims to help software engineers (especially rule designers) analyze rules
and detect faults in them automatically.
1.3 Contributions
This section summarizes the achievements and contributions produced by this Thesis. The manuscript
starts from a general analysis of CAAAs’ architectures and of their related failures. Common causes of
faults are generalized and techniques to detect them automatically, are proposed.
1.3.1 Architecture and Failure Taxonomy
Due to their context-aware and adaptive nature CAAAs’ implementation follows a general architecture
which became more evident with the rise of context-awareness middlewares. In Chapter 3 this architec-
ture is modelled in detail with particular focus on how context variables are computed and evolve inside
the application layers which we have identified.
Once a high level architectural model is defined, known failures can be re-examined in terms of
which layer fails and which contextual variable is faulty. Such context-related failures can hardly be
classified with existing bug reporting tools. In fact their error reports miss those context-aware infor-
mation which would provide a better support to software developers. In Chapter 4 we describe such
taxonomy and we use it to classify instances of failures which we have identified in various applications.
1.3.2 A-FSM Model
The diffusion of context-awareness middleware moves the complexity of CAAAs from the context-
awareness to the adaptation logic. Nowadays developers mainly focus on defining their own adaptation
logic or in providing design tools to let each user to configure its own configuration.
To support this new trend in Chapter 5 we propose the Adaptation Finite State Machine model, a
model for the application logic of CAAAs. This model uses a Finite State Automation (FSA) also known
as Finite State Machine (FSM) to model the adaptive behaviour of a CAAA, and can be considered one
of the main contributions of this Thesis as all the following validation techniques are built on top of that.
Given that CAAAs are more and more taking advantage of context-awareness middlewares and
their implementation is often reduced to the definition of behaviours and adaptation rules, the definition
of a standard model acquires more and more relevance and becomes crucial in a scenario in which such
configuration needs to be portable from one implementation to the other.
1.3.3 Fault Patterns
As described in Chapter 3 most of the failures occurring in CAAAs can be reduced to a set of common
causes. By means of the A-FSM such common causes have been encapsulated in a set of properties
which, if violated, may lead to a failure. We name such violations fault patterns and we describe their
effect in Chapter 5.
Being able to identify properties and faults’ patterns is a big step in CAAAs validation because: It
allows their automatic verification; It abstracts the problem from testing if an implementation is correct
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to defining what correct means and letting automated validation techniques to prove such correctness.
1.3.4 Validation Techniques
Given an A-FSM Model describing a CAAA, such model can be validated against our Fault Patterns.
Even if such validation can be performed in several ways in Chapter 6 we present three different imple-
mentations by defining for each of them a set of unique validation algorithms.
At first, in Section 6.1 we describe an enumerative technique which is not scalable but which pro-
vides a detailed error report. In Section 6.2 we solve the scalability issues by means of a more optimized
BDD-based (Binary Decision Diagram-based) context representation. Both these approaches rely on the
definition of specific pattern detection algorithms. At last, in Section 6.3, we show how violations can
also be detected by converting the definition of their violation in a planning task and by using a planner
to find instances of such violations. This third approach does not require the definition of a detection al-
gorithm and supports more complex properties and provides a fully detailed trace starting from an initial
configuration till a detected fault instance.
1.3.5 Evaluations
The techniques described in Chapter 6 are capable of validating CAAAs against known faults and addi-
tional techniques could be defined. By examining them we found that there is a trade off between the
details of the error report, the ways faults are aggregated and the scalability of the technique. Moreover
the computation time is not always the issue, and the application may need to be validated on devices
where the limited memory is a stricter constraint. In Chapter 8 we compare our three techniques and
discuss their strengths and weaknesses.
This evaluation is important because not only it shows that no technique is superior to the others but
also puts the basis for a more sophisticated validation in which at first the whole application is validated
using approaches which prioritize scalability to error report’s details and then only the faulty application
subsets are revalidated with other less scalable but more accurate approaches.
1.4 Outline
The rest of this Thesis is organized as follows: in Chapter 3 we introduce a high level architectural
model, on which the fault taxonomy presented in Chapter 4 is based. In Chapter 5 we present our A-
FSM Model based on which, we define a set of properties which, if validated may lead to failures. In
Chapter 6 we introduce three techniques capable of validating applications against the patterns of faults
which we have presented. Such techniques are compared with each other in Chapter 8. Finally Chapter 9
presents conclusions and future works.
1.5 Publications
Initial results in the definition of an architecture for CAAAs have been published as a short paper in
the 1st ICSE 2008 International Workshop on Software Architectures and Mobility (SAM) [SRWE08b].
Such work has then been revised, extended and published in a special issue on mobile architecture of the
IEEE Journal on Software Systems (JSS) [SRWE10].
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Behavioural faults, hazards and their related fault patterns have been presented at the 16th ACM
SIGSOFT International Symposium of Software Engineering [SRWE08a] in which, faults were only
detected using the enumerative approach. We introduced a first symbolic implementation in the IEEE
1st International Workshop on Automated engineeRing of Autonomous and run-tiMe evolvIng Systems
(ARAMIS). The two improved symbolic approaches, which are presented in this thesis, as well as their
evaluation have been published on a special issue of the IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
(TSE) [SER+10]. The latest approach using planners to detect behavioural faults is still under review.
ContextNotifier and TestingEmulator, a framework and a testing tool which we have used to detect
faults on CAAAs and which we have used to test manually PhoneAdapter have been presented on the
demo session of the 5th ACM International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services
(MOBISYS).
The A-FSM model has been applied to Webservice composition in a work presented in the IEEE
International Conference on Services Computing 2009 (SCC).
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
Software testing is any activity, that aims to evaluate an attribute or capability of a program (or even a
system) and determines if it meets its required results [HH91]. One part of the software testing validation
is the activity of checking that a software system meets its specifications and that it fulfills its intended
purpose. To validate applications monitoring the environment in order to adapt and to provide their
user a more suitable behavior, we need to understand what is their intended purpose. In this thesis we
believe that their intended purpose is to always show the user the most suitable behavior according to the
environment in which they are being executed. Then the problem is: how do we establish which behavior
is the correct one? The best answer to this question is that it depends on the application’s purpose. In the
presence of a formal detailed specification of how the application should behave it would be possible to
verify if such specifications are respected. However, in the presence of a variety of inputs it is not trivial
for developers to define a detailed specification which would take in account all the possible situations.
In this thesis we look at the problem from the opposite direction. Indeed, we can easily say that a CAAA
is violating its purpose if, in a certain context, it exposes any undesired behavior. Then deciding which
behavior can be considered undesired in a certain environment is a much simpler task which we solved
by defining a set of properties and by considering all those undesired behaviors that are violating at least
one property. To define such a set of properties we followed previous works on testing and validation
for context-aware and adaptive applications and we attempt to isolate and classify the various fault they
found. Then to apply such properties, we were inspired by the existing model checking and validation
techniques.
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 gives an overview of testing and val-
idation techniques applied to context-aware applications; Section 2.2 introduces related work in model
checking and validation techniques designed for a more general class of applications; Section 2.3 de-
scribes Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams, a data structure with which a Boolean representation of
CAAA can be encoded; Finally Section 2.4 introduces the Planning Domain Definition Language, which
has been used to convert CAAA validation into planning tasks.
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2.1 Testing and Validation Techniques related to Context-Aware
Applications
In the literature there are various work designing and testing middleware-centric context-aware sys-
tems [LCT06]. Middleware-centric context-aware applications are part of a centralized system in which
a centralized coordinator controls several distributed applications using the contextual information they
provide. The communication between the coordinator and the distributed applications requires an in-
frastructure, such as a WiFi, a 3G or a wired network. In terms of context-awareness this architecture
provides various benefits. In particular, sensor reading errors are identified by comparing readings from
different sources, and interferences between different applications are prevented by having a centralized
coordinator. With a certain approximation, middleware centric systems can be considered an evolution
of client server distributed systems using also contextual information. Note that in this architecture the
context-aware clients tend to be as simple as possible, their coordinator is delegated for all the compu-
tation by forwarding all the information and waiting for a command. In this thesis we do not focus on
context-aware applications which are part of a middleware-centric system, because their implementation
tend to be trivial. Instead we focus on those stand alone context aware applications which gather and
compute environmental information by themselves. When such applications are part of a distributed
system they consider information coming from the system, as part of their context, and therefore they
are still able to take decisions independently from the rest of the system. Please note that with a cer-
tain abstraction the coordinator of a middleware-centric system can also be considered as a standalone
application receiving data from remote clients, therefore they can also be validated with the techniques
described in this thesis.
The basic way of validating a CAAA is to feed the application with various environmental inputs
and to observe its resulting behavior. Depending on the knowledge that we have on the application there
are three ways in which an application can be validated. If the application is a black box, meaning that we
do not have any information about its internal structure, we cannot monitor its internal configuration and
that we cannot change or instrument its source code, it can be validated by executing it inside a controlled
environment. For instance, mobile applications can be executed in an emulator, simulating a certain
environment and observing how the application reacts [SRb]. This approach has various limitations: it
requires an oracle to detect failures; it is not trivial to decide which context need to be generated; user
input may also need to be emulated; it requires an adequacy criterion to terminate the validation and it is
not trivial to trace failures to their causing source. In addition, this approach can be used to validate user
defined configurations only if those are known a priory and if they are part of the simulation. However,
it cannot be used for runtime validation of user defined configurations. If it is possible to manipulate
the application’s code, for instance by instrumenting it, then we can validate the application by forcing
the execution of certain execution path and by monitoring the results. This approach is discussed in
Section 2.3. This approach is very effective in detecting bugs in the source code, but cannot detect issues
related to user defined configurations. If we can design or extract a model describing how the application
reacts to environmental changes then we can validate such model. A model can also be extracted from
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user configurations and those can also be validated. The latter approach is applied in this thesis because
we want to focus on user defined configurations.
CAAAs suffer from concurrency issues as a result of the asynchronous updates from their connected
sensors. Concurrency and race condition have been broadly studied in the literature. In his work Sen
uses potential data race information obtained from a dynamic analysis technique to control a random
scheduler of threads so that real race conditions get created with very high probability and those races
get resolved randomly at runtime [Sen08]. Similarly Lei and Carver [LC06] use reachability testing
to generate synchronization sequences automatically and on-the-fly. Although this potential data races
also occurs in CAAAs the issues here is deeper. CAAAs use multiple sensor reading representing the
same contextual information or information related to each other. Preventing data races solves issues
caused by threads reading and writing the same variables but it does not prevent the application from
computing various context information inconsistent between each other. This and similar techniques
need not only to prevent race conditions but also understand the contextual-meaning of each variable. A
race-safe execution can still lead to a fault due to the internal inconsistence between multiple variables
representing the same information.
Previous works on testing context-aware applications have identified the existence of context vari-
ables and the need of sharing those variables between multiple threads both updating and reading them.
This has also been identified as one of the major source for failures in CAAAs. In other terms, multiple
sensors are read by multiple threads, which store the read values in variables which are representing the
context inside the application [LCT06]. These context variables are then accessed by the application to
perform some computation. The thread reading or depending on those variables are not aware of when
those contextual values have been updated or when their value will be refreshed. Similarly, the threads
looping to refresh such variables are not aware of the impact that overwriting that variable will have on
the computation.
For instance, consider a scenario in which a thread U is updating a Boolean context variable b and
another thread R will need to read that variable twice. In particular, consider the sequence in which b
is false and R reads it, U updates it to true, and then R reads it again. This simple sequence generates
a paradox in which b had two values during the same computation and in which the result computed
by R may be inconsistent. To address this problem Wang et al. [WER07b], and Lu et al. [LCT06] use
code analysis to detect context-dependent variables or codes attempting to identify and remove those
execution paths in which the context has become inconsistent. In general, by observing in the execution
graph of these context variables and context-aware program point (CAPP) it is possible to understand if
the context has become inconsistent and to abort the computation.
From a testing point of view, by controlling the preemption of different threads, it is also possible
to identify execution paths, in which those variables are used. Sequences of paths can be executed on the
system under test until some adequacy criterion has been satisfied. Both these research works suggest
their own set of adequacy criteria based on the execution of specific sets of drivers in order to cover all
the possible paths in which contextual variables are assigned and used.
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Lu et al. [LCT06] apply their work to an industrial application driving a conveyor belt. For such
application in which the context-aware thread and the algorithm are part of the implementation, this and
similar techniques work perfectly. The execution of all possible paths suffers from scalability issues
on the number of threads and variables, which is another limitation of this approach. In addition code
analysis requires the logic of the computation to be part of the code. In these modern applications the
logic is not written in the application, but instead is loaded either from a configuration file or from a
database.
The research work in this thesis focuses mainly on those applications built on top of existing frame-
works and middlewares, with particular interest in those applications in which the logic is loaded and
applied at runtime (i.e. user defined).
2.2 General Purpose Model Checking and Validation Techniques
In the field of software verification and testing the techniques that we apply in this thesis can be classi-
fied as model checking and software validation. Model checking is an automatic technique for verifying
finite-state reactive systems, such as sequential circuit designs and communication protocols. Specifica-
tions are expressed in temporal logic, and the reactive system is modeled as a statetransition graph. An
efficient search procedure is used to determine whether or not the state-transition graph satisfies the spec-
ifications [Cla97]. Those software capable of perform this automated verification are known as model
checkers.
Among them SPIN [Hol03] is an examples of a model checker using properties expressed in Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL). SPIN is based on a language called Promela which is a verification modeling
language. However the abstractions and the structures of distributed systems which Promela provides
have a different level of abstraction from the ones which are required to validate a CAAAs. Although it
would be possible, it would require a serious effort to model a CAAA with Promela. In addition time is
only one of the multiple context which CAAAs use, therefore LTL is also a limit. For instance consider
the LTL predicate P : f(t). If we consider time as part of the context (as it normally is) then we can also
define P ′ : f(C) where C represent the context. P ′ is expressed in some sort of context-driven logic
and it is more suitable to define conditions on a CAAAs. This kind of formalism is possible in other
languages such as PDDL [GL97] which is unfortunately not supported by existing model checkers.
Another interesting tool is Java Path Finder (JPF) [HP00] which translates a given Java program into a
Promela model, which then can be model checked using Spin. The Java program may contain assertions,
which are translated into similar assertions in the Promela model. The Spin model checker will then look
for deadlocks and violations of any stated assertions. Eventually developers could use the Java assertion
mechanism to write constraint in their CAAAs and use JPF to validate them. On the other hand this
approach is only semi automated as it still requires developers to write their own assertions.
Other model checkers such as PRISM [KNP02], known as probabilistic model checkers are capable
of validate probabilistic automata (PAs) and probabilistic timed automata (PAs) using a discrete-event
simulation engine. This kind of model checkers not only can verify if a certain condition is met but also
with which probability within a certain amount of time. Although this kind of information is useful our
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intent is not to predict what will happen but to verify what can happen wrong.
More sophisticated techniques such as static and dynamic source code analysis [Bin07] represent
the internal execution of an application using data structures such as the Control-Flow Graph (CFG), the
Value-Dependence Graph (VDG) or even a finite-state automata. All of such representations can also be
used to validate and detect a given pattern. For instance Christodorescu and Jha [CJ03] used static anal-
ysis to detect malicious patterns making it possible to detect malicious code in the application under test.
This together with symbolic execution [Kin76] could be eventually used to craft various combinations of
inputs which can trigger certain fault conditions. However, the kind of fault condition that we are trying
to validate in this thesis require an higher abstraction level, identifying context variables, adaptation and
states which is hard to get using source code analysis or symbolic execution. It may be possible to use
annotations and code instrumentation to provide the required abstraction level. For instance it could
be possible to annotate all the context readings and to trace their path in the CFG as done by Wang et
al. [WER07b].
2.3 OBDDs and Symbolic Computation
Most of the modern model checker and system using a large quantity of boolean variables handle them
with the support of a data structure known as Ordered Binary Decision Diagram (OBDD). Ordered
Binary Decision Diagrams have been particularly successful in the last two decades because they offer,
a much more compact representation of Boolean functions with respect to other canonical forms (e.g.,
conjunctive/disjunctive normal forms) [Bry86]. During the implementation of the validation techniques
presented in this Thesis we also used OBDDs to improve the scalability and the speed of our algorithms.
Here we present a brief explanation of how OBDD works and how they can be used. The reader will
need this knowledge to better understand the following chapters.
A Boolean variable x is a variable whose value is either 0 or 1. A Boolean function of n Boolean
variables is a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Boolean formula can be seen as Boolean functions. For
instance, the Boolean formula x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3) can be seen as the Boolean function f(x1, x2, x3) =
x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3), with x1, x2, x3 ∈ {0, 1}.
A rooted, directed graph G can be associated to every Boolean function f(x1, . . . , xn) by impos-
ing an ordering on the variables x1, . . . , xn, and by reducing the graph (in the sense explained below)
[Bry86]. The graph G is called the Ordered Binary Decision Diagram of f . For instance, the reduced
graph associated with the Boolean function f(x1, x2, x3) = x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3) is depicted in Figure 2.1
(b), by “simplifying” the graph depicted in Figure 2.1 (a). Formally, a graph is reduced by iteratively
eliminating the vertexes which are the root of two isomorphic subgraphs, and by merging isomorphic
subgraphs. A graph is said to be reduced if it contains no isomorphic subgraphs and no vertexes v and
v′ such that the sub-graphs rooted at v and v′ are isomorphic. We assume here that the left child of
a vertex corresponds to the choice of the value 0 (i.e., false) for the variable preceding it, while the
right child correspond to the choice of the value 1 (i.e., true). Thus, the leftmost path of Figure 2.1 (a)
corresponds to an assignment of 0 to all variables and, consequently, to the value 0 to the expression
f(x1, x2, x3) = x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3).
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Figure 2.1: OBDD example for f = x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3).
State Boolean vector Boolean formula
S1 (1, 1) x1 ∧ x2
S2 (1, 0) x1 ∧ ¬x2
S3 (0, 1) ¬x1 ∧ x2
Table 2.1: Example of Boolean encoding.
It is shown in [Bry86] that, given a fixed ordering of the Boolean variables x1, . . . , xn, the reduced
graph of any Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is unique. Thus is, OBDDs are a canonical
representation for Boolean functions.
Boolean operators can be applied to Boolean functions; for instance the disjunction operator ∨ can
be applied to two Boolean functions f1 and f2 to obtain a third Boolean function f3 = f1 ∨ f2 allowing
Boolean calculus to be applied to OBDDs.
The use of OBDDs to represent states and transitions has been proposed by [McM93]. The key
idea here is to represent states (and sets of states) as Boolean formula which, in turn, can be en-
coded as OBDDs. As an example, consider the set of states S = {S∞,S∈,S3} and the relation
R = {(S∞,S∈), (S∈,S3), (S3,S∞)} (i.e., a simple loop). Let N = dlog2|S|e; in our example N = 2.
Each element S ∈ S is associated with a vector of Boolean variables x = (x1, . . . , xN ); that is, each
element of S is associated with a tuple of {0, 1}N . Each tuple x = (x1, . . . , xN ) is then identified with
a Boolean formula, represented by a conjunction of literals, that is, a conjunction of variables or their
negation.1 It is assumed that the value 0 in a tuple corresponds to a negation. The encoding of the states
in our example is given in Table 2.1.
1By slight abuse of notation, the same symbols xi(i ∈ {1, . . . , N}) are used to denote both Boolean variables in a vector and
atomic propositions in logical formulae.
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Sets of states are encoded by taking the disjunction of the Boolean formula encoding the single
states. For instance, the set of states {S1, S3} from the example in Table 2.1 is encoded by the Boolean
formula f = (x1 ∧ x2) ∨ (¬x1 ∧ x2).
A new set of “primed” variables (x′1, . . . , x
′
N ) is introduced to encode the relation between two
states S, S′ ∈ S . In particular, if SRS ′ holds, then S is encoded using the non-primed variables, S′ is
encoded using the primed variables, and the relation SRS ′ is expressed as a Boolean formula by taking
the conjunction of the encoding for S and S′. The whole relation R ⊆ S × S is encoded as a Boolean
formula by taking the disjunction of all the transitions in R. In our example, the transition relation is
encoded by the following Boolean formula fR:
fR(x1, x2, x
′
1, x
′
2) = ((x1 ∧ x2) ∧ (x′1 ∧ ¬x′2))∨
((x1 ∧ ¬x2) ∧ (¬x′1 ∧ x′2)) ∨ ((¬x1 ∧ x2) ∧ (x′1 ∧ x′2))
2.4 Planners and PDDL
At the end of this Thesis we propose a planner-based validation technique as an alternative approach.
The use of planner to solve satisfiability problems is not new to the literature [Ede08, ABM09], however
as far as we know, planners where never used to validate context aware applications. In this thesis we
benefit from similarities between the planning domain definition language and rule-driven computation
which is driving the adaptation mechanism of most of the CAAAs.
From a general point of view, planners are designed to solve a reachability problem (i.e., how to
reach some goal), and to report the trace leading to the goal from the initial state. Typically, planners
implement heuristics and other efficient techniques for their operation, and in this sense they may be
more suitable than model checkers for certain classes of problems.
The Planning Domain Definition Language (PDDL) is a LISP-like language for the definition of
planning domains and problems, developed by the model-based planning community as a standard lan-
guage for planning competitions [GL97]. A PDDL planning problem is a domain augmented with a set
of goals and constraints that define one planning instance with respect to a given model. The following
two listings report a classical planning example encoding a scenario in which a certain number of blocks
need to be moved on a table to achieve a desired final configuration.
This code describes a domain called blocks-worlds-domain, which requires three features,
listed after the requirements keyword: the possibility of using conditional effects and equalities,
and the support for a STRIPS-like syntax [RN03]. The domain contains a constant Table, and three
predicates: (on ?x ?y), (clear ?x), and (block ?b). The notation ?x denotes a placeholder
for a certain object; the predicate (on ?x ?y) takes two arguments and its intuitive meaning is that
object ?x is on top of object ?y. The predicate (clear ?x) is used to express the fact that nothing
is on top of ?x, and the predicate (block ?b) denotes that ?b is an actual block. The (:action
section contains the declaration of how the domain evolves. In this particular case, the only action is
called puton and takes three parameters ?X, ?Y and ?Z, with the intuitive meaning of removing a
block ?X from ?Z and placing it on top of ?Y. The precondition section of the action lists a set of
27 2.4. Planners and PDDL
Algorithm 1 Simple PDDL domain example.
; Domain definition
(define (domain blocks-world-domain)
(:requirements :strips :equality :conditional-effects)
(:constants Table)
(:predicates (on ?x ?y) (clear ?x) (block ?b))
(:action puton
:parameters (?X ?Y ?Z)
:precondition
(and
(on ?X ?Z)
(clear ?X)
(clear ?Y)
(not (= ?Y ?Z))
(not (= ?X ?Z))
(not (= ?X ?Y))
(not (= ?X Table))
)
:effect
(and
(on ?X ?Y)
(not (on ?X ?Z))
(when
(not (= ?Z Table))
(clear ?Z)
)
(when
(not (= ?Y Table))
(not (clear ?Y))
)
)
)
)
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constraints, expressed as a Boolean combination of predicates over the parameters, that must be true for
the action to be “enabled” (notice the use of equality). Similarly, the effects of the action are listed in
the :effect section as a Boolean combination of predicates (notice the use of the when keyword to
express conditionals).
PDDL domains provide a general description of how a blocks-world looks like; concrete instances
of this domain are defined in problem files, such as the one reported below:
Algorithm 2 Simple PDDL problem example.
; Goal definition
(define (problem tower-invert3)
(:domain blocks-world-domain)
(:objects A B C)
(:init
(block A)
(block B)
(block C)
(block Table)
(on A B)
(on B C)
(on C Table)
(clear A)
(clear Table))
(:goal
(and
(on B C)
(on C A)
)
)
)
Each problem has a name (tower-invert3 in this case), and it must be an instance of a certain
domain. In this particular example, the problem contains three objects A, B, and C, in addition to the
constant Table. The keyword :init defines the initial state of the problem: the three objects and the
Table are blocks, and initially A is on top of B, B is on top of C, C is on top of the Table, and A and the
Table are clear. The final goal is to achieve an inverted situation: B should be on top of C, and C should
be on top of A. The solution to this problem is a sequence of actions defined in the domain to achieve
the desired goal, or an error message if the goal cannot be achieved. In the particular example above, a
solution is simply a sequence of moves puton to achieve the desired configuration.
PDDL domains can include a number of other requirements, such as typing, durative actions, con-
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straints, etc. For the purposes of our work we employ fluents [Thi05]. The fluent calculus extends the
standard semantics of PDDL by providing the notion of states. The standard PDDL semantics defines
a predicate for each single logical property which needs to be modelled; for instance, three predicates
are needed to denote the fact that an object can be of three possible colours. This may result in quite
a large predicate space. However, multiple predicates can be avoided by defining single logical atomic
properties called fluents whose value can be set, compared and retrieved.
Various planners are available to solve PDDL planning problems with the extensions mentioned
above; we refer to the proceedings of the International Conference on Automated Planning and Schedul-
ing (ICAPS [ICA]) for further details. For the purposes of this work we use SGPlan [CwHW04] and
MIPS-XXL [EJN06] because they implement all the PDDL3 features that we required.
2.5 About Locale
Among the CAAAs that we have examined during the progress of this thesis one captured our attention.
In this commercial application the developers took some very particular design decisions in what we
assume was an attempt of preventing certain context-based faults from happening. We decided to discuss
this design decisions here to show how developers could make their application more robust.
Winner of the Android Developer Challenge, Locale is a context based phone profiler. The user,
through a very intuitive configuration GUI, sets up a list of predicates based on various contextual con-
ditions, and associates to each of those predicates an action. When a predicate is satisfied the action
associated with the predicate is performed. Actions include changes in the device configuration, various
notifications to the user and the possibility to start third-party applications.
Due to its similarity with our running example, Locale developers had to face failures similar to
the ones described in this thesis. Since the adaptation logic is designed by the user through the GUI at
runtime, the user can potentially apply a configuration affected by context-awareness faults.
To prevent such faulty configurations to be executed it would be possible to validate it at runtime,
either on the device or by sending it to a remote Web Service, and to propose possible corrections. Both
these solutions can be implemented by using the validation algorithms proposed by this thesis.
However Locale developers, instead of verifying the correctness of the user input, decided to prevent
the user from applying a fault prone input by imposing a set of limitations on the input itself. It is
interesting to observe how such limitation indeed prevent several faults from happening:
1. In Locale the user specifies predicates, and when one of those predicates is satisfied, the device
adapts to a state in which that predicate is satisfied and the action related to that predicate is per-
formed. However the user has also to order such predicates with a strong priority order, meaning
that when a predicate with higher priority is applied the ones with lower priority are not evaluated.
If a predicate with higher priority than the predicate of the state currently applied is satisfied, then
Locale adapts to the new state. With this simple limitation Locale developers have protected their
users from adapting nondeterministically and all the drawbacks discussed in Section 5.1.1.
2. In Locale users can assign actions which will be performed after an adaptation. To prevent such
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actions from creating side effects, the Locale developers do not allow action to turn off sensors
which could have been used to sense the context and to evaluate predicates. By introducing this
limitation Locale developers have protected their users from those faults which in Section 5.2.4
we will call state invariant violations.
3. Locale users can specify predicates triggering certain behaviors. Those predicates are evaluated
by their priority order. As long as a some predicate is satisfied Locale only allows adaptations to
states identified by predicates with a higher priority level than the current one. If a predicate with a
high level of priority is almost always satisfied it would prevent predicates with lower priority from
being triggered causing rule/state liveness faults. To prevent these faults, the Locale developers
forced users to use only conjunctions and negations in the predicate definition and to use each
single context at most once. The more users aggregate conjunctions over different context, the
more they are narrowing the space of values satisfying predicates. Moreover, since they can only
use each context at most once, they cannot design tautologies such as A ∧ ¬A. In Appendix A
we describe how predicates over the same context suffer also from hazards. Predicates without
disjunctions are by design less vulnerable to hazards.
By examining these limitation that the developers have imposed on the definition of predicates
in Locale we can easily assume that during various tests, users experienced some of the faults we are
addressing and that developers have preferred to reduce the possibility of their occurrence rather than
validating the set of rules as we do in this Thesis 2. Note that since all these limitations apply to a single
rule, faults can still occur as a result of multiple predicates. For instance it is possible to design two high
priority predicates P1 = A and P2 = ¬A which will cause what in Section 5.2.2 we will call rule/state
liveness fault in all the predicates/states with lower priority.
2.6 Terminology
Before continuing in next chapter, we should define some of the terms which, we will use in the rest of
this Thesis.
System: with system we refer to the application, to all the devices or infrastructures are running
together with their surrounding environment in which they interact. For instance for a mobile application,
by system we indicate the application and the device including the sensors which are used and the
surrounding environment. For a distributed application with the system we mean the whole composition
of all its distributed components plus the network or the infrastructure that the application is using to
communicate and the resources that are being used.
Application: with application we refer to all the software parts of a system including software
components as well as resource and configuration files.
Middleware: with middleware we refer to a task specific layer of the application which is used as an
interconnection between other layers or to create a certain level of abstraction. Middleware are normally
independent software component which are embedded in the application to ease its development.
2We can only assume because the Locale developers did not reply to any of our emails.
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Context-aware: any system or an application that is actively using sensor readings from its sur-
rounding context as inputs to fulfill its purpose, we refer to as context-aware. With this definition a
pacemaker can be considered as context aware because it use the frequency of the patient heart beat to
administrate an electrical charge. At the same time an heart beat monitor is not context-aware because is
simply monitoring the context and is not actively using it.
Fault: with fault we indicate an issue in the implementation or in the definition of a software
component which can cause the system not to meet its specifications or not to fulfill its intended purpose.
Failure: with failure we indicate the variation from the expected behavior observed by the user or
by a monitoring system as a result of a fault.
Error: with error we indicate the incorrect state in which the system is in, after a fault has occurred.
Chapter 3
A Model of the Architecture of CAAAs
This and the following chapters extend and complete a research work aiming to define a common high
level architecture and a fault taxonomy for CAAAs [SRWE08b, SRWE10]. These previous works have
been extended with an overview of CAAAs’ architecture at different stages of their evolution which can
help the readers foresee the future evolutions and with the addition of examples describing commercial
applications which were suffering by context-awareness or adaptation faults.
Simultaneously, and sometimes independently from their users, CAAAs constantly monitor the
context, elaborate read information and, if necessary, adapt. In other terms this context awareness means
that the application stores and computes variables containing contextual information and that its behavior
is based upon the value of certain of these variables. In Section 3.1.3 we name a set of variables repre-
senting the context as a view on the context. As it will be explained in this Chapter, CAAAs normally
have at least three of such views, which are computed hierarchically.
By isolating components handling such views it is possible to identify a general common high level
architecture for CAAAs. By means of this architectural model CAAAs can be cut horizontally in a stack
of logical layers. Each layer represents a level of abstraction from the physical environment in which the
application is being executed and provides to the above layers a more refined view on the context. In this
Chapter we identify three of such layers of which, the top one is application dependent and represents the
behaviors which a CAAA can assume; and the two lower ones represents how the application retrieves
the context and how the context is computed in order to decide whether the application has to adapt or
not.
This novel layered context-driven architecture supports developer and software testing engineers to
understand and prevents common faults which can happen in this kind of applications. Traditional bug
reporting tools classify faults in terms of how they can be reproduced by human interaction, which can
hardly represent faults happening in proactive responses to context changes. In Section 4.2 we introduce
a novel taxonomy dedicated to context aware faults. Faults are classified in terms of which context can
trigger them and of which view they affect.
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Figure 3.1: Canonical Architecture of Context-Aware Adaptive Applications.
3.1 A General Architecture
CAAAs have common characteristics which distinguish them from other applications types. Identifying
such characteristics is the base for more specific analysis on CAAAs. Unlike other applications, CAAAs
also monitor the context in parallel with their other application task and, when opportune, modify their
behavior according to the new situation. Starting from this general point of view it is possible to define
a first simple but effective architectural model.
The context-awareness execution flow starts by monitoring the environment often with parallel mul-
tiple threads and ends up by applying a different application behavior when necessary. With environment
we represent both the surrounding physical environment, as well as any external configuration or param-
eters which the CAAA needs to use and to which it may have access. It is rather difficult to give a formal
definition to what an applicative behavior is, as it depends on the nature of the application itself. In gen-
eral applicative behaviors describe all the different modes in which an application can operate, meaning
that to the same input, and with the same configuration, the application will produce a different output
depending on the current operational mode. Note that such application is still deterministic because its
response can be predicted by knowing the mode in which it is operating.
As depicted in Figure 3.1, we can model a layered architecture in which, on top of the surrounding
environment an event-driven Context Manager collects and maintains low-level context information,
and an Adaptation Manager queries and processes the current context values on behalf of the CAAA
and automatically triggers adaptive behavior by the CAAA.
Context Manager and Adaptation Manager are the two most important macro-components of which
the pervasive part of a CAAA is composed. Their implementation changed through the time according
to the CAAAs evolutionary process which was explained in Section 1.1. Figure 3.2 depicts in detail how
Context Manager and Adaptation Manager evolved at every step of the evolutionary chain of CAAAs.
These architectures are the ones that we considered being the most interesting but variations are also pos-
sible. For instance developers with specific requirements may re-implement/customize existing layers to
their needs.
Figure 3.2 also underlines which layers of the CAAA are given, as part of a framework/middleware
and which ones need to be implemented by application’s developers.
For embedded or industrial applications in which the hardware is custom or not-standard, develop-
34 3.1. A General Architecture
Figure 3.2: Evolution in the architecture of CAAAs
ers are responsible for the whole implementation. Applications built with this architecture are, generally,
tightly coupled to a specific hardware and their users have very few (or even none) configuration op-
tions. In this first architecture applications have no support from external/existing components. The
ContextManager reads raw values directly from the hardware and has to filter them before passing them
to above layers. Similarly also the Adaptation Manager has no adaptation support and, in addition to the
adaptation logic, it also directly switches application’s behaviors. In CAAAs following this architecture
the adaptation logic is normally hard coded, and tightly coupled with other application components.
In the presence of standard hardware the ContextManager’s implementation is greatly simplified,
as provided drivers take care of the data readings, and noise filtering. Still the ContextManager commu-
nicates directly with the drivers strictly limiting the portability of the application. Deploying on devices
with different sensors or even with a different version of the driver will require a strong maintenance.
With the advent of standard frameworks such as the Java ME platform [Sun09] the portability
issue is solved with the introduction of an additional layer between the ContextManager and the drivers.
The introduction of such layer has been possible with the definition of open standards respected by
associations of device manufacturer and with the implementation of a set of open source APIs.
Frameworks make it possible to deploy a CAAA on multiple devices but still require the Con-
textManager to interact with an heterogeneous set of APIs and the Adaptation Manager to apply adap-
tations directly.
Context-awareness middlewares have been introduced to address exactly these two limitations. An
additional layer on top of the framework’s API simplifies the acquisition of contextual variables making
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often transparent to developers how a certain information was obtained. An extra layer has also been
introduced between the Adaptation Manager and the application supporting adaptations. With the addi-
tion of these two extra layers the ContextManager focuses on when and which contextual information are
read without considering how, similarly the Adaptation Manager focuses on when and which adaptation
to apply without specifying how to apply them.
By being able to focus on the adaptation logic, developers have been able to increase its complexity
often with the support of various additional technologies. Although typically some form of rule process-
ing is employed, leading to rule-based adaptations [SRWE08b, SRWE08a] in which implemented rules
define, at least in part, the application behavior. These rules are typically specified in terms of logical
predicates over variables representing context readings [CEM03a, SRa]. Alternatively, in some cases the
presence of context variables can be represented better through probability-based predicates, in which
case stochastic models are used [ZLS+08, KKKM06].
The next evolutionary step, to which we are assisting now, is the introduction of a Configuration-
Manager. At runtime the CAAA is fed with a configuration file, which could be standardized and there-
fore completely application independent. This configuration file is used by the ConfigurationManager
to generate at runtime both ContextManager and Adaptation Manager. Such ConfigurationManager
could be either a component of a certain CAAA or part of a context-awareness middleware. CAAAs
developer provides GUI and tools to help the end user in creating its own configuration file. At runtime
the architecture of such novel CAAAs is the same as the one depicted in Figure 3.1, however their im-
plementation is quite different and it does not provide a static implementation of ContextManager and
Adaptation Manager.
3.1.1 Views on the Context
As depicted in Figure 3.1, the layered architecture of CAAAs gives rise to four different views of the
context—the physical context, the sensed context, the inferred context and the presumed context. At any
given point during the execution of a CAAA, all four of these views may differ from each other.
Starting from the external environment, which embodies the physical context, the Context Manager
loads environmental information by using available sensors. Each sensor works independently from the
others, and they sense context asynchronously with respect to each other, possibly via multiple threads.
In this way the Context Manager generates the sensed context, which is a discretization of the physical
context created by multiple sensors at different times.
Asynchronously with respect to the sensing thread(s), the Adaptation Manager uses the sensed con-
text to determine when to perform an adaptation. Such decisions are made based on the evaluation of a
set of adaptation predicates. Generally, these are Boolean predicates whose evaluation produces the in-
ferred context, representing a set of higher-level concepts inferred about the external environment. Once
any relevant predicates are satisfied, an adaptation is triggered, and the application behavior changes
to match the presumed context, which represents a high level, application-oriented view of the external
environment. In some applications the presumed context simply corresponds to an implicit, conceptual
view represented by a particular configuration or composition of components. In others it is realized
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explicitly through particular state variables or parameters.
Ideally, the physical context and presumed context always should be consistent with each other and
represent the same situation. However, this may not happen for several different reasons, depending
on the sequences of assignments and accesses to context variables between the different layers. An
inconsistency between the physical context and presumed context may be caused by a fault, which itself
may lead to a failure of the CAAA. The kinds of faults that may arise, and thus the kinds of failures that
may occur, are determined in part by the choice of adaptation technology, as we show in this thesis.
3.1.2 An Example of Multiple Views of the Context
Before going into more detail and examining variables in each layer of the architecture, we clarify the
idea of multiple views of the context with an example.
Consider a mobile CAAA that redirects incoming calls from a mobile phone to a Bluetooth hands-
free system when the user is driving. Assume the physical context to be
The user is in a car equipped with a Bluetooth hands-free system.
The sensed context, assuming that the CAAA would be using Bluetooth, would be something like
Bluetooth device 00:01:E4:AC:34:71 was detected.
This information is then evaluated and will produce the following inferred context:
It is true that the car’s hands-free system is in range.
Using this inferred context, an adaptation will be performed, the application will connect to the hands-
free system using a pre-established key, and then the presumed context will become
The user is driving, and incoming calls are diverted to the hands-free.
This adaptation has been successful, and the user, without any interaction, is now able to use the phone
hands-free.
Even for a simple scenario like this, CAAA adaptation can become complex. For example, as
described, the sensed context does not explicitly specify if the user is the driver. That information is
presumed by the fact that the hands-free system was detected. To avoid misinterpretation of the context
and to constrain the adaptation, the application would require additional sensors capable of identifying
whether the user is driving, or additional logic to detect the presence of multiple people in the car.
3.1.3 Propagation of a Context Change through the Layers
The layered architecture has an impact on how variables representing contextual information are pro-
cessed. In particular, to generate the different views of the context, each layer of the architecture handles
a set of variables and converts context values to a form appropriate for its needs. Figure 3.3 depicts the
life-cycle of a context variable as it is converted to different forms in the layers.1 Each triangle at the
bottom of the pyramid typically represents a context variable, continuously refreshed. Those variables
1Note that the three levels of Figure 3.3 correspond to the top three layers of Figure 3.1. The physical context has no represen-
tation in terms of variables because it represents the real environment, external to the system.
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Figure 3.3: Propagation of a Change in the Context.
are combined into context predicates, which is represented by the second level of the pyramid. Context
predicates are evaluated to adapt in a configuration, depicted in the top of the pyramid, which is suitable
for the current presumed context.
Refreshing the sensed context. At the bottom of the propagation pyramid are context variables
read directly from sensors. These variables can have multiple formats, and their structure depends on how
complex the context is that they represent. For instance, time can be used to order events sequentially, in
which case it can be represented simply by an integer. But if time is used to identify a specific date and
time, then a data structure such as a GregorianCalendar object is needed.
Regardless of their type, sensed variables must be refreshed. Middleware support for context
refreshing comes in the form of two common context handler interfaces: an asynchronous call-
back [Pro06a, Ope08a, Jav00] and a synchronous get [Ope08b]. In both cases, the middleware may
require negotiating the precision of the retrieved value or the refresh rate. For instance, the Location API
of J2ME [Pro06a] requires negotiating the precision of the retrieved location as well as the frequency of
updates and will throw an exception if the required precision is too high. Note that this sensing activity
is not synchronized and that refresh rates can vary dramatically. For instance, in the Java Platform Micro
Edition [Sun09], the system clock has a refresh rate of 1 millisecond, the GPS sensor refreshes every
few seconds [Pro06a], and the Bluetooth sensor refreshes almost once a minute [Jav00].
Each context variable is refreshed by CAAAs also monitor the context in parallel with their other
applicative task and, when a single context handler. Those context handlers work independently of each
other and asynchronously suspend, update and loop. This implies that different context variables are
refreshed independently even if they are sensing the same phenomenon in the environment, and thus
they may be inconsistent with each other.
Computing the inferred context. The second layer of the pyramid contains the context predicates
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used to compute the inferred context. Each predicate can be evaluated over multiple context variables
and is stored in Boolean variables representing the inferred context. There may be many such predi-
cates and Boolean variables used to compute the inferred context, and so it is not necessarily the case
that these Boolean variables are fewer in number than the context variables over which they are evalu-
ated. As previously discussed, the implementation of this layer varies across CAAAs and middleware
(e.g., rule-based [CEM03a, AMNT08], stochastic [ZLS+08, KKKM06], hybrid [LCT08, WER07c]).
Irrespective of the implementation, some representation of the inferred context is needed ultimately to
support decision making by the Adaptation Manager.
Given that the predicates in this layer may include multiple context variables, the different refresh
rates and choice of interfaces with which those contexts are sensed can lead to the incorrect evaluation
of a predicate. This in turn will result in the incorrect inferred context and perhaps an inappropriate
adaption. To address this issue, adaptation managers often delay a full predicate evaluation until other
conditions are satisfied (e.g., other relevant variables are refreshed within a threshold, sensed variables
lead to consistent state), sacrificing adaptation performance for stability [SRWE08a, LCT08].
Adapting and setting the presumed context. Once a predicate or a set of predicates is evaluated
and triggers an adaptation, the CAAA adapts to match the environment by generating a presumed context
(as shown in top level of the pyramid). The form of these top-level contextual variables again depends on
the implementation. They can be state variables or more complex configuration of components aiming to
achieve a certain task (e.g., to connect a mobile device to the car’s hands-free system through Bluetooth).
3.2 Related Work
Several works in the literature propose context-awareness middlewares to support and simplify the im-
plementation of the internal logic. Mainly in those middlewares the internal logic is rule-based or state-
based, and it is dynamically loaded from a configuration file or from a database. Among those, Carisma
[CEM03b] and ContextNotifier [SR07] loads trees of logic gates which are used to filter the context and
activate a trigger.
In the attempt of solving the problem of inconsistent data reading certain middlewares provides
additional contextual information acquiring them from external sources which can be both local or dis-
tributed. Sensay [SSF+03], connects to the application an external programmable box with multiple
sensors which performs real time computation on the received data.
Similarly certain middlewares apply a sensor-server-client architectural model, which is known as
middleware centric context aware model. This model has been broadly adopted for industrial monitoring
in which clients receives on demand only a small amount of the computed data while the server is moni-
toring the whole factory. The benefit of this architecture is that the server will continuously compute the
context independently from the clients allowing them to go in standby to spare battery. The drawback is
that clients disconnected from the server do not receive updates from the context. Nokia research applied
the idea of a centralized context-aware middleware and developed its own middleware (MUPE) [RS04]
and a script language for context specification (CSP) [Lak03]. CEP is an XML-based language trying to
formalize context exchange between a client and a server. Base element for CEP are logical connectors,
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atomic values and script actions.
Certain middlewares implements a bidirectional communication allowing the server to receive part
of the context directly from its multiple clients also allowing their interaction. ContextPhone [ROPT05]
uses an online jabber server to store users’ status, and a Symbian OS implementation for smartphone as
stand-alone client. Users are instantaneously notified by their buddies status, location and other contex-
tual information. Once again clients are completely dependent on the server, strictly requiring a constant
communication which drains the battery.
Chapter 4
Taxonomy of Faults in CAAAs
During the course of this research work we came across several failures in the CAAAs that we were
examining. In addition to traditional failures CAAAs suffer from peculiar failures caused by faults in
their adaptive and context-aware components. These peculiar failures are hard to replicate and it is
difficult to describe why they can happen. The existing bug-tracking tools are often almost worthless
in classifying them, reducing error reports to mere verbal descriptions. These descriptions vary from
simple descriptions of the effect, such as “this is supposed to happen but sometimes it does not”, to more
detailed instructions of how to reproduce the failure such us “run the application, activate the GPS, turn
the application off and on again, then re-activate the GPS”.
In Chapter 3 we defined an architecture capable of describing CAAAs’ adaptive mechanisms. We
observed that describing CAAAs’ failures in terms of layers of such an architecture was helping us
isolate and fix the causing fault. Starting from this intuition we felt that it was possible to provide quality
assurances with instruments to formally classify faults and failures.
In this chapter, in Section 4.1 we describe seven CAAAs which we have examined during our
research and we present eleven unique context-aware and adaptive faults affecting them. In Section 4.2
we define a taxonomy capable of classifying such faults over multiple dimensions. We conclude the
chapter by classifying the faults we presented with our taxonomy and by showing how such classification,
not only can help in identifying the faults but also may underline weakness or vulnerability in the whole
application.
4.1 Faults in the CAAAs We Studied
In this section we explore, in addition to PhoneAdapter which was introduced in Section 4.1.1, six
other CAAAs utilizing different middleware and a wide range of context information, and we describe
some of the faults and failures we have observed associated with their architectural layering and the
incorrect propagation of context information. We then conclude the chapter by presenting a taxonomy
of CAAA faults and failures that represents a preliminary attempt to synthesize our experience with
these four applications, and we apply the taxonomy to the faults and failures we observed. Table 4.1
presents a summary of the CAAAs we have studied, including a description of the context and underlying
middleware used.
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These artifacts have been selected in order to give the reader a complete view of which faults
may happen and how they are perceived by the end user. PhoneAdapter and GPS-Recorder have been
implemented during the course of this research as running examples and their faults will be examined
in details the following chapters. TourApp is well known application used as a benchmark for context-
awareness testing. TourApp has been included to show how known faults detected by other researches
fits in our taxonomy. The conveyor belt example has been included because it is the running example of
closely related work and also because it is a good example of a CAAA not build upon a context-awareness
middleware [LCT08]. PowerManager and Timeriffic have been included as examples of commercial and
open-source applications. These represent the state of the art for this kind of applications. SeNIE is an
example of a CAAA implemented with a neural network instead of a rule-based logic. SeNIE ha been
included to that the taxonomy can be applied independently of the technology used to implement the
adaptation logic.
Name Description Middleware Context Data
PhoneAdapter [SRWE08a] An application for adjusting a mobile phone pro-
file according to the user’s activity
ContextNotifier [SRa] Bluetooth, location,
speed, calendar
TourApp [WER07c] An application for adjusting PDAs information
as a user tours a facility
Context Toolkit [SDA99] Location using bea-
cons, battery
SeNIE [SPF+06] An application for identifying hand gestures
from a glove used with a body-area sensor net-
work
SeNIE Bend sensors and a tri-
axial accelerometer
Conveyor Belt [LCT08] An application for locating packages moving
through a conveyor belt
Not specified Four ordered RFIDs
PowerManager [pow] An Android application and service proactively
adapting the system settings to spare battery
Android APIs [All09] All the sensors avail-
able to Android
Timeriffic [tim] An simple Android application muting and un-
muting the device
Android APIs The internal system
clock
GPS-Recorder (See Sec-
tion 4.1.7)
An application to record trekking traces Not implemented Location and WiFi
beacons
Table 4.1: Examined Artifacts
4.1.1 PhoneAdapter
Case 1. Consider two of the profiles defined by PhoneAdapter, Home and Office. The former is meant
to be applied automatically whenever the application detects that the user is at home, while the latter
is meant to be applied automatically whenever the application detects that the user is in his office. The
application uses GPS to infer when the user is at home, and it uses Bluetooth to discover the user’s office
PC, from which it infers that the user is at work. The necessary physical context is first sensed by GPS
and Bluetooth sensors on the phone and fed to the middleware’s Context Manager, which updates context
variables used by the CAAA’s adaptation rules specified for the Home and Office profiles. This sensed
context stored in the context variables is used by the Adaptation Manager to evaluate the predicates of
the adaptation rules. The evaluation of predicates results in inferred contexts that determine which rule
or rules to trigger. The triggering of a rule initiates a chain of adaptive behaviors in the CAAA, causing
the CAAA to operate in a new presumed context, which is revealed by the selection of a new profile.
In the PhoneAdapter, we discovered an unanticipated fault related to these profiles that arises be-
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cause of an unforeseen form of mobility, leading to an inconsistency between the physical context, the
sensed context and the inferred context. In particular, if the user’s work PC is a laptop, then it is very
convenient for the user to bring his laptop home. In such situations, the true physical context of the user
is his home location, but the Context Manager senses both the home location and the work PC. This
leads the Adaptation Manager to infer simultaneously the existence of two different contexts, leading to
the simultaneous triggering of the rules for both contexts and thus to a nondeterministic setting of a new
profile.
Case 2. Consider two other profiles defined by PhoneAdapter, Jogging and Driving. The former
is meant to be applied automatically whenever the application detects that the user is jogging, while
the latter is meant to be applied automatically whenever the application detects that the user is driving
in a car. The application uses GPS to infer user location and user mobility, and it uses Bluetooth to
detect the hands-free system in the user’s car. In our implementation of PhoneAdapter, we discovered
another unanticipated fault related to these profiles that arises because of differences in the refresh rates
of the GPS and Bluetooth sensors. Suppose the user leaves his home, enters his car and starts driving.
The physical context of the user is thus the car in which he is driving. But due to the differences in
refresh rates, the Context Manager senses that the user has left his home location and is moving rapidly.
This causes the Adaptation Manager to infer that the user is jogging, thereby causing the application
to apply the Jogging profile as the new presumed context. Eventually the Context Manager detects the
car’s hands-free system via Bluetooth, but by then it is too late to apply the Driving profile, because the
adaptation rules are defined in such a way that the Driving rule cannot trigger when the Jogging profile
is active.
Case 3. PhoneAdapter has a second driving profile, Fast Driving, which is applied when the ap-
plication detects, again via the GPS sensor, that the user is driving at high speed. We observed that
PhoneAdapter failed to adapt to this profile when the user started driving and accelerated quickly. The
problem was that the rapid acceleration prevented the middleware from propagating the information nec-
essary to apply the Driving profile first, which is a necessary condition for Fast Driving to be applied.
As a result, PhoneAdapter allows the phone to accept calls while driving at high speeds.
Case 4. Consider one more profile, Meeting. When the Office profile is active, the Meeting profile
is meant to be applied whenever the application infers that the user is in a meeting, based on the user’s
calendar and the phone’s clock indicating the presence of a scheduled meeting time, and on Bluetooth
discovering another person for a meeting. Our initial implementation of PhoneAdapter, however, fell
into an adaptation cycle between the Office and the Meeting profiles since both of their conditions are
triggered whenever a meeting is held in the office, leading to inconsistencies between the sensed and
inferred contexts.
Architectural considerations. Faults such as the one described in Case 1 happen when multiple
adaptations interfere with each other. If identified, these faults can be fixed by redefining the interfering
predicates. Detecting all of them can be difficult and time-consuming. Rather than spotting and fixing
single interferences, a design which does not allow them should have been used.
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Nondeterministic adaptations happen in PhoneAdapter because, unlike other applications such as
Locale [Two09], it supports adaptation rules with the same priority. Such rules can interfere with each
other, creating multiple inconsistent inferred contexts. A strong ordering of rules helps prevent nonde-
terministic adaptations but makes them less flexible and may just move the problem from the inferred
context to the presumed context. In Case 1, for instance, giving the adaptation to Office higher priority
will cause the Office profile to be applied erroneously when the user is at home. Lowering its priority
will produce the opposite scenario when the user brings his personal laptop to his office. The fault in
Case 1 can be solved by giving more importance to those contextual information which are certain and
less to those which are assumed. For instance, when the application is trying to identify the location,
GPS readings could have a priority higher than non-GPS predicates that use other context variables to
infer the location (such as Bluetooth discovery of location-specific devices).
PhoneAdapter reacts to a context change immediately upon a change to some context variable,
which can be independent of some situation of interest to the application. The time it takes to detect the
change can vary depending on the internal refresh rate of the underlying middleware, making the reaction
itself too impulsive in some instances and too slow in others. Occurrences of faults as the ones described
in Cases 2 and 3 could have been, at least partially, prevented by maximizing the sensors refresh rate and
by reacting instantaneously only when the applications logic demands it. For instance the profile Driving
Fast, which in the applicative domain requires a quick reaction, should be applied (and un-applied) as
soon as satisfied. Jogging which instead describes a durative action, should be applied only if the trigger
condition remains satisfied for a certain amount of time.
4.1.2 TourApp
TourApp is a context-aware application that runs on mobile devices of visitors attending an exhibi-
tion to notify them of presentations of interests. TourApp was distributed originally with the Context
Toolkit [SDA99] and has become a common demonstration application for context-awareness middle-
ware.
Context sensing is supported by different Widgets, each running on a router in some room of the
exhibition. As the user walks toward a registration desk, the application is supposed to sense a Registra-
tion Widget, which stores the user’s preferences and determines which information the user will receive.
As the user enters different presentation rooms, the application will receive information (e.g., presenta-
tion title, duration, speaker bio) from a set of Presentation Widgets. As the battery becomes critically
low during the visit, the application will enter a power saving mode, reducing the quantity of displayed
information.
Case 5. Consider a user launching the application at the registration desk, but within range of two
different routers—the one in the registration room and the one in the first presentation room. As the
device has no control over which Widget will be sensed first, the Presentation 1 Widget running on the
latter router may be sensed before the Registration Widget running on the former router. In that case, the
inferred context will become “It is true that the user is in presentation room 1,” and the application will
assume that the user decided to skip the configuration phase at registration and will adapt to tour mode,
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loading the information about a presentation the user did not intend to visit. What is worse, registration
becomes unavailable once the application is in tour mode.
Architectural considerations. TourApp infers the user’s activity from the user’s location, which if
sensed incorrectly can propagate a fault to higher layers. However, the expected sequence of user actions
is known from the application domain. TourApp could use this knowledge to prevent faults by applying
a more restrictive predicate for adaptations that deviate from the expected route. For instance, requiring
each user to configure his device in the registration room and preventing adaptations to tour mode for
un-configured devices could help to prevent the fault described in Case 5.
4.1.3 SeNIE
SeNIE [SPF+06] is a toolkit for reading and computing streams of data from a connected body area
sensor network [HPB+09]. A user, wearing several sensor nodes, transmits data about his movements to
SeNIE, which computes them on the fly and notifies external components. One of SeNIE’s key features
is provided by a gesture recognition component. Possible gestures include a closed fist, an open palm,
and some intermediate gestures with a combination of closed and open fingers such as “thumbs up”, “on
the phone” (thumb and little finger) and “music” (thumb, index finger and little finger).
Case 6. When a user is opening and closing his hand, passing from the closed fist to the open palm,
the sensed context contains a sequence composed of the initial gesture, one or more transitional gestures,
and the final gesture. The training of the gesture classifier did not consider such transitions. As a result,
when a transitional gesture matched one of the predefined gestures in the library (e.g,, thumbs are up in
the transition from closed to open palm), an intermediate configuration may be incorrectly applied and
an incorrect context presumed.
Architectural considerations. The inferred and presumed contexts of SeNIE do not model dy-
namic conditions. The lack of inferred contexts defining the transitions between two configurations,
such as “closing palm”, or even the more general “changing gesture”, cause the output produced by the
gesture recognition to be incorrect. Improving the granularity of the situations modeled by the inferred
context would mitigate the fault described in Case 6.
4.1.4 Conveyor Belt
This application was conceived by Lu et al. and used to illustrate the effectiveness and efficiency of their
Context Inconsistency Resolution (CIR) techniques [LCT08]. The scenario consists of a sequence of
RFIDs placed along a conveyor belt to identify the position of a moving package in order to manipulate
it precisely. When we map this application to our architectural model, the context management layer
reads all the RFIDs, and the adaptation logic simply uses their estimate position function to infer the
position of the package, which it does by reading the strength of the signal received by each RFID.
Once the package’s position on the conveyor belt has been determined, the program unit relevant to that
location is started.
Case 7. During the computation, a package should move along the conveyor past a number of
position readers. The application reads the signal strength of all the readers, generating a sensed context
such as “[strength0, strength1, strength2, strength3]”, which may be computed as an inferred context
45 4.1. Faults in the CAAAs We Studied
“position == reader1 is true”, and which in turn may trigger an adaptation to a presumed context
“executing program unit1”. Thus, the application can adapt quickly to a new presumed context as soon
as it has been computed by the adaptation logic, but this makes the application highly reactive but also
vulnerable to noise. In particular, a valid sequence of inferred context would correspond to a package
making forward progress along the conveyor. However, during the execution it may happen that, due to
noise in the sensed context, the Adaptation Manager computes a sequence of inferred contexts indicating
that a package has reversed course and is traversing backwards, which is impossible. In such a case, the
application may erroneously adapt to a presumed context such as “executing program unit0”, causing
operation on an empty position of the conveyor. Similarly, it may happen that the Adaptation manager
computes a sequence of inferred contexts indicating that a package has skipped some stages and then has
reappeared at a later position.
Architectural considerations. Similarly to TourApp, Conveyor Belt identifies package position
from sensor readings and has an expected sequence of positions through which the package should
move. Real world constraints, such as the direction in which the belt is moving, the last correct known
position and the maximum belt speed can be used to correct or discard faulty readings, preventing them
from propagating beyond the sensed context [LCT08].
4.1.5 Power Manager
Power Manager is a commercial Android application available from the Android Marketplace. Out of
the box, Power Manager maximizes the battery duration by turning on and off GPS, Bluetooth and Wifi,
and by regulating the screen brightness according to the current battery level [pow]. The basic idea is to
turn off each sensor when the battery is running low and to turn them on again when the battery is full
or while the phone is recharging using the AC power or USB.
Like most CAAAs, Power Manager allows users to configure its adaptation logic as they please.
The one useful for our studies included five profiles:
1. Initial: the initial profile when the application starts,
2. ChargingAC: the phone is charging using an AC charger,
3. ChargingUSB: the phone is charging using a USB cable,
4. OnBattery: the phone is running on battery and the battery charge is above 30%,
5. BatteryLow: the phone is running on battery and the battery charge is under 30%,
In this custom configuration, adaptations to BatteryLow turn off Bluetooth, GPS and WiFi to extend
the battery life. Adaptations to ChargingUSB and ChargingAC, instead, are defined with the associated
actions of turning on all the sensors, since the phone can use them without exhausting the battery, which
is on charge. Adaptations to OnBattery do not perform any action since the battery is full and the phone
can be used as it was configured.
Case 8. While we were running it on an Android G1 phone with a custom configuration we found
that the battery duration was reduced to one half of the normal duration. As we tried to discover what was
causing such a malfunction we observed that recharging the phone also activates all the sensors, which
are then left active while the device switches to OnBattery. Indeed the OnBattery configuration does not
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perform any corrective action when applied. As a consequence 70% battery was quickly drained forcing
the device to switch to BatteryLow after a couple of hours.
Architectural considerations. Indeed the fault was caused by the configuration we applied. How-
ever Power Manager asks the user to specify for each profile, a corrective action to be performed when
a profile is applied. If we assume that the current configuration would be unknown, as it could be after
several adaptations, the definition of such corrective action is fault prone. Defining the configuration of
each profile independently from the others would have prevented this fault from happening.
4.1.6 Timeriffic
Timeriffic is a simple application aimed at muting the cellphone at night and un-muting it during the
day [tim].
Case 9. In the initial stages of its development, Timeriffic was affected by a fault causing the phone
to be muted during the day instead of at night. The fault was caused by a bug in the code in which a
developer inverted the actions of the adaptation rules of day and night mode. The bug was introduced in
revision 7 and fixed over two months later in revision 86. The faulty logic was hard-coded and the bug
was hard to be spotted. In the corrected version the developers removed completely the hard-coded logic
and introduced an XML configuration file.
Architectural considerations. Created originally to be a very simple yet useful background ser-
vice, Timeriffic was initially implemented as an hard-coded rule-based application without taking advan-
tage of any existing rule-based middleware. Underestimating the complexity of the two adaptation rules
has introduced a very resilient fault jeopardizing the whole adaptation logic. In this sense Timeriffic is
living proof that even a simple set of rules can be error prone. After moving the whole logic to a config-
uration file, developers have been able to make Timeriffic much more configurable and user-friendly.
4.1.7 GPS-Recording
GPS-Recording is a very simple application that is developed to evaluate our PDDL-based approach.
Essentially, this is a simple GPS-based trekking tour recording application. Tourists can rent from a base
camp a GPS-enabled device on which the recording application is running. When the application starts,
it enables the GPS and starts reading the current location. As long as the user remains in the base camp
GPS-Recording waits for the tour to start by entering in a stand-by low-consumption mode. As soon as
the users leaves the base camp, GPS-Recording starts collecting GPS information, showing their location
on a map, and recording statistics about the route, including position, altitudes and speed. At the end
of the tour results can be uploaded and stored. A distracted user may start the application when he is
already on route. In that case GPS-Recording will start recording immediately.
Case 10. Imagine a user starting GPS-Recording from the base camp. The application starts, turns
on the GPS, and immediately starts collecting data as if the user has already left the base camp. The
implementation states that if ”GPS is enabled and if location is base camp” the application should wait
in standby mode. Instead, due to the asynchronous nature of the updates, the standby mode is skipped
and the recording starts. The fault can be explained as follows. When the GPS is turned on there is a
gap of time in which the sensor is on but in which the location is not available. If the GPS is turned off,
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GPS-Recording enables it on start-up right before evaluating the context. When that happens, even if
the user is physically located in the base camp, the standby mode is not applied because the location is
”unavailable” and not “base camp”.
Case 11. Similarly to case 10, if the user is in the base camp, with the application correctly in
stand by mode, sporadically it may happen that the application starts recording while the user is still
in the camp. Once again, if the location becomes “unavailable”, such as when the user goes inside a
thick building in the base camp, the condition “location == base camp” is not satisfied any more and the
application assumes that the trekking trip has started.
Architectural considerations. In most of the frameworks GPS readings have a non-trivial data
structure providing several interconnected information, including geo-location, altitude, speed, move-
ment direction, time, precision of the reading, number of available satellites and their signal strength.
All this information makes GPS a very powerful data source. However, certain GPS readings are not
always available or correct. Applications heavily relying on GPS readings should be aware of such
weaknesses and rely on some high-level error correction/prevention.
4.2 Taxonomy
To gain a better understanding of the types of faults occurring in CAAAs, their frequency, and their
impact, we have studied several failures and the faults they induce. Based on this experience, we are able
to delineate a taxonomy of faults and their corresponding failures that arise due to the peculiar nature of
CAAAs. This taxonomy is open to future improvements as the number of CAAAs grow and more data
become available.
Our previous work focused on rule-based adaptation in CAAAs and the faults that arise through
the use of rule-based context-awareness middleware. We distinguished between two broad classes of
faults, behavioral faults and hazards. The former are faults in the internal logic of the set of rules used to
control adaptation, while the latter are faults due to the asynchronous updating of context variables, and
the different rates at which those updates are performed as readings are taken from context sensors. The
taxonomy we present here is meant to subsume our previous categorization.
The taxonomy classifies faults and failures in CAAAs along seven dimensions. The dimensions
characterize those aspects of faults and failures that appear to be most important for their detection
and elimination by engineers. In fact, the taxonomy could be be integrated into error-tracking systems
such as Bugzilla [Ind09], allowing developers to describe faults in an application systematically. As the
description of a fault is fleshed out, it can be compared to similar previous faults in order to help further
with the localization and elimination of the fault. In addition, as the number of discovered failures and
fixed faults increases over time, a statistical profile of the application and its use of context layers can be
developed, allowing engineers to focus their attention on the most fault-prone layers of the application
architecture. Table 4.2 summarizes the dimensions of the taxonomy and provides a labeling scheme that
we use below to classify the faults and failures described previously in this Chapter.
In the first dimension, different faults arise in different architectural layers, and their effects typically
are realized as failures in higher layers (row I in Table 4.2). The physical context is taken to be correct
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Dimension Dimension Observed
Number Name Values
S: Sensed
I Source Layer I: Inferred
P: Presumed
S: Sensed
II Observation Layer I: Inferred
P: Presumed
A: Annoyance
N: No Output
III Severity O: Incorrect Output
T: Termination
U: Unsafe Operation
R: Implicit from Refresh
IV Recoverability D: Direct
P: Possible/Eventual
I: Impossible
H: Human
W: Sensor Wear
V Origin S: Sensor Deployment
D: Design
L: Sensing Libraries
I: Input
VI Method of Reproduction T: Timing
E: Execution Path
P: Physical
VII Root Cause [case specific]
Table 4.2: Preliminary Taxonomy of Faults and Failures in CAAAs
since it represents the real environment. Identifying the source layer of a fault is a necessary step in
pointing a developer to the faulty component.
Second, and related to the first, different faults have different degrees of observability in different
layers, with some faults having high observability (leading directly to clearly obvious failures) and others
having low observability (leading indirectly to more subtle failures). Furthermore, faults tend to be
detected in layers other than the ones in which they occur (row II). Understanding in which layers a fault
manifests itself as observable misbehavior helps developers in pinpointing the source layer and helps
testers to understand if a fault has been fixed or not.
Third, the failures resulting from faults have different severities, from a mild annoyance to the user,
to an incorrect output or no output at all, to full termination and even unsafe operation (row III). Fur-
thermore, while propagating from the layer in which it occurs to a higher layer, a fault can increase its
severity, or can be mitigated or even fixed if the system incorporates some form of error prevention/re-
covery.
Fourth, and related to the third, different faults entail different degrees of difficulty in recovering
from the failures they induce (row IV), ranging from implicit recovery via refresh of underlying sensors
to direct recovery via error recovery mechanisms. Some cases lie between these extremes when certain
sequences of events allow for recovery, and still other cases are not recoverable at all. Classifying both
the severity and recoverability of a fault helps prioritize the work in eliminating faults.
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Fifth, different faults have different origins, including the “wear and tear” of physical sensors, the
manner of sensor deployment, inconsistencies between application libraries used within a middleware
or CAAA (with each library itself behaving in a consistent manner in isolation), or misunderstandings
or unforeseen circumstances on the part of the application developer (row V). Identifying the origin of a
fault helps developers to fix the fault. Furthermore, keeping track of the origin of several faults helps to
reveal systemic weaknesses in the CAAA.
Sixth, different failures can be reproduced with varying degrees of effort, depending on the faults
that induce them (row VI). Reproducing a failure may require certain inputs, or the occurrence of certain
timing conditions, thread schedules, or physical conditions in the environment, or some combination of
these. As in any system exhibiting asynchrony and nondeterminism, faults (particularly hazards) that
arise in the presence of such features are particularly difficult to reproduce and typically require the use
of runtime instrumentation or simulation. Understanding the method of reproducing a failure associated
with a fault helps testers improve their testing to report new faults and to mark existing ones as fixed.
The origin and method of reproduction of a fault are coupled with the source and observation layers,
respectively. The former focus on the misbehavior itself, while the latter focus on the context associated
with the misbehavior. These combinations are synergistic, for instance allowing a developer to classify
a fault as being a design issue with the inferred context, whose associated failure is reproducible with a
certain input value and observable in the presumed context.
Seventh, we can identify more precisely the root causes of faults in terms of the particular design
decisions and/or technology choices involved in producing them (row VII). The root cause thus specifies
application-specific information that further helps developers in locating and addressing the fault.
Table 4.3 classifies the eleven failure cases described in previous sections according to the dimen-
Taxonomy Dimensions
Case I II III IV V VI VII
1 I P O P H IT Incomplete Rule Logic
2 S P U P L ITP Inconsistent Sensing Rates
3 S IP U P L ITP Slow Sensing
4 I P A I H IT Problematic Rule Logic
5 S IP O I S IE Overlapping Sensor Fields
6 I IP O R D IT Granularity Mismatch
7 S IP O D SW IT Sensor Noise
8 P P A P D PE Faulty Rule Logic
9 I IP O P D IT Faulty Rule Logic
10 S IP O I LWD IT Sensor Activation
11 S IP O I S IT Sensor Noise
Table 4.3: Classification of the Failures Observed in the Studied Applications
sions outlined above. As shown in columns I and II of Table 4.3, only three of the eleven failures, Case 6,
Case 8 and Case 9 were detected in the same layer as the faults that caused them. Of the remaining eight,
seven were detected in the layer immediately above, possibly because that layer produced an incorrect
computed output. Only in Case 2 did the fault propagate through multiple layers, from the sensed context
to the presumed context. Of the six faults arising in the sensed context, none could be observed directly
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in the sensed context. This simply could be due to the examples we considered, but it also seems that
faults are more easily detected in contexts at a higher level of abstraction, because the sensing libraries
do not expose enough information to detect them directly.
As shown in columns II and III, there appears to be no correlation between the severity of a fault
and its observability. For instance, severe faults exposing the user to dangers such as Cases 2 and 3 were
not observed in the layers in which they arose.
If we compare columns V and VII, we can see that problems with sensors and sensing libraries
have a direct impact within the sensed context. Developers should be aware of this and should find ways
of preventing faults in the sensed context from propagating to higher layers. Faults in generating the
inferred or the presumed context seem to be related to weak design or increased complexity.
Finally, as shown in column VI, all eleven cases require significant effort to reproduce, requiring not
only a certain sequence of inputs but also certain timing conditions, execution flows or even the presence
of certain physical conditions, in order to “fool” the sensing libraries into reproducing a failure.
As the discussion above shows, we can see that the taxonomy provides developers with a way to
identify the architectural layers involved in an observed failure. The taxonomy also highlights several
opportunities to better support the development of more reliable CAAAs. This support can be provided at
different layers of the architecture as well, ranging from support for sensor builders to library developers
to rule designers. Support for checking the space of behaviors defined by a CAAA’s governing rules and
for verifying the sensed and presumed contexts for consistency could address some of the root causes
we have observed.
As we expect that context-awareness middlewares will handle both the context reading and the
adaptation mechanisms, we believe that techniques for testing CAAAs should focus in the adaptation
logic or in the configuration file provided by the user. Accordingly, the next chapters describe the classes
of techniques that can be used to detect faults in the application logic or in its configuration and to
mitigate their impact.
4.2.1 Benefits of Using a Context-Aware Taxonomy
Our taxonomy has been defined to help developers to improve the quality of their CAAAs. It is important
to underline that users will probably not be able to report failures by filling all the dimensions of this
taxonomy and that in most of the cases the developers will have to fill the missing fields themselves.
However by investing time in classifying all the reported failures developers will have two benefits: (1)
this taxonomy will help them in speed up the correction by pointing them in the right direction and (2)
by providing a series of well documented statistical information on which component of the application
is more fault prone and how it fails.
Imagine a software house with various developers each one of them responsible for a different com-
ponent. What normally happens with a bug tracking tool is that a random developer starts addressing a
reported failure and once the existence of a fault has been verified the correction is delegated to the devel-
oper responsible for the component in which the fault was generated. The delegation from a developer
to the next one normally includes a textual description of the progress made by the developer currently
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working on the fault. Such description includes information such as how to replicate the failure and
where the fault is located. Unfortunately such descriptions are often incomplete or even missing slowing
down the correction process. Our taxonomy provides a standard way of reporting useful information
which assist the developers by telling them exactly how to classify each reported failures.
Moreover, after a certain number of faults have been classified with our taxonomy, it is possible to
statistically analyze the reported data in order to find which component are most fault prone and which
ones are the most common causes for a failure. Such statistical reports can be used by a software house
to prioritize the future development phases of their application.
4.3 Related Work
The literature contains several studies on how to classify and isolate faults in CAAAs. Each one of such
works focuses on a different aspect of the context-aware and adaptive mechanisms.
During each adaptation the application evolves. This evolution is not immediate, since there may
be a transitory in which the application is waiting for certain components to load. While performing this
transition the application may fail to react consistently to further inputs. Predicting and validating the
application’s behavior during this transitory is not trivial. A proposed solution solution is to freeze the
computation during the whole adaptation [ZC06]. Unfortunately such a design model, which is based
on Petri nets, does not fit with systems which cannot afford to suspend their services. Another approach
proposes to use a rule based system as a consumer for context aware events and using a sequential
producer/consumer mechanism to buffer requests during the adaptation [CFL03]. This solution could be
successfully applied to our architectural model by introducing a queue between the context manager and
the application logic.
Concurrency is one of the main sources of faults in context-aware applications. These faults are
generated by interference between threads reading sensors, adapting and performing high/level tasks.
One of the most relevant works in the field of testing concurrency is the one by Long et al. [LHS03]
that uses a formal language to force the execution of each possible combination of threads within a
monitor. This approach is effective in discovering deadlocks, starvation and interferences because for
each monitor makes it possible to test different predetermined situations. This approach is not effective
to validate concurrent faults in CAAAs because faults are not related to monitors. However the same idea
could be reused and applied to context aware program points and to adaptive program points [WER07b].
For application domains, in which applications adopt a certain architecture, domain-specific fault
taxonomies have been defined. Bruning et al. have designed a fault taxonomy for Service-Oriented
Architecture (SOA) [BWM07]. The approach they used is similar to ours. We classified faults with
seven independent parameters including in which component the fault occurs and its severity. Bruning
instead organizes faults in a tree in which to classify a fault engineers have to navigate from the root
to a leaf. All the root children represent the different stage of SOA services (publishing, discovery,
composition, binding, execution) which is similar to the source layer in our taxonomy. All nodes at
depth two or more represent the fault origin. All the faults described by Bruning are blocking, therefore
severity, recoverability and observation layer are not mentioned. Bruning does not consider those faults
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in which the composition and the execution terminate successfully but in which, due to a non blocking
error, the produced result is faulty. Chan et al. have designed a fault taxonomy for web service compo-
sition [CBS+09]. Similarly to ours they isolate all the observed effects and six elementary fault classes
identifying the fault origin. By combining observed effects and fault origin they classify faults in thirteen
classes of faults divided in three macro groups. Chan does not classify faults in terms of severity and
recoverability. It is therefore not possible to specify if an observed fault aborts the computation or if the
system will perform some error recovery policy.
Chapter 5
The A-FSM Model
In Chapter 3 we have shown that CAAAs typically are built using adaptation rules triggered by changes
in context variables values. Because of the complexity of the rule logic and the asynchronous updating
of context variables, it is possible for these rules to embody faults.
An exhaustive testing of such rules would require to run several combinations of execution paths
and to validate them against a set of expected results. Enumerating all the possible combinations and
knowing their expected values requires a deep knowledge of the application’s adaptation logic. Given
that most of the implementations are rule-based, such knowledge can be effectively provided by a model
representing those rules. Moreover, as also stated in Chapter 3, context-awareness middlewares are more
and more taking care of the implementation of standard CAAA components, moving developers’ focus
to the adaptation logic.
In this chapter, in Section 5.1 we exploit the rule-based design of CAAA adaptation logic to define
the Adaptation Finite-State Machine or A-FSM, a new finite-state model that supports the analysis of
potential faults in the adaptation rules of CAAAs. The A-FSM model also helps testing engineers in
validating CAAAs. In Section 5.2 we use the A-FSM to define properties whose violation leads to
faults. To conclude, in Section 5.3 we present models extracted from some of the CAAAs that we have
used in the research. In Chapter 6 and in the rest of this thesis we present verification and fault detection
techniques based on the A-FSM model.
5.1 Formal Definition of A-FSMs
Context-awareness middlewares lend themselves naturally to the derivation of finite-state models from
the adaptation rules they support. In this section we present formal definitions for the kind of rules that
we described informally in Section 4.1, and then we formally define the A-FSM induced by such rules.
Typically, CAAAs “live” in an environment that can be sensed by means of a set of sensors, such
as GPS and Bluetooth receivers, (video)cameras, etc. We denote with C the set of all the sensed context
variables that can be sensed by a CAAA. For instance, C = {ctime, cgps, . . . }, where each ci is a complex
structure that includes, for instance, the date, time timezone of the clock and the actual GPS position, the
signal strength, etc.
Based on C we define a set V of propositional context variables (PCVs for short); elements of V are
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Boolean variables v1, v2, . . . used to reason about context variables in C. For instance, a variable vi can
encode the fact that “the Bluetooth device is paired with HomePC”, or “the speed obtained from the GPS
device is greater than 5 km/h”. PCVs may not be independent: for instance if a variable vi encodes the
fact that the speed is greater than 40 km/h, and vj encodes the fact that the speed is greater than 5 km/h,
then vi implies vj . We capture these dependencies by means of Global Constraints: a Global Constraint
is a Boolean formula where such dependencies are made explicit, and we denote with G the set of all
such constraints. A formal definition of these constraints can be found in Section 5.1.2.
The propositional context variables are used to define the rules that govern transitions between
states of a CAAA. We denote with S the set of the possible states of a CAAA; as an example, possible
states of a CAAA are “Silent”, “Driving”, “Meeting”, etc., characterizing, in this case, different profiles
of a mobile phone application. We denote withR the set of rules that govern transitions between states.
Each rule R ∈ R is a tuple (name, P, S,ActionList, i), where name is a string identifier, P is is
a Boolean predicate over V , S ∈ S is the destination state, ActionList is a list of actions to be
performed upon entering S, and i is an integer number denoting the priority of a rule (with lower values
meaning higher priority). Actions are expressed as a Boolean combination of v ∈ V and encode the
modifications to the context variables caused by the transition (For instance, a transition may switch
off the Bluetooth device, and this is encoded as an action by negating all the v ∈ V referring to the
Bluetooth; these negations are added to ActionList). The predicate P of an action is the “trigger”
for the rule, i.e., the transition caused by a rule R can only be performed when P is true. Rules are
associated with starting states by means of a function T : R → 2S . If a state S is associated with a rule
R by means of T and the corresponding predicate P is true, then we say that R is active in S. If more
than one rule is active in a given state, only the one with the lowest priority value is triggered.
For each state in the CAAA we define a (optional) set Inv(S) of invariants that must hold true if
the CAAA is in state S, expressed as Boolean predicates over PCV. If one of the predicates is not true,
then we require a rule to be active in S to enable a transition to a new state.
The description of a CAAA is completed with the definition of an initial state I ∈ S . The tuple
(C,V,G,S,R, T , Inv, I) defines an extended finite state machine that we call the Adaptation Finite
State Machine (A-FSM). Notice that this is not a pure rule-based formalism due to the presence of
the (optional) elements to reason about states (i.e., the sets G and Inv). However, we introduced these
elements because they capture naturally various properties that stakeholders and developers want to make
true in a CAAA. Notice that A-FSM models can be obtained automatically by parsing the configuration
file used by the CAAA itself or by instrumenting its source code. Since most of the modern CAAAs
also provide their users a configuration GUI to specify the desired adaptive behavior at runtime, a model
could also be obtained directly from the user configuration.
5.1.1 Priority and Rule Ordering
Multiple rules are often active simultaneously in the same state. If the predicates of two or more of
them are satisfied simultaneously then the CAAA will adapt by nondeterministically triggering one of
the rules. As we will describe more in detail in Section 5.2.1, if that happens then the adaptation logic
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is nondeterministic. Rule designers can prevent this from happening by fixing an order in which rules
should be applied.
Given two rules A and B, and their trigger predicates PA and PB we can force rule B to be satisfied
only when rule A is not by assigning to rule B a new trigger predicate P ′B defined as: P ′B = ¬PA∧PB .
By means of this conversion it would be possible to enforce any possible ordering without adding extra
notation to the A-FSM definition. The obtained predicates can be computed very effectively, as the
complexity is only introduced in the predicate itself. If needed, the predicates could be further simplified
by applying various Boolean techniques (e.g. removing double negations, applying De Morgan’s law,
removing contradictions and tautologies).
Unfortunately, in the presence of several rules in the same state, even if the computational overhead
remains minimal, the obtained predicates may become not human understandable and error prone.
To support rule designers we introduced the concept of priority which can be considered as syntactic
sugar. In the A-FSM model we associate a priority level for each rule which defines the order in which
it will be computed by the Adaptation Logic.
If each priority level contains at most one rule, rules are ordered with a strong priority order,
otherwise if multiple rules have the same priority the ordering is called a weak priority order. The A-
FSM model supports both the priority orders transparently and the decision of which one to apply is
left to rule designers. None of these two ordering is superior to the other and as we will discuss in
Section 5.2, they suffer from different faults.
In our implementation we accept 9 priority levels from 1, the highest, to 9, the lowest, of which 5
is the default one.
5.1.2 Global Constraints
Assignments of values to propositional context variables represent a suitable input for an A-FSM and
therefore for its associated CAAA. PCVs derived from different relational expressions over the same
sensed context variable are not necessarily independent. For instance, if variable c1 encodes the fact that
the speed is greater than 5 km/h and c2 that the speed is greater than 50 km/h, then it is not possible for
c2 to be true and c1 to be false simultaneously.
The A-FSM model allows testing engineers to define additional global constraints to eliminate such
inconsistent truth assignments; the analysis algorithms then treat such global constraints as additional
conjuncts of all rule predicates, effectively reducing the state space that needs to be explored.
In our implementation we support constraints in the form of implications because that was conve-
nient to model the constraints in our case studies. Particularly we found it convenient to impose that,
certain PCVs cannot be satisfied (or negated) depending the assignment of other PCVs. For instance if
a PCV representing the predicate gpslocation =′′ home′′ is satisfied, any other PCVs representing the
GPS location cannot be satisfied.
Developers may need to extend our implementation with other functions representing more sophis-
ticated or more specific forms of constraints depending on the physical properties affecting the context
variables.
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5.2 Properties and Fault Patterns
Rule designers or even end users define or add adaptation rules following specific needs or behaviours
which they want the CAAA to follow. Even if correctly designed, when introduced in a complex rule
space, rules tend to interfere with each other, causing annoyances or failures.
To support rule designers and testers in validating instances of the A-FSM model against common
faults, we have defined a set of properties which the model must satisfy. When a model or a set of rules
violates one of such properties the implementation, represented by the model, may contain a fault. We
categorize faults violating of one of such properties with a unique pattern of fault.
5.2.1 Determinism
CAAAs are by design adaptive, meaning that given a certain input they react differently according to
the current state which defines the current behavior and their current configuration. However, even if
CAAAs are adaptive their behavior must be deterministic. Given a CAAA and knowing its internal state
and its configuration, its reaction to a certain input should be predictable. In other words given a CAAA
starting from a known initial state with predetermined initial configuration and given a fixed sequence
of input, it should be possible to determine the new state and the new configuration to which the CAAA
would adapt as a result of the given input. In applications violating the Determinism property the se-
quence of adaptations depends on hidden implementation aspects or on uncontrollable physical factors
making the final behavior unpredictable. We define the determinism property as follows:
Determinism property: For each state in the A-FSM and each possible assignment of values to propo-
sitional context variables in that state, the Determinism property is respected if there is at most one rule
that can be triggered. If the rules of a CAAA violate the Determinism property, we say that the rules
contain a Nondeterministic Activation fault, a pattern of faults characterized by the presence of multiple
active rules in the same state and with the same priority whose predicates can be satisfied by the same
set of context updates. This kind of fault happens because unrelated predicates might not be mutually
exclusive.
Nondeterministic Activation fault can be eliminated in three ways: (1) by reformulating the pred-
icates of the affected rules in such a way that at most one is satisfied by the bit string; (2) by splitting
the affected state into multiple states, with the affected rules associated with different states; and (3) by
assigning different priorities to the affected rules.
As described in Section 5.1.1, a strong priority order forces rules of a single state to be mutually
exclusive by design. Therefore it guarantees that the Determinism property is respected.
5.2.2 Rule and State Liveness
In the A-FSM model a rule describes an adaptation from the current state to a more suitable one. Once
a rule has be designed there should be at least one assignment of PCVs satisfying its trigger predicate.
If none of the possible assignment of PCVs satisfies the rule then its adaptation will never be performed
and its action never applied. This is similar to dead or unreachable code in a programming language.
Similarly states, with the exception of final states, are supposed to be sustained only until the next
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adaptation, meaning that in each state there should be at least a satisfiable active rule. We define the
liveness property of rules and states as follows:
Rule Liveness property: For each state in the A-FSM and each of its active rules, there is at least one
assignment of values to propositional context variables that satisfies the predicate of the rule. If the rules
of a CAAA violate the Rule Liveness property, then we say that the rules contain a Dead Predicate fault,
a pattern of faults characterized by the presence of an unsatisfiable predicate in the set of active rules of
some state.
State Liveness property: For each state in the A-FSM, if the state contains any active rules (and thus
is not a final state), then at least one of the active rules has a satisfiable predicate. If the rules of a
CAAA violate the State Liveness property, then all the active rules of the state contain a Dead Predicate
fault, and we say that the set of rules contains a Dead State fault, a pattern of faults characterized by a
deadlock state.
A state can violate the State Liveness property when it has no active rules or when all of its rules
violate the Rule Liveness property. A rule violates the Rule Liveness property if its trigger predicate is
not satisfiable in the current state because of the current assignment or because other rules with higher
priority are satisfied first. A-FSMs implementing a weak priority order as described in Section 5.1.1 are
less prone to dead predicate faults because multiple rules can coexist at the same priority level.
5.2.3 Reachability
In the A-FSM model states represent the different behaviors that the modeled CAAA can assume. Each
one of such behaviors are meant to be applied as a response to certain circumstances. However, due to
issues in the rule design, one or more states can become unreachable, preventing the application from
applying the correct behavior. We describe state reachability as follows:
Reachability property: For every state, it is possible to reach the state from the initial state via some
sequence of adaptations. If a state of the CAAA is not reachable (through any sequence of adaptations),
we say that the rules contain an Unreachable State fault.
The Unreachable State fault represents a complementary concept of the Dead State fault. The for-
mer underlines those states unreachable by the automata, the latter those in which the automata remains
blocked. Besides the obvious circumstance in which there are no incoming rules to a certain state, we
have identified two causes which lead to violation of the reachability property: (1) a too strong priority
order may cause high priority rules to mask other active rules; if the masked rules are the only ones
reaching their destination state, that, or those, states become unreachable, violating both the liveness and
the reachability property, (2) a particular assignment of PCVs either selected by the user or resulting of
previous adaptations, which prevent rules from being applied (e.g. if the GPS has been disabled to spare
battery certain location based rules may not be applied).
5.2.4 State Invariants
At runtime PCVs are sequentially reassigned by changes in the environment, as effect of adaptations
and by explicit user’s intervention. After an adaptation some PCVs hold assignments they had due to
previous events. Such assignments are unpredictable and on certain states lead to faults, causing the
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CAAA to expose a behavior not suitable for the current situation. The nature of those side effects
vary between a mild annoyance to more serious faults. Imagine for instance an application skipping
a speed security check because the GPS has been turned off. To detect faults or side effects resulting
from misconfiguration we have enriched the A-FSM with the notion of invariants. Similarly to what
it happens in contract based-testing [Aic03] an invariant allows testing engineers to specify conditions
which should be respected while a certain behavior is applied. We define the State Invariant property as
follows:
State Invariant property. After a context change the current state S ∈ S, and the current PCVs
assignment to V , are violating the State Invariant property if the assignment is stable in S and if it
violates at least one invariant in Inv(S). We call State Invariant violations those faults which violates
the State Invariant property.
There are two possible ways in which a violation can occur: (1) upon entering a state S by means of
a rule R, the actions associated with R make assignments to PCV that violate the invariant; (2) a change
in the context occurs while the A-FSM is in state S (which is reflected in a change to the PCVs), such
that the new PCVs assignment violates at least one invariant in Inv(S), and there is no rule R exiting
from S which is activated by the new PCVs assignment. Note that faults violating the stability property
below may also hide state invariant violations along their paths. Similarly that state invariants violations
may also happen simultaneously with violations of the Rule Liveness property. When this happens an
unanticipated PCVs assignment is preventing the CAAA from adapting and is imposing faulty behavior.
5.2.5 Stability
CAAAs suffer from stability and metastability issues which manifest themselves with an (un)bounded
sequence of consecutive adaptations. Such sequences have a different impact on the expected application
behavior, varying from simple annoyances to the user to continuous adaptation loops. The cause of such
failures is a subtle dependence between consecutively triggered predicates and the sensed duration of
assignments of certain PCVs.
Adaptations should not implicitly depend on the duration in which a propositional context variable
holds a certain value. If they do so the obtained behavior would be nondeterministically based on how
promptly the application is sensing such values. While it is legitimate for an application to use durations
as PCVs, (e.g., logging and tracing applications may need to monitor or record certain events or to trigger
a certain behavior after a certain time-based threshold has been reached), but not to base sequences of
adaptations on the duration of such PCV assignments.
Imagine an adaptive application which, with a given PCVs assignment could adapt from a stateA to
a state B and from B to C. Assume also that, for various reason, each adaptation would take an amount
of time considerably greater that the refresh rate of the constant. This would be the case of adaptation
involving the execution of additional components or the connection to remote services. Once the first
adaptation has been triggered the final destination state is nondeterministic and it could be both B or C
depending on how long the PCVs assignment lasted and how slow was the adaptation. Also suppose that
the same assignment from C would trigger an adaptation to A. If that happen the application becomes
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metastable and keeps adapting until the context changes. Once again when the context changes and the
application returns stable its state could be any of those involved in the loop.
Consider an ordered set SC = {S0, S1, S2, ..., Sn} of states connected by an ordered sequence
AR = {R0, R1, R2, ..., Rn} of adaptation rules. If the first and the last states S0, Sn of SC coincide
we say that the set SC is a loop. Assume that it exist an ordered sequence of PCVs assignment V =
{V0, V1, V2, ..., Vn} ⊂ V , of which V0 satisfies R0 in S0, Vj satisfies Rj in Sj with j ∈ {1...n} and
Vj = Vj−1 ∧ kj−1 where kj−1 is the action predicate associated to the rule Rj−1. If V exists then the
CAAA is metastable and its adaptations are implicitly depending on the sensed duration of the sensed
context. If V0 = Vn then the CAAA is unstable as long as the sensed context holds.
If V0 is sensed in S0 the application adapts in S1 and applies k0 to V0. Once in S1, if V1 still holds,
then the application will adapt to S2 and it will continue to adapt until the last state Sn is reached, after
which it will restart from S0 if SC is a loop. The final state is nondeterministic and it could be any state
in SC depending on how long the sensed context holds. During this sequence of adaptations the applica-
tion has been unstable and the number of adaptations that have been performed is also unpredictable. If
the sensed context changes it interrupts the sequence of adaptations and leaves the CAAA nondetermin-
istically in one of the intermediate states. To unmask faults such as these we define the Stability property
as follows:
Stability property: A CAAA is stable if there is no PCVs assignment which can produce a sequence of
adaptations such that the choice of which state ends the sequence depends on the duration with which the
assignment itself holds its value. More specifically, given a state Si and a PCVs assignment V triggering
an adaptation from Si to Sj with action k, we say that a CAAA contains an Adaptation Race fault if the
assignment obtained by applying k to V is triggering a sequential adaptation from Sj . If the sequence
of adaptations triggered by the the propagation of the initial assignment forms a loop, then we say that
the rules contain an Adaptation Cycle fault.
Often these patterns of behavior may produce multiple adaptations that merely annoy the user with
repeated updates. Nevertheless, races can be dangerous, particularly in situation when the CAAA is
operating some kind of electro-mechanic device (e.g. a robot) in which repeated updates may damage
the circuits or endanger the operator.
5.3 Extracting the A-FSM From Our Case Studies
5.3.1 PhoneAdapter’s Model
PhoneAdapter is a phone profiling application that we have introduced in Section 4.1.1. Table 5.1
presents the set of adaptation rules according to which PhoneAdapter modify its behavior. For con-
venience, the table represents rule predicates both in their fully expanded form and as a composition of
PCVs. The conversion between a PCV and its underlying predicate is contained in Table 5.3. Table 5.2
shows the actions applied by each rule. In this example rules only affect the ring-tone volume’s, the
vibration, the call diversion and the synchronization. This table has only been included for completeness
and, since none of the action changes the value of any of the PCVs they only modify the phone behavior
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Table 5.1: Adaptation Rules of PhoneAdapter
Rule Name Current States New State Full Predicate Simple Predi-
cate
Priority
ActivateOutdoor General Outdoor GPS.isValid() ∧ ¬ GPS.location()=home
∧ ¬GPS.location()=office
Agps ∧ ¬Bgps
∧ ¬Cgps
5
DeactivateOutdoor Outdoor General ¬ActivateOutdoor ¬ (Agps ∧
¬Bgps ∧
¬Cgps)
5
ActivateJogging Outdoor Jogging GPS.isValid() ∧ GPS.speed()> 5 Agps ∧Dgps 5
DeactivateJogging Jogging Outdoor ¬ActivateJogging ¬(Agps ∧
Dgps)
5
ActivateDriving General, Home,
Office, Outdoor
Driving BT=car handsfree Abt 1
DeactivateDriving Driving General ¬ActivateDriving ¬Abt 1
ActivateDrivingFast Driving DrivingFast GPS.isValid() ∧ GPS.speed()> 70 Agps ∧Egps 0
DeactivateDrivingFast DrivingFast Driving ¬ActivateDrivingFast ¬(Agps ∧
Egps)
0
ActivateHome General Home BT=home pc ∨ (GPS.isValid() ∧
GPS.location()=home)
Bbt ∨ (Agps ∧
Bgps)
5
DeactivateHome Home General ¬ActivateHome ¬(Bbt ∨ (Agps
∧Bgps))
5
ActivateOffice General Office BT=office pc ∨ BT=office pc * ∨
(GPS.isValid() ∧ GPS.location()=office)
Cbt ∨ Dbt ∨
(Agps ∧ Cgps)
5
DeactivateOffice Office General ¬ActivateOffice ¬(Cbt ∨ Dbt ∨
(Agps ∧Cgps))
5
ActivateMeeting Office Meeting Time>=meeting start ∧ BT.count()>=
3
At ∧Ebt 4
DeactivateMeeting Meeting Office Time>=meeting end Bt 4
ActivateSync General Sync BT=home pc ∨ BT=office pc Bbt ∨ Cbt 9
DeactivateSync Sync General ¬ActivateSync ¬(Bbt ∨ Cbt) 9
and not how the phone behavior adapts.
As shown in the table, PhoneAdapter adapts between nine different states according to 16 different
rules expressed over three different sensed context variables, namely BT (Bluetooth), GPS and time,
which are monitored via 12 propositional context variables representing the 12 different relational ex-
pressions in which the sensed context variables are used. For example, one such relational expression is
GPS.location()=home, which tests whether the location sensed by the phone’s GPS sensor corresponds
to the user’s home location (stored in configuration variable home). This relational expression is repre-
sented throughout the rules by the propositional context variable Bgps.
We define the following global constraints for PhoneAdapter, which account for the facts that
(1) checking context via GPS first requires GPS to be on, (2) locations are mutually exclusive, (3) dis-
equations on the same context variable must be consistent with each other, and (4) the end time of a
meeting is later than its start time:
¬Agps ⇒ (¬Bgps ∧ ¬Cgps ∧ ¬Dgps ∧ ¬Egps)
(Bgps ⇒ ¬Cgps) ∧ (Cgps ⇒ ¬Bgps)
Egps ⇒ Dgps
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Table 5.2: Adaptation Rules’ action of PhoneAdapter
Rule Name Action
ActivateOutdoor volume=high, vibration=on
DeactivateOutdoor volume=medium, vibration=on
ActivateJogging BT=off, volume=high, vibration=off
DeactivateJogging BT=on, volume=high, vibration=on
ActivateDriving volume=high, vibration=off
DeactivateDriving volume=medium, vibration=on
ActivateDrivingFast vibration=off, volume=off, divert call=on
DeactivateDrivingFast vibration=off, volume=high, divert call=off
ActivateHome volume=medium, vibration=off
DeactivateHome volume=medium, vibration=on
ActivateOffice volume=low, vibration=on
DeactivateOffice volume=medium, vibration=on
ActivateMeeting volume=off, vibration=on
DeactivateMeeting volume=low, vibration=on
ActivateSync synchronization=on
DeactivateSync synchronization=off
Table 5.3: PCVs in PhoneAdapter’s A-FSM model
Context Predicate PCV
GPS GPS.isValid() Agps
GPS GPS.location()=home Bgps
GPS GPS.location()=office Cgps
GPS GPS.speed()> 5 Dgps
GPS GPS.speed()> 70 Egps
Bluetooth BT=car handsfree Abt
Bluetooth BT=home pc Bbt
Bluetooth BT=office pc Cbt
Bluetooth BT=office pc * Dbt
Bluetooth BT=office pc * Dbt
Bluetooth BT=office pc * Dbt
Bluetooth BT.count()>= 3 Ebt
Time Time>=meeting start At
Time Time>=meeting end Bt
Bt ⇒ At
Figure 5.1 depicts the A-FSM we derive from the adaptation rules of PhoneAdapter, with state
General being its initial state. For completeness Table 5.4 shows all the state invariants defined for
PhoneAdapter.
At the early stage of this research work we tested PhoneAdapter by running it within TestingEmu-
lator [SRb] and by manually triggering variations in the context and we exposed several faults as antic-
ipated in Section 4.1.1. By means of the A-FSM model we can now examine such failures and we can
explain them as violations of properties which the A-FSM model should respect.
In state General 4 of the 5 outgoing rules try to infer the location both from Bluetooth and GPS
readings. Such context readings are independent from each others and they may satisfy multiple trigger
predicates simultaneously causing nondeterministic faults to happen. The fifth of those 5 rules, Acti-
vateSync has low priority and its predicate is completely masked by the other rules causing a Dead Rule
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Figure 5.1: A-FSM of PhoneAdapter.
Table 5.4: State invariants in PhoneAdapter’s A-FSM model
State State invariant
General
Outdoor
Jogging GPS.speed() > 5
Driving BT=car handsfree
DrivingFast BT=car handsfree
Home
Office
Meeting
Sync BT=home pc ∨ BT=office pc
fault. Unfortunately ActivateSync is also the only incoming rule to state Sync, therefore the Dead Rule
fault to which it is affected propagates and causes also a State Reachability fault preventing state Sync
from being reachable. The Stability Property is also not satisfied in several states causing the model to
be metastable if a certain environmental changes happen. Particularly, the rules ActivateMeeting and
DeactivateMeeting creates a loop causing the model to become unstable if the application enters in state
Office or Meeting after a meeting.
5.3.2 GPS-Recording’s Model
As above GPS-Recording is an application that we crafted to evaluate and compare our techniques. Its
implementation was derived directly from the model (and not the other way around). The A-FSM we
used is depicted in Figure 5.2 of which each adaptation is described in Table 5.5. The A-FSM model
also includes the state invariants listed in Table 5.6.
As introduced in Section 4.1.7 the application enables GPS-based trekking tour recording. Tourists
can rent from a base camp a GPS-enabled device on which the recording application is running. When
the application starts, it enables the GPS and starts reading the current location. As soon as the users
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Figure 5.2: Crafted GPS recording application.
Table 5.5: Adaptation Rules of GPS-Recording
Rule Name Current States New State Full Predicate Priority Action
StartConfiguration Init BaseCamp GPS.isValid() ∧
GPS.location()= “base-
camp”
5 waitToStart()
StartRecording Init, BaseCamp Recording GPS.isValid() ∧
¬GPS.location()= “base-
camp”
5 enableRecordingMode()
SaveResults Recording EndTour GPS.isValid() ∧
GPS.location()= “desti-
nation”
5 saveTourStatistics()
leave the base camp, the application starts collecting GPS information showing them on a map, and
recording statistics about the route, including position, altitudes and speed. At the end of the tour results
can be uploaded and stored.
We model the application with four states:
1. Init: the initial state;
2. BaseCamp: the user is still in the starting point of the route and the application is not recording;
3. Recording: the user has left the base-camp and the application is recording times and locations; and
4. EndTour: the user has reached the destination, the recording is blocked and the statistics are uploaded.
We introduce a number of rules: a rule ActivateBaseCamp is triggered from Init if GPS = True
and location = “base-camp”. A rule StartRecording is triggered from Init or from BaseCamp if GPS
is providing a valid reading and if location 6= “base-camp”. The tour ends when from Recording the
application triggers ApplyEndTour, which is satisfied if GPS= True and location= “destination-camp”.
When triggered each one of these rules execute one of the procedures listed in the “action” column of
Table 5.5 which activate a certain behavior in the application. To respect the law of physics affecting the
Table 5.6: State invariants in GPS-Recording’s A-FSM model
State State invariant
Init
Basecamp GPS.location()=basecamp
Recording GPS.location()¬destination
EndTour
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Figure 5.3: State Matrix of state Init.
PCVs we applied the following constraints:
¬GPS.isV alid()⇒ ¬(GPS.location() = “base− camp′′ ∨GPS.location() = “destination′′)
GPS.location() = “base− camp′′ ⇒ ¬GPS.location() = “destination′′
GPS.location() = “destination′′ ⇒ ¬GPS.location() = “base− camp′′
.
The expected behavior of this application is a first adaptation from Init to BaseCamp, a second
adaptation to Recording and a third adaptation to EndTour. However it should also be possible to adapt
from Init directly to Recording if a user turns the application on when he has left the base camp already
(see Figure 8.1). Instead, starting from the initial state it is not possible to find any valid path capable of
triggering ActivateBaseCamp and therefore capable of reaching the state BaseCamp.
Figure 5.3 shows the Karnaugh map [Kar53] for the activation of state Init trigger predicate. By
means of this Karnaugh map it is possible to follow the execution paths in the space of possible assign-
ments of state Init and it helps to detect faults. A constraint imposes that when the GPS reading is not
valid then all the predicates on locations are False, therefore the assignment GPS = False and location
= “base-camp” is not valid. Starting from an initial configuration with GPS = False and location 6=
“base-camp” the only path to reach state BaseCamp pass through the configuration GPS = False and
location 6= “base-camp” which triggers an adaptation to Recording.
In this crafted example, using a Karnaugh map, it is straightforward to spot that there is no direct
path from a stable and valid configuration to any configuration triggering ActivateBaseCamp; however
similar situations may occur in applications with more rules, and they can be difficult to detect. Moreover
Karnaugh maps can only represent Cartesian spaces with up to six Boolean dimensions and cannot be
used for more complex situations.
5.3.3 Timeriffic’s Model
Timeriffic is a simple open source application that we have introduced in Section 4.1.6.
As shown in Figure 5.4, Timeriffic, in all the revisions before 86, can be modeled by means of
three states: Init, DayMode and NightMode. When the application starts it immediately adapts to state
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Figure 5.4: Timerrific’s model.
Table 5.7: Adaptation Rules of GPS-Recording
Rule Name Current States New State Full Predicate Priority Action
ApplyNightMode Init, DayMode NightMode time > NightStarts ∧ time
< DayStarts
5 volume=high (human error)
ApplyDayMode Init, NightMode DayMode time > DayStarts ∧ time <
NightStarts
5 volume=off (human error)
DayMode or NightMode depending on the current time, then it sequentially adapts from one to the other
at the scheduled time. Time-related PCVs must respect the following constraints:
time > NightStarts⇒ time > DayStarts
time < DayStarts⇒ time < NightStarts
meaning that the configuration variable DayStarts must be lower than the variable NightStarts, and that is
the time is lower than DayStarts then it is also lower than NightStarts and if it is greater than NightStarts
then it is also greater than DayStarts.
In the initial stages of its development, Timeriffic was affected by a fault causing the phone to be
muted during the day instead of at night. This fault appears to be a violation of the state invariant
property, caused by bug in the code in which a developer inverted the actions of the adaptation rules of
day and night mode. As defined in Section 5.2.4, state invariant violations happens when a certain PCVs
is stable in a state in which it should not be (e.g. in which it violates one or more state invariants). The
bug was introduced in revision 7 and fixed over two months later in revision 86. We modeled this bug in
the “Action” column of Table 5.7 where it appears clearly that the actions of the two rules are inverted.
With the A-FSM model that bug can be easily exposed by imposing on the ringtone’s configuration
the state invariants shown in Table 5.7. This particular fault fault was caused by human mistake and the
A-FSM, even if applied at design time would not have prevented it from happening. However the A-FSM
Table 5.8: State invariants in Timerrific’s A-FSM model
State State invariant
Init
DayMode volume¬off
NightMode volume=off
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Figure 5.5: Power Manager’s model.
would have helped developers in exposing, detecting and fixing the fault as soon as it was introduced in
the code.
5.3.4 Power Manager’s Model
Power Manager is a commercial Android application available from the Android’s Market that we have
described in Section 4.1.5. Out of the box, Power Manager maximises the battery by switching from
various user-defined configurations according to environmental parameters.
Extracting the A-FSM model from Power Manager simply requires us to represent its configuration
with the A-FSM. On the Android G1 Phone Power Manager stores his configuration in the default
Sqlite DB as recommended by the Android development guidelines. In our research we use a consumer
version of the G1 phone in which access to that DB is disabled. Indeed in an unlocked development
device in which the Sqlite DB would be reachable this model extraction could be easily automated. In
the configuration files the user can specify various profiles. For each profile the user has to specify a
condition of activation and the effect that has to be applied when that profile is applied. The generated
A-FSM represents each one of these profiles with a state. Those states are fully connected to each other.
For each state all the incoming adaptations have, as trigger predicate, the predicate with which the profile
is applied and as action the effect that has to be applied when applying the new profile.
Figure 5.5 and Table 5.9 depicts the A-FSM model that we have obtained from our custom config-
uration. The model has five states:
• Initial: the initial state when the application starts;
• ChargingAC: the phone is charging using an AC charger;
• ChargingUSB: the phone is charging using a USB cable;
• OnBattery: the phone is running on battery and the battery charge is above 30%; and
• BatteryLow: the phone is running on battery and the battery charge is under 30%.
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Table 5.9: Adaptation Rules of PowerManager
Rule Name Current States New State Full Predicate Priority Action
ApplyOnBattery Initial, Battery-
Low, Chargin-
gUSB, Chargin-
gAC
OnBattery (¬ battery < 30%) ∧
charging=no
5
ApplyBatteryLow Initial, OnBattery,
ChargingUSB,
ChargingAC
BatteryLow battery < 30% ∧ charg-
ing=no
5 ¬ BT.isEnable(),
¬ WiFi.isEnable(),
GPS.isEnable(),
screen brightness=low
ApplyChargingUSB Initial, OnBat-
tery, BatteryLow,
ChargingAC
ChargingUSB charging=USB 5 BT.isEnable(),
WiFi.isEnable(),
GPS.isEnable(),
screen brightness=high
ApplyChargingAC Initial, OnBat-
tery, BatteryLow,
ChargingUSB
ChargingAC charging=AC 5 BT.isEnable(),
WiFi.isEnable(),
GPS.isEnable(),
screen brightness=high
Table 5.10: State invariants in PowerManager’s A-FSM model
State State invariant
Initial
OnBattery ∧ (BT.isOn() ∧WiFi.isOn() ∧ GPS.isOn()) ∧¬ screen brightness=high
BatteryLow (¬ BT.isOn()) ∧ (¬WiFi.isOn()) ∧ (¬ GPS.isOn()) ∧ screen brightness=low
ChargingUSB
ChargingAC
All the rules adapting to the same state have the same trigger predicate and apply the same action and, in
the picture, they have been represented with arrows with the same style. The model also constraints the
value of its PCVs by forcing that:
screen brightness = high⇒ ¬(screen brightness = medium ∨ screen brightness = low)
screen brightness = medium⇒ ¬(screen brightness = high ∨ screen brightness = low)
screen brightness = low ⇒ ¬(screen brightness = high ∨ screen brightness = medium)
charging = no⇒ ¬(charging = USB ∨ charging = AC)
charging = AC ⇒ ¬(charging = no ∨ charging = USB)
charging = USB ⇒ ¬(charging = no ∨ charging = AC)
In this custom configuration, adaptations to BatteryLow turn off Bluetooth, GPS and WiFi to extend
the battery life. Adaptations to ChargingUSB and ChargingAC, instead, are defined with the associated
actions of turning on all the sensors, since the phone can use them without exhausting the battery, which
is on charge. Adaptations to OnBattery do not perform any action since the battery is full and the phone
can be used as it was configured.
To find the malfunction that exists in in our test configuration we added to the A-FSM model state
invariants for the two states running on battery as shown in Table 5.10. When the phone is in state
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BatteryLow, we require that all the sensors must be off, and the back-light should be low. When the
phone is in state OnBattery, we require that at least one of the sensors should be off or the back-light
should not be high, to avoid an excessive battery consumption.
5.4 Considerations About the A-FSM Model
We have designed the A-FSM model to give developers a general-purpose, high-level view of the adap-
tation logic of CAAAs. Indeed, we have good results in applying this model to various applications
and, as we will present in the rest of this Thesis, we also manage to use it as base for several validation
techniques. There are two considerations which need to be underlined.
First, the A-FSM model is general-purpose. To model correctly or more efficiently applications
belonging to particular application domains, the model may need to be extended with additional domain-
specific features. Imagine, for instance, industrial applications made for controlling mechanical external
devices with some sort of electro-mechanical actuator. In those CAAAs, the delay between when an
adaptation rule is triggered until its effect has been applied and the adaptation completed may be consid-
erable. We call that gap time an adaptation transitory. During the adaptation transitory the application
is in an intermediate state in which its behavior may be different from the origin and destination state.
Indeed, it would be possible to model those transitories with additional intermediate states, but it would
be better to extend the A-FSM in order to model, this and any other required concept, properly.
Secondly, the A-FSM is not trying to impose to developers a certain design, and instead it just offers
tools to model CAAAs with a level of abstraction high enough to identify faults in the adaptation logic.
Thus, the model itself is not preventing developers from introducing faults in their applications. Consider
for instance Locale, an application winner of the Android Contest 2009 [Two09]. Locale allows users
to define through its GUI rules, trigger predicates, and effects, with a very similar level of abstraction as
the one given by the A-FSM. However, to prevent the most common faults, Locale imposes limitations.
A strong priority order between rules is forced, only conjunctions can be used in the trigger predicates,
and sensors cannot be turned off as the effect of an adaptation. Those limitations increase the robustness
of the created configurations but also reduce their flexibility. Indeed, any Locale configuration can be
modeled with an A-FSM, but not all A-FSM models can be applied in Locale.
5.5 Related Work
The work by Nilsson and Offut [NO07] uses patterns of potential faults to detect missed scheduling of
sporadic and periodic time-critical tasks. Our approach employs a similar idea, in which the different
refresh rates of asynchronously updated context variables may trigger incorrect decisions in an appli-
cation’s adaptation behavior. We analyze the impact of asynchronous updates on the evaluation and
triggering of adaptation rules, allowing us to determine where faults can occur.
CAAAs also suffers from real-time issues. Timing problems in real-time systems have been ana-
lyzed by using methods based on specialized finite-state models. Alur and Dill propose a timed automata
model that incorporates time constraints for specifying real-time systems [AD94]. Timed automata have
been utilized as well by several test case generation techniques, which exploit timing constraints speci-
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fied between actions or events [ENDK02, HNTC99, KT04, NS03]. In a similar way, we apply constrains
not only to time, but to all kinds of context inputs utilized by the adaptation rules.
Timing problems in real-time systems have been analyzed by using methods based on specialized
finite-state models.
Alur and Dill propose a timed automata model that incorporates time constraints for specifying
real-time systems [AD94]. Timed automata have been utilized as well by several test case generation
techniques, which exploit timing constraints specified between actions or events [ENDK02, HNTC99,
KT04, NS03]. In a similar way, we apply constrains not only to time, but to all kinds of context inputs
utilized by the adaptation rules.
In 1971 Akiyama [Aki71] published the first attempt to use metrics for software quality prediction
by proposing a regression-based model for module defect density, measuring the number of defects per
KLOC (kilo lines of code). The statistical model proposed by Akiyama and all the ones predicting the
quality of a system in terms of his complexity differ from our A-FSM first because they are stochastic
models while the A-FSM is deterministic, second because they predict either the fault occurrence rate
or the number of faults to be expected, while the A-FSM model detects an input or a sequence of inputs
which triggering behaviors considered faulty. It would be possible to create a statistical model for the
CAAAs using the number of states rules and PCVs as metric of complexity for example by estimating
the number of human introduced faults by number of rule.
Probabilistic model checkers such as PRISM [KNP02] are capable of validate probabilistic au-
tomata (PAs) and probabilistic timed automata (PAs) using a discrete-event simulation engine. By mod-
eling a CAAAs with PRISM developers could answer questions such as “How often a certain adaptation
will occur?” or “Which state will be applied in the first 3 hours of usage?”. Contrarily our A-FSM model
assumes that all the given PCVs can be satisfied and verifies what happens when they do. The A-FSM
model could be extended with the PRISM formalism in order to estimate the occurrence rate of all the
detected faults. Developers could benefit of this addition by addressing first all those fault which are
most likely to appear withing a given amount of time (i.e. all the fault which are more likely to appear
within the first 24 hours of usage).
Chapter 6
Validation Techniques
The A-FSM model defined in Chapter 5 gives developers a high-level representation of the adaptation
logic. Based on such representation, properties capable of proving (or disproving) the correctness of the
CAAA under test can be defined. In Section 5.2 we introduced a set of unique properties which we used
to validate our case studies. Such properties are capable of isolating novel classes of faults which affect
CAAAs and allow developers to correct the adaptation logic. Developers may also introduce additional
properties if needed.
In this chapter we introduce three novel techniques which, based on the A-FSM model, validate the
CAAA under test by applying the properties we have defined in Section 5.2 and report instances of faults.
We classify the first two of these techniques as model checking approaches, because, although they do
not use a specific model checker, they work in a similar way. The Enumerative Approach, presented in
Section 6.1, enumerates all the possible inputs and verifies their effect on the CAAA. The OBDD-based
Approaches presented in Section 6.2 use a symbolic approach to very our properties without looping on
all the possible inputs. Finally, our PDDL-based approach, presented in Section 6.3 employs a planner
to validate the A-FSM model, removing the need of writing specific fault detection algorithms for each
property.
In the following chapters these techniques will be applied to our case studies, and both the results
they provide and their performance will be evaluated. In Chapter 7 we will validate our case studies by
applying our properties. Detected faults will be isolated and discussed. In Chapter 8 we will discuss the
effectiveness of these three techniques, and we will compare their performances.
6.1 Enumerative Approach
Our initial algorithms for detecting faults in an A-FSM employ enumerative exploration of an explicit
representation of the state space of the A-FSM. The idea behind the algorithms is to observe the adaptive
behavior of the A-FSM independently in each state using a chosen set of assignments of values to the
propositional context variables. By probing all states and all possible assignments of values, we construct
a derivative representation called a state matrix that is associated with each state S in M . This data
structure is used as a base for all the enumerative algorithms.
Conceptually, the state matrix of S enumerates bit strings for associated sets of rules. A bit string
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is a sequence of ordered bits, of which each one specifies a set of truth assignments to the set C ⊂ V of
propositional context variables that can cause the predicates of the associated rules to become satisfied
and the destination states of those rules to be entered. Bit strings that do not satisfy the predicates of any
active rules of a state S are not included in the state matrix of S.
Imagine an A-FSM model M1 composed by two states S0 and S1 with a rule R1 adapting from S0
to S1 and a rule R0 adapting from S1 to S0 both with the same level of priority. This is a simple model
with two states allowing adaptations to each other. Also imagine two PCVs Pa and Pb where the trigger
predicate of R1 is defined as Pa ∧ Pb and the trigger predicate of R0 is Pa ⊕ Pb. For completeness
suppose that in M1 there is a constrain C1 imposing that ¬Pb ⇒ Pa. Simply when both Pa and Pb are
satisfied M1 should adapt state S1, otherwise it should adapt to S0. In addition, due to the constraint, Pa
and Pb cannot be simultaneously not satisfied.
The Listing 6.1 depicts the state matrices for M1. There are two state matrices, on for each state.
Both the state matrices contains all the entries representing PCVs assignments triggering an adaptation
with the exclusion of the assignment which violates C1. For clarity in Listing 6.1 we represented each
entry of the two state matrices with two notations: one explicit and one compact (the one inside the
brackets). The compact one is the notation produced in output by our implementation of this technique.
In the compact notation the bit string represents the assignment of each PCV in a fixed order, which in
this case is the order in which they were defined. For instance, 01 stands for Pa = false, Pb = true. The
remaining part of the compact notation represents an array of triggered adaptation rules, where the array
[R 1] indicates that R1 is triggered.
Listing 6.1: State matrices for M1 with extended notation
s t a t e S 0 :
P a = t r u e , P b = t r u e : t r i g g e r s R 1 ( 1 1 , [ R 1 ] )
s t a t e S 1 :
P a = f a l s e , P b = t r u e : t r i g g e r s R 0 ( 0 1 , [ R 0 ] )
P a = t r u e , P b = f a l s e : t r i g g e r s R 0 ( 1 0 , [ R 0 ] )
Listing 6.2 depicts examples of entries from two state matrices for PhoneAdapter, the one for state
General and the one for state Outdoor as they are reported by our Java implementation using a compact
notation illustrated previously. Notice that state matrices are used as input for our detection algorithms
and are not . The print out in 6.1 is only a representation of how the data structure looks like.
Listing 6.2: Example State Matrix Entries
s t a t e G e n e r a l :
(110000000000 , [ Act ivateHome ] )
(110001000000 , [ ActivateHome , A c t i v a t e D r i v i n g ] )
. . .
. . .
s t a t e Outdoor :
(100100000000 , [ A c t i v a t e J o g g i n g ] )
(100101000000 , [ A c t i v a t e J o g g i n g , A c t i v a t e D r i v i n g ] )
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. . .
. . .
As mentioned for the previous example the previous example also in Listing 6.2 each entry in the
state matrix of a certain state S depicts a bit string of variable assignments (with 1 indicating true and 0
indicating false) along with the names of the active rules of S whose predicates become satisfied upon
the variables obtaining those assignments. Note that while the order of variables does not matter, the
same order must be used for all state matrices. In our experiment we ordered all the PCVs in phone
adapter first by context (i.e. GPS, Bluetooth, time) and then alphabetically by their simplified names as
shown in Table 5.1 (e.g. Agps, Bgps, ...).
By constructing each state matrix over all propositional context variables, the size of the state
matrix grows exponentially in the number of variables. For instance, considering a CAAA with the same
number of states and PCV of PhoneAdapter, in the worst case scenario, the number of such entries would
be O(S ∗ 2PCV ) = 9 ∗ 212 = 36864.
6.1.1 Localization
It is possible to reduce the memory footprint of the state matrices and therefore the execution time
of some of our algorithms by excluding from the state matrix of a state whose propositional context
variables which are not relevant to that particular state. For each state we may therefore construct a
projection of the state matrix in that state, obtaining a reduced state matrix that contains bits for only the
relevant variables of the state (with the remaining bits essentially set to the value “don’t-care”).
For faults related to properties whose occurrence is local to a single state, such as the Nondeter-
minism property, there are no side effects in using the reduced state matrices. Instead, when detecting
faults resulting from sequential adaptations between various states, using reduced state matrices requires
additional effort because their detection requires to monitor multiple states at once and therefore it also
requires to switch from a state matrix to the other.
The solution we embody in our implementation is able to use the reduced state matrices by ”local-
izing” (i.e. considering a state-local subset of PCVs starting from a PCVs assignment) and ”globalizing”
(i.e. applying changes to a PCVs assignment starting from a state-local PCVs assignment) between the
CAAA and one of the reduced state matrices. Consider a global assignment ag ∈ G containing all the
PCVs of the A-FSM model. As such assignments are composed by an ordered sequence of PCVs their
validation does not require computing the global state matrix. Indeed it is possible to enumerate all of
them by counting from 0 to 2n − 1, where n is the total number of PCVs in the A-FSM.
Starting from each of such global assignments from the initial state, we can localize ag in the initial
state SI obtaining aSI . The localize function is a surjection associating to each ag ∈ G at most one
aSI ∈ MSI . This association is performed by removing all the PCVs not in Si, and by preserving
the original order of the remaining ones. For instance an assignment v1v2v3v4 could become v1v3 if
localized into a state using only v1 and v3. If aSI does not exists in MSI it means that that specific
assignment is stable in SI and that the execution path starting from ag has terminated in SI . Otherwise,
if aSI exists, it identifies an adaptation to a state Sj with an action k.
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To continue the exploration we need to follow the adaptation in Sj . Intuitively we could apply k to
aSi obtaining a
′
Sj
then either migrate a′Sj to Sj or, more intuitively, globalize a
′
Sj
to G and re-localize
it in MSj . Unfortunately the two functions migration and globalization are both not injective and not
surjective, therefore to each a′Sj the migration associates a set of assignments ASj ⊂ MSj and the
globalization associates a set Ag ⊂ G. The cardinality of this sets is equal to the number of assignments
of PCVs not in Si but respectively in Sj or in the whole A-FSM. For instance, assuming that v is the
number of PCVs in VSj − VSi where VSi is the set containing only those PCVs appearing in state Si,
ASj will have size s
v . Following the adaptation from a single assignment to a set will increase the
computation exponentially and sequential validation will validate the same configuration multiple times.
In our implementation we use a workaround which solves this issue and which maintains the com-
plexity of exploring sequential adaptations linear in the number of states. Once we have identified Sj and
k by applying aSi , we apply k to the global assignment ag ∈ G, obtaining one and only one a′g ∈ G. If
a′g does not violate any constraint, that is if it is a valid assignment we can re apply the localize function
from G to MSj obtaining at most one a
′
Sj
∈ MSj . If a′Sj does not exists, the application is stable in Sj
and the we can terminate the exploration. Otherwise we iterate this process.
Note that if we hit the same state twice with the same assignment, meaning that two assignments
ayg = a
z
g exist and are applied to the same state, then the adaptation is looping and the execution will
not terminate without an external input. To avoid looping and to report such anomalies, it is necessary
to trace both visited states and global assignments with which they have been explored. An algorithm
using this implementation is shown in Section 7.6.1.
6.1.2 Applying the Enumerative Approach
Once the state matrices for the various states have been computed, enumerative algorithms can use them
to detect faults by iterating on their assignments. Property designers willing to validate an application
with novel properties have to implement algorithms to detect them. Such algorithms have a common
structure iterating on each assignment of each state matrix. For each assignment a particular validation
is performed. The base complexity of these algorithms is O(S ∗ 2n) where n is the number of PCVs. In
Chapter 7 we present algorithms to detect the properties discussed in Section 5.2
6.2 OBDD-Based Approaches
In examining some of the open source CAAAs we found on the Web, we noticed that the number of states
in a CAAA is generally limited, as each state corresponds typically to a different behavioral modality.
On the other hand, we also noticed that the number of propositional context variables one would identify
for these CAAAs varies between 15 and 20. The size of the state matrix and the time required to analyze
it are in the worst case exponential in the number of variables, and so 20 variables may require too much
memory to store all the state matrices.
To address this problem, we have defined algorithms that detect faults in an A-FSM through explo-
ration of a symbolic representation of the state space of the A-FSM. In particular, we encode A-FSMs
with Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs) using a technique similar to those used by model
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checking [CGP99] and planing [JV99] tools. The key idea is that states and transitions are encoded by
means of Boolean formula, and the Boolean formula are then manipulated using OBDDs, which are a
compact and efficient representation for Boolean formula; typically, OBDDs allow for a reduction of
several order of magnitude in the size of a corresponding explicit-state representation.
The Boolean formula used to encode an A-FSM is composed by various sets of Boolean variables
representing respectively: KC for the current PCVs assignment, K ′C for the PCVs assignment after an
adaptation rule has been applied, KS for the current state, K ′S for the destination state after an adaptation
rule has been triggered and KR for the adaptation rules. We introduce KC = |C| variables in a vector
c = (c1, . . . , cKC ) to represent the truth values of the Boolean propositional context variables when a
rule is triggered and an additional set of K ′C variables to describe the context after the action has been
applied; for the A-FSM of PhoneAdapter there are 24 (12 plus 12) such variables. Note that we do not
use Boolean variables to encode priority, since priority is handled as part of the derivation algorithm,
as explained below. The number of Boolean variables required to encode the states S of an A-FSM
M is KS = dlog2|S|e; for instance, for the A-FSM of PhoneAdapter, KS = dlog2|9|e = 4. Let
s = (s1, . . . , sKS ) be the vector of KS Boolean variables encoding S; for instance, the vector (0, 0, 0, 0)
can be used to encode the first state (corresponding to the Boolean formula ¬s1 ∧¬s2 ∧¬s3 ∧¬s4), the
vector (0, 0, 0, 1) the second state, and so on. We introduce K ′S more variables to encode the destination
state of a transition by means of a vector s′ = (s′1, . . . , s
′
KS
). Finally we introduce KR = |R| variables
in a vector r = (r1, . . . , rKR) to identify the different rules inR; for the A-FSM of PhoneAdapter there
are four such variables.1
The Boolean variables introduced above support the encoding of a state activation BDD that char-
acterizes the evolution of the CAAA from a particular state as the transitions in that state are triggered.
Consider the example M1 in Section 6.1. In state S1 there is only one adaptation rule R0 adapting
to S0 when only one of the PCVs Pa and Pb is satisfied. Figure 6.1 represent the state activation BDD for
state S1. All the path leading to 1 trigger an adaptation, while all the paths leading to 0 represents stable
configurations in S1 To represent the two states we need one boolean variable S for the current state and
one variable S′ for the future state. When S or S′ are assigned with 0 they represent S0, otherwise when
they are assigned with value 1 they represent S1. Note that since we are composing the state activation
BDD of state S1 the boolean variable S has always value 1 therefore it values does not contribute to the
state activation BDD. The value of S will be used when merging multiple states together. To discriminate
between the two rules we need one boolean variable R. For each PCV x we use one boolean variable
Px to describe the current assignment and another boolean variable P ′x to describe the context after the
adaptation has been applied. Notice that since there is a constraint saying that if Pb is not satisfied then
Pa must be, two paths in the BDD have been removed because they where violating such constraint.
Also notice that since the action of R1 does not change the PCVs assignments the subtree representing
the future assignments (the one with the variables P ′x) is the same as the subtree with the current PCVs
assignments.
1This is an example of how we can exploit the similarity of the four different rules labeled ActivateDriving in Table 5.1,
effectively reducing 19 rules to 16 rules represented by four variables.
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Figure 6.1: Activation BDD for state S1.
Algorithm 3 computes the state activation BDD as follows. For each priority level (Line 3), starting
from the highest priority to the lowest, we compute, for each rule at that priority level (Line 5), a BDD
representing the activation of each rule (Lines 7–9). The disjunction of all of these BDDs (Line 10) is
the state activation BDD returned by the algorithm. The activation of a rule within a certain priority
level prevents rules with lower priorities to be triggered with the same inputs. The BDD defined in
Line 2 records executions of all the rules predicates at higher priority and excludes them from being
reused (Line 7 and Line 12). Note that the space of feasible inputs is further reduced by removing all
those solutions that do not satisfy the global constraints. The BDD GcBDD given as input contains the
conjunction of all the global constraints. The activation of each single rule (Lines 7-9) is encoded as the
conjunction of the current state’s encoding, the rule’s encoding, the destination state encoding, the trigger
input and the context after the rule’s action has been applied. The trigger input is the one computed in
Line 7. The context resulting from the action is computed by applyActionToPredicate in Line 8. This
function takes as input a BDD representing the trigger input, reassigns all the variables modified by the
action, reapplies all the constraints and swaps the predicate boolean variables into the action variables.
Note that since the post action assignment is computed from the BDD in Line 7 it is also affected by
constraints and by higher priority rules.
The complexity of this algorithm is O(P ∗ |R|), where P is the number of priority levels.
In the rest of this thesis we use the following notation to represent BDDs:2 〈Vi:0〉 means that
2This is the notation used by the open source library JavaBDD [Wha07] to print BDDs as strings.
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Algorithm 3 State Activation BDD Generation
Input: S: a state of the A-FSM;
GcBDD: global constraint BDD.
Output: StateActivationBDD: state activation BDD.
1: BDD activation = 0
2: BDD exclusion = 0
3: for i = VALUE OF HIGHEST PRIORITY to VALUE OF LOWEST PRIORITY do
4: BDD esclusionAtPriority = 0
5: for each R ∈ S.getActiveRulesAtPriority(i) do
6: esclusionAtPriority = esclusionAtPriority ∧ R.getPredicate()
7: BDD triggerInput = (R.getPredicate() ∧¬exclusion) ∧ GcBDD
8: BDD futureAssignments = R.applyActionToPredicate(triggerInput)
9: BDD ruleActivation = triggerInput ∧ R.getDestState() ∧ R.getEncoding() ∧
R.getDestState().getFutureEncoding() ∧ futureAssignments
10: activation = activation ∨ ruleActivation
11: end for
12: exclusion = exclusion ∨ exclusionAtPriority
13: end for
the variable Vi must be false to satisfy the enclosing BDD, while 〈Vi:1〉 means Vi must be true. We
indicate a conjunction by placing multiple variable assignments within the same pair of angle brackets
and disjunction by a sequence of angle-bracketed variable assignments. Thus, 〈Vi:0, Vj : 0〉 indicates that
both Vi and Vj must be false to satisfy the BDD, while 〈Vi: 0〉〈Vj :0〉 means that at least one of Vi and
Vj must be false to satisfy the BDD.
The state activation BDD for state Sync of PhoneAdapter can be represented using this notation as
follows:
〈0:0, 9:0, 12:0, 21:0, 28:1, 29:0, 30:0, 31:1, 32:0, 33:1, 34:1, 35:1〉
In this and all subsequent examples for PhoneAdapter, i : 1 means that variable number i is true
and i : 0 means that variable number i is false. Table 6.1 describes all the set of variables used to encode
PhoneAdapter. Variables 0–11 represent the propositional context variables. The current state is encoded
with variables 24–27, which are absent here because, as described above, a state activation BDD does
not explicitly encode its associated state. The destination state is encoded in variables 28–31, and rule
identities are encoded in variables 32–35. Variables 12–23 represent the PCVs assignment after the active
rules have been applied. In this example the only active rule is DeactivateSync. Thus, the state activation
BDD of Sync encodes fact that when the predicate 〈0:0, 9:0〉 is satisfied, rule 〈32:0, 33:1, 34:1, 35:1〉will
adapt the A-FSM to state 〈28:1, 29:0, 30:0, 31:1〉. with no changes to the PCVs assignment (variables
〈12:0, 21:0〉). Table 6.2 shows in details the BDD encoding of the current and future states. Table 6.3
shows the rule BDD encoding. This encoding will be used in Chapter 7 to report faults detected with the
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Table 6.1: Variable encoding in PhoneAdapter’s global activation BDD
Indexes Variables
0–11 KC = Agps, Bgps, Cgps, Dgps, Egps, Abt, Bbt, Cbt, Dbt, Ebt, At, Bt
12–23 K ′C = A
′
gps, B
′
gps, C
′
gps, D
′
gps, E
′
gps, A
′
bt, B
′
bt, C
′
bt, D
′
bt, E
′
bt, A
′
t, B
′
t
24–27 Current state KS
28–31 Destination state K ′S
32–35 Rules KS
Table 6.2: State encoding in PhoneAdapter’s global activation BDD
State Current encoding Future encoding
General < 24 : 0, 25 : 0, 26 : 0, 27 : 0 > < 28 : 0, 29 : 0, 30 : 0, 31 : 0 >
Outdoor < 24 : 1, 25 : 0, 26 : 0, 27 : 0 > < 28 : 1, 29 : 0, 30 : 0, 31 : 0 >
Jogging < 24 : 0, 25 : 1, 26 : 0, 27 : 0 > < 28 : 0, 29 : 1, 30 : 0, 31 : 0 >
Driving < 24 : 1, 25 : 1, 26 : 0, 27 : 0 > < 28 : 1, 29 : 1, 30 : 0, 31 : 0 >
DrivingFast < 24 : 0, 25 : 0, 26 : 1, 27 : 0 > < 28 : 0, 29 : 0, 30 : 1, 31 : 0 >
Home < 24 : 1, 25 : 0, 26 : 1, 27 : 0 > < 28 : 1, 29 : 0, 30 : 1, 31 : 0 >
Office < 24 : 1, 25 : 1, 26 : 1, 27 : 0 > < 28 : 1, 29 : 1, 30 : 1, 31 : 0 >
Meeting < 24 : 0, 25 : 0, 26 : 0, 27 : 1 > < 28 : 0, 29 : 0, 30 : 0, 31 : 1 >
Synch < 24 : 1, 25 : 0, 26 : 0, 27 : 0 > < 28 : 1, 29 : 0, 30 : 0, 31 : 1 >
symbolic algorithms
The conjunction of a state activation BDD and a BDD encoding an assignment of values to the
propositional context variables produces a contextual BDD encoding the adaptations triggered by that
input from the state associated with the state activation BDD.
Finally, the global activation BDD B encodes all the states and transitions of the A-FSM M and is
derived by first conjoining each state activation BDD with the encoding of its associated state, and then
computing the disjunction of the resulting state-specific BDDs over all states S:
B =
∨
S∈S
(S.getEncoding() ∧ S.getStateActivationBDD())
Figure 6.2 depicts the global activation BDD for the example A-FSM M1. The two state activation
BDDs for states S0 and S1 (which is the one in Figure 6.1) have been put together in conjunction with
the boolean variables used to encode the states. The resulting BDD represents the formula:
(¬S ∧ S0.getActivationBdd()) ∨ (S ∧ S1.getActivationBdd())
.
Independently from the state all the paths of Figure 6.2 reaching 1 represent a PCV assignment
triggering an adaptation. Vice-versa all the paths reaching 0 are stable.
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Table 6.3: Rule encoding in PhoneAdapter’s global activation BDD
Rule Encoding
ActivateOutdoor < 32 : 0, 33 : 0, 34 : 0, 35 : 0 >
DeactivateOutdoor < 32 : 1, 33 : 0, 34 : 0, 35 : 0 >
ActivateJogging < 32 : 0, 33 : 1, 34 : 0, 35 : 0 >
DeactivateJogging < 32 : 1, 33 : 1, 34 : 0, 35 : 0 >
ActivateHome < 32 : 0, 33 : 0, 34 : 1, 35 : 0 >
DeactivateHome < 32 : 1, 33 : 0, 34 : 1, 35 : 0 >
ActivateOffice < 32 : 0, 33 : 1, 34 : 1, 35 : 0 >
DeactivateOffice < 32 : 1, 33 : 1, 34 : 1, 35 : 0 >
ActivateMeeting < 32 : 0, 33 : 0, 34 : 0, 35 : 1 >
DeactivateMeeting < 32 : 1, 33 : 0, 34 : 0, 35 : 1 >
ActivateDriving < 32 : 0, 33 : 1, 34 : 0, 35 : 1 >
DeactivateDriving < 32 : 1, 33 : 1, 34 : 0, 35 : 1 >
ActivateDrivingFast < 32 : 0, 33 : 0, 34 : 1, 35 : 1 >
DeactivateDrivingFast < 32 : 1, 33 : 0, 34 : 1, 35 : 1 >
ActivateSynch < 32 : 0, 33 : 1, 34 : 1, 35 : 1 >
DeactivateSynch < 32 : 1, 33 : 1, 34 : 1, 35 : 1 >
Figure 6.2: Global activation BDD for M1.
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Figure 6.3: Differences between fault detection and PDDL extraction algorithms.
6.2.1 Applying the BDD-based approach
Once the state activation BDDs for the various states and the global activation BDD have been computed
symbolic algorithms can use them to detect faults by iterating on their assignments.
All the BDD-based fault detection algorithms work in a similar way. At first they compute a BDD
representing the violation of the property under validation. Once this BDD is computed, in most of
the cases, its conjunction with the state activation BDD generates a disjunction of all the configurations
violating the property (e.g., detected faults). In other term the algorithms generate a BDD containing
all the detected faults. In order to be used by developers this BDD has to be converted into a human
readable form. This can be done simply by looping state by state (and eventually rule by rule) and by
extracting the detected faults for each state.
In Chapter 7 we present algorithms to detect the fault classes discussed in Section 5.2 implemented
using both the global activation BDD an the state activation BDDs. In chapter 8 we evaluate the perfor-
mance of our implementations of these algorithms.
Similarly to the enumerative approach, developers willing to validate an application with their own
custom properties have to implement the related validation algorithms.
6.3 Planner-Based Approach
The third approach presented in this Section differs from the previous in how the A-FSM model is
involved in fault detection. Figure 6.3 represent an overview of the execution flow of the previous
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techniques (on the left) and of this new approach (on the right). To validate an A-FSM model against a
certain class of faults both enumerative and symbolic approaches explore the model with a fault-specific
algorithm (the central block on the left). Fault detection algorithms performs four main activities: explore
the A-FSM model, detect faults, report detected faults and decide when to stop searching.
Differently than enumerative and symbolic approaches the PDDL-based approach uses the A-FSM
to extract a PDDL domain and PDDL goals then delegates a planner to perform the validation. For each
class of faults a goal extractor algorithm uses the A-FSM model and the fault definition to generate a set
of PDDL goals representing possible faults. In comparison with the fault detection algorithms the goal
extraction algorithms are simpler because they only perform one of the four activities: defining how to
detect a fault. The remaining three activities, exploring the A-FSM model, reporting detected faults and
deciding when to stop the exploration are delegated to a planner.
The extracted PDDL domain represents the A-FSM model using the PDDL language. The extracted
PDDL goals represent critical conditions which have to be validated. The delegated planner attempts
to reach all the extracted goals starting from a given initial configuration. To facilitate the reader we
describe how planners works in Section 2.4.
Planner reports successfully computed plans as the sequence of PDDL actions they had to perform
to reach the goals from the given initial state. Due to a similarity between the A-FSM model and the
PDDL language, plans generated by our technique contains a sequence of context-changes and adapta-
tions which we encoded as PDDL actions. Such plans can be easily interpreted by a human and do not
need any further computation.
In the remaining of this Section we introduce our PDDL-based approach which can be used as a
fast prototyping technique.
6.3.1 Creating the Domain
The first step in using a planner for verifying a CAAA is to extract from the A-FSM a PDDL domain
describing the CAAAs. The extraction includes the definition of types of variables in the planning
domain, predicates and actions. We represent an A-FSM using only one variable type: context, which
represents the current configuration of the context. We also introduce the concept of state and priority
using fluents of PDDL 3.0 [GL97] by defining two non-parametric functions and by re-assigning their
values when needed. States are identified with a unique numeric index. Priority is defined as an integer
where 0 represent the highest and 10 the lowest.
The notion of state is obtained by means of a fluent [Thi05]. As mentioned in Section 2.4, the
fluent calculus provides the concept of atomic properties with which values can be set, retrieved and
compared. A fluent (assign (state) s) is applied whenever the A-FSM adapts into the state represented
by s. The current state can be used in preconditions by using (= (state) x) which is true if x is the index
representing the current state. For each propositional context variable v ∈ V we create a predicate (is-
true-v ?c context), which if satisfied (or negated) encodes the fact that a certain propositional context
variable is satisfied (or not). Similarly to those identifying the current state, these predicates have an
instance of context as a variable. In contrast to state predicates, multiple of these predicates can be
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satisfied or negated at the same time.
In the real environment something may occur which will change the truth value of a PCV. We model
these environmental events as actions that a planner may apply. For instance an event such as “the user
has turned the GPS on” will be modelled as an action satisfy-v where v is the propositional context
variable satisfied when GPS is on. We have 2∗ |V| such actions. If all the propositional context variables
are independent of each other, the preconditions and effects of those actions would simply make the
predicate either true or false:
(:action unsatisfy_C_bt
:parameters (?c - context)
:precondition (and
(= (priority) 10) (is_true_C_bt ?c))
:effect (and
(not (is_true_C_bt ?c)) (assign (priority) 0)))
If some variables depend on each other (i.e., if the relevant entries exist in G), preconditions and
effects must apply these constrains. For instance, turning off GPS makes false all the other predicates
using GPS; in the example below, is_true_A_gps encodes the fact that the GPS is on, and all the
other predicates is_true_*_gps encode other GPS properties such as “the location is home”, etc.:
(:action unsatisfy_A_gps
:parameters (?c - context)
:precondition (and
(= (priority) 10) (is_true_A_gps ?c))
:effect (and
(not (is_true_B_gps ?c)) (not (is_true_C_gps ?c))
(not (is_true_D_gps ?c)) (not (is_true_E_gps ?c))
(not (is_true_A_gps ?c)) (assign (priority) 0)))
These represent all the contextual changes that the system can apply independently from the rule’s
effects, typically as a result of users’ actions. The verification of certain systems may require some of
these changes to be disabled. For instance, if we are not interested in plans in which the user turns on
(or off) the GPS manually, the predicates satisfy-GPS-on and unsatisfy-GPS-on can be removed from the
domain.
Additionally, we create an action in PDDL for each adaptation rule in the A-FSM, and the planner
can apply these actions appropriately. These actions accept two variables, one for the state and the other
for the context. The preconditions encode the fact that the state should be one in which the rule that the
action is modeling is active, and moreover the preconditions include the triggering predicate that should
be satisfied for the rule to be active. The effect of these PDDL actions results in the transition to a new
state and in the execution of the A-FSM actions from ActionList. The following is an example of an
action deactivating the synchronization process of a mobile device with a base station, such as a home
PC:
(:action rule_DeactivateSync
:parameters (?c - context)
:precondition (and
(= (state) 8) (= (priority) 9)
(not (or (is_true_B_bt ?c) (is_true_C_bt ?c))))
:effect (and (assign (state) 0) (assign (priority) 0)))
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The planning domain loops through a priority queue in which actions with higher priority are always
applied first (where each adaptation rule encoded as a PDDL action is assigned the priority from the A-
FSM model). This encodes the fact that if an adaptation rule can be performed in the current state with
the current priority, nothing else can be applied. Otherwise the planner increases the priority value. To
increase the level of priority an action set priority p, where p is the new level of priority, is extracted
from the A-FSM. The precondition of these actions is that there are no adaptation rules satisfiable in the
current state, with the current level of priority. Every time a rule is applied or the context changes, the
priority is reset to 0.
(:action set_priority_5
:parameters (?c - context)
:precondition (and
(= (priority) 4)
(or
(= (state) 0) (= (state) 1)
(= (state) 2) (= (state) 3)
(= (state) 4) (= (state) 5)
(and (= (state) 6)
(not (and (is_true_A_t ?c)
(is_true_E_bt ?c))))
(= (state) 7) (= (state) 8)))
:effect (assign (priority) 5))
In our implementation we assigned to all the context changes a priority lower than all the priority
assigned to the adaptation rules. This force the planner to evaluate all the adaptation rules before applying
new contextual changes. We forced this execution because it is similar to the behavior of most the system
we observed, in which the thread evaluating the adaptation logic updates the sensed context only at the
beginning of its computation.
Architectures in which the adaptation logic can abort and restart the computation if a change in the
context has been sensed can be represented by giving top priority to those PDDL actions representing
environmental changes.
Notice that mixing the priority of rules and context changes is potentially dangerous because the
priority of rules only describes the order with which they are evaluated and not their reactivity. Saying
that a contextual changes has an higher priority value than a certain adaptation rule means that before
evaluating a certain rule the adaptation logic will sense the context and apply changes to the PCVs
representing that specific context. For instance, in the conveyor belt example by Lu at al. [LCT08]
RFIDs values are read multiple times during the computation, to follow the package movements on the
belt. In this and similar cases developers need to assign the correct priority to each context changes.
6.3.2 Applying the PDDL-Based Approach
Starting from the A-FSM model of the CAAA under test PDDL domains and goals are extracted. For
each fault class various goals are extracted one for each fault’s instance that can be detected. The number
of PDDL goals is finite and it is proportional to the number of rules and states in the original A-FSM
model.
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Plans reaching the extracted PDDL goals represent either the prove that a certain property, is sat-
isfied, either contains the counter-example of a detected fault, depending on the extracted goals. We
provide an implementation of the goal extraction algorithms for the properties discussed in Section 5.2.
The nondeterministic activation goal generation algorithm creates a goal for each pair of rules which
are active with the same priority in any of the states. A fault is found when the planner is in the state
under test with the correct priority and when both the rules under test are satisfied. In the worst case the
number of these goals is
∑|S|
s=0 |Rs|2, where |Rs| is the number of active rules in state s.
The state liveness violation goal generation algorithm creates a goal for each state, and a fault is
found if there is no plan satisfying (= (state) s) where s is the state under test.
Similarly the rule liveness violation goal generation algorithm creates a goal to impose that a rule
associated with a state is active, and this is repeated for all rules associated with all states. A fault is
reported if no plan can be generated for a particular rule to be active in a particular state having the rule’s
priority. The number of generated goals for this property is
∑|S|
s=0 |Rs|.
The state invariant violation goal generation algorithm creates a goal for each state in which an
invariant has been specified. A fault is reported if there is a path reaching the state under test and
negating the invariant.
Finally, each goal is initialized with an initial condition in which the state is the initial state and the
priority is the highest (i.e. (= (state) 0) (= (priority) 0))
6.4 Related Work
Among the validation techniques there are some which validate the application with a set of given pat-
terns. Roman et al. define Mobile UNITY, an extension of the UNITY notation and proof logic to the
verification of mobile systems [RMP97]. Given mobile applications specified in Mobile UNITY and
associated specified properties, Mobile UNITY is able to verify the application against the specified
properties. This work mainly focuses on verifying the mobility aspects of the application, whereas our
approach is concerned with discovering faults in an application’s context-awareness and adaptation be-
havior.
Xu and Cheung propose inconsistency detection in context-aware applications whereby patterns
identify conflicts among context inputs at run-time before they are fed to an application [XC05, XCC06].
The patterns are defined by engineers based on their understanding of relevant mathematical and physical
laws. This work focuses mainly on verifying the correctness of the context inputs themselves. In contrast,
we assume context inputs to be consistent and then evaluate them within the predicates of adaptation rules
to check whether there are faults in the formulation or triggering of rules. We also consider intrinsic
relationships among context variables, in particular the delays resulting from asynchronous update of
context variables having different refresh rates, and we identify the adaptation faults that may arise as a
result.
Several researchers from the testing community have begun to target the validation of
CAAAs [LCT06, WER07a]. Although we share their goal of detecting faults in CAAAs, our ap-
proach is fundamentally different, employing static analysis of adaptation models, while theirs are
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centered primarily on test selection and runtime analysis.
Efforts for testing rule-based systems (the main adaptation mechanism used by CAAAs) have fo-
cused on the development of coverage criteria for exercising single rules or rule chains [Bar97, Gup98].
In contrast, we statically analyze a set of rules to identify variables that may trigger multiple rules con-
currently or multiple commutations of variables within the same rule, leading to adaptation failures.
When designing sequential digital circuits in which multiple signals are input to a network of logic
gates, engineers must avoid hazards and races, which may produce incorrect outputs. Unger [Ung95] and
Hauck [Hau95] summarize timing problems in sequential circuits and describe techniques for predicting
and correcting them. Our work is based in part on the insight that processing of context inputs induces
similar kinds of hazards and races in CAAAs, and we provide an appropriate formulation of such faults
using our adaptation models. In particular, in our work we detect faults in which the choice of adaptation
rules to trigger and the order in which to trigger them depends on how long a context input value holds.
Finite-state models have been used extensively to represent and verify properties of systems. Some
work similar to our own has been done in the context of requirements engineering. Heitmeyer et al.
use finite-state models to discover inconsistencies in SCR specifications [HJL96], and Heimdahl and
Leveson use finite-state models to discover inconsistencies in RSML specifications [HL96]. While the
classes of inconsistencies that they detect are characteristic of requirements specifications, the fault pat-
terns that we detect are characteristic of CAAAs. Thus, although there are some similarities between our
fault patterns and their classes of inconsistencies, certain classes appear to arise only in CAAAs, notably
instability faults (described in Section 5.2.5) and context hazards (described below in Appendix A). Fi-
nally, we also note that model checkers use finite-state representations extensively to model concurrent
systems and to verify their temporal properties [CES86], and static checkers for meta-programming lan-
guages use such models to detect potential vulnerabilities in generated code [WGSD07]. Similarly, our
analysis operates on a finite-state model, but we have extended it to incorporate context information and
have tailored the analysis to focus on properties that are of particular relevance to CAAAs.
As we mention, several failures are caused by errors in the sensed context variables which are
computed and used for adaptations. This opens the problem of verifying the correctness of the read data.
Tse et al. [LCT06] suggest a formal language to create constraints between inputs and outputs and
apply metamorphic testing on those constraint in order to find out how the program handles noises. This
is a sort of contract-based context-aware testing but as it happens for other context based approaches,
if the logic becomes too complicated it may be difficult or impossible to represent it with a formal
language. Moreover, this formal description tends to become a twin implementation which will need to
be maintained.
The idea of using a planner instead of a model checker to validate a model or to find a suitable plan
to a desired configuration exists in the literature. Stefan Edelkamp has studied limit and possibilities
of using planners to validate models with particular focus on protocol validation [Ede08]. In this work
Edelkamp exposes benefits and drawbacks of planners, underlining the simplicity with which planners
can be used. Albarghouthi et al. have shown the potential of using planners for solving verification
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tasks [ABM09].
Chapter 7
Detecting Faults
This chapter shows how concepts introduced in the previous chapters can be applied to detect faults. In
Chapter 4 we described seven applications suffering from context awareness faults and we have classified
these faults according to various aspects. In Chapter 5 we presented a model representing behaviors and
adaptations, and we described various properties that when violated, lead to faults. In Chapter 6 we
introduced three novel techniques that analyze the A-FSM to detect violations of our properties.
In this chapter we discuss in detail the algorithms and setups required to detect faults in the A-FSM
models with our techniques. To facilitate the comprehension and the comparison we do not discuss the
three techniques separately. Instead we compare them by fault in order to underline differences and
benefits for each different fault.
In Chapter 8 we evaluate our novel validation techniques by applying their implementation to the
applications presented in Chapter 4. We will show which faults have been detected, and we compare
both performance and error reports.
7.1 Base Implementation and Setup
Figure 7.1 depicts the validation flow for the three techniques. Our techniques start from the A-FSM
model of the application under validation. We provide a simple Java 6 API capable of representing the
A-FSM in memory.
Our A-FSM generation API provides a simple but effective program interface to create an A-FSM
programmatically. This API is intended for developers willing to write parsers to extract the A-FSM from
the configuration files of their CAAAs. The API can also be used to create the A-FSM programmatically
within a Java application.
In this research we have used the A-FSM generation in two ways. First we used it to encode the
A-FSMs of all the application we validated. Second, we used it to generate the A-FSM model of a set of
synthetic models generated randomly for benchmarking purposes.
Listing 7.1: Example use of the A-FSM Generation API
1 /∗∗ D e f i n e an A−FSM ∗ /
2 Adaptat ionFSM afsm = new Adaptat ionFSM ( ) ;
3
4 /∗∗ D e f i n e c o n t e x t v a r i a b l e s ∗ /
5 C o n t e x t V a r i a b l e t ime = c o n t e x t ( afsm , ” Time ” , 1 ) ;
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Figure 7.1: Sub-models extraction from the A-FSM.
6 C o n t e x t V a r i a b l e a l a rm = c o n t e x t ( afsm , ” Alarm ” , 2 0 0 0 ) ;
7
8 /∗∗ D e f i n e PCV ∗ /
9 / / s t a r t <= s t o p
10 P r e d i c a t e s t a r t L e s s e r E q u a l S t o p =
11 v a r i a b l e ( afsm , ” S t a r t L e s s e r E q u a l S t o p ” , t ime ) ;
12 / / t i m e < s t o p t i m e
13 P r e d i c a t e b e f o r e S t o p =
14 v a r i a b l e ( afsm , ” B e f o r e S t o p ” , t ime ) ;
15 / / t i m e >= s t a r t t i m e
16 P r e d i c a t e a f t e r E q u a l S t a r t =
17 v a r i a b l e ( afsm , ” A f t e r E q u a l S t a r t ” , t ime ) ;
18 P r e d i c a t e enab leSound = v a r i a b l e ( afsm , ” EnableSound ” , a l a rm ) ;
19 P r e d i c a t e e n a b l e V i b r a t i o n = v a r i a b l e ( afsm , ” E n a b l e V i b r a t i o n ” , a l a rm ) ;
20
21 /∗∗ D e f i n e c o n s t r a i n t ∗ /
22 / / b e f o r e S t o p != a f t e r S t a r t
23 C o n s t r a i n t c t i m e = new C o n s t r a i n t ( b e f o r e S t o p , a f t e r E q u a l S t a r t ) ;
24 afsm . a d d C o n s t r a i n ( c t i m e ) ;
25
26 /∗∗ D e f i n e s t a t e s ∗ /
27 S t a t e i n i t i a l = new S t a t e ( ” I n i t i a l ” ) ;
28 afsm . a d d S t a t e ( i n i t i a l ) ;
29 afsm . s e t I n i t i a l S t a t e ( i n i t i a l ) ;
30
31 S t a t e day = new S t a t e ( ”Day” ) ;
32 afsm . a d d S t a t e ( day ) ;
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33
34 S t a t e n i g h t = new S t a t e ( ” Nigh t ” ) ;
35 afsm . a d d S t a t e ( n i g h t ) ;
36
37 /∗∗ D e f i n e p r e d i c a t e s ∗ /
38 / / t i m e >= s t a r t t i m e && t i m e < s t o p t i m e
39 P r e d i c a t e i sDay = or ( and ( s t a r t L e s s e r E q u a l S t o p , a f t e r E q u a l S t a r t , b e f o r e S t o p ) ,
40 and ( n o t ( s t a r t L e s s e r E q u a l S t o p ) , o r ( b e f o r e S t o p , a f t e r E q u a l S t a r t ) ) ) ;
41 P r e d i c a t e i s N i g h t = n o t ( i sDay ) ;
42 P r e d i c a t e dayMode = and ( enableSound , n o t ( e n a b l e V i b r a t i o n ) ) ;
43 P r e d i c a t e nightMode = and ( e n a b l e V i b r a t i o n , n o t ( enab leSound ) ) ;
44
45 /∗∗ D e f i n e r u l e s ∗ /
46 A d a p t a t i o n R u l e ac t iva teDayMode = new A d a p t a t i o n R u l e ( ” Act ivateDayMode ” , day ) ;
47 ac t iva teDayMode . s e t C o n d i t i o n ( i sDay ) ;
48 ac t iva teDayMode . s e t A p p l i e d A c t i o n ( dayMode ) ;
49 ac t iva teDayMode . s e t P r i o r i t y ( Rule . DEFAULT PRIORITY ) ;
50
51 A d a p t a t i o n R u l e a c t i v a t e N i g h t M o d e = new A d a p t a t i o n R u l e ( ” Ac t iva t eNigh tMode ” , n i g h t ) ;
52 a c t i v a t e N i g h t M o d e . s e t C o n d i t i o n ( i s N i g h t ) ;
53 a c t i v a t e N i g h t M o d e . s e t A p p l i e d A c t i o n ( nightMode ) ;
54 a c t i v a t e N i g h t M o d e . s e t P r i o r i t y ( Rule . DEFAULT PRIORITY ) ;
55
56 /∗∗ Add r u l e s i n t o s t a t e s ∗ /
57 / / ( i n i t i a l ,{ act iva teDayMode , a c t i v a t e N i g h t M o d e })
58 i n i t i a l . addRule ( ac t iva teDayMode ) ;
59 i n i t i a l . addRule ( a c t i v a t e N i g h t M o d e ) ;
60
61 / / ( day ,{ a c t i v a t e N i g h t M o d e })
62 day . addRule ( a c t i v a t e N i g h t M o d e ) ;
63 day . s e t H o l d C o n d i t i o n ( i sDay ) ;
64 day . s e t I n S t a t e A s s u m p t i o n s ( enab leSound ) ;
65
66 / / ( n i g h t ,{ ac t i va teDayMode })
67 n i g h t . addRule ( ac t iva teDayMode ) ;
68 n i g h t . s e t H o l d C o n d i t i o n ( i s N i g h t ) ;
69 n i g h t . s e t I n S t a t e A s s u m p t i o n s ( n o t ( enab leSound ) ) ;
70
71 /∗∗ Compute t h e i n p u t m a t r i c e s ∗ /
72 afsm . l o a d I n p u t S p a c e s ( ) ;
Listing 7.1 shows the Java code to create the A-FSM for Timerrific. In line 2 a new instance of the
object representing the A-FSM model is created. In lines 5–6, context variables are created and added
to the model. In this example there are only two context variables; one representing the time, and one
indicating the alarm status.
Once the context variables have been initialized, they can be used to define PCVs, in lines 9-19.
To avoid false positives in lines 23-24 a global constraint is defined, to ensure that the two predicates
identifying the time during the day and during the night cannot be simultaneously satisfied.
In lines 25-35 state Initial, Day and Night are added to the A-FSM. State Initial is also flagged as
the initial state. Once those states and PCVs are defined it is possible to create rules. In lines 46-69 two
rules are defined and added to the states. Notice that the formal definition of rule in the A-FSM model
identifies with a rule a single directed transition between two states. With this representation adaptations
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with the same trigger predicate and with the same final state are represented with a different rule for each
source state. This representation is formally correct, because in each state each rule can have a different
priority or a different action. However in practice, if two rules differ only in their source state, it is a
waste of memory to represent them with two separate instances. To minimize the memory usage the Java
class AdaptationRule defines a prototype of rule that can be associated with multiple source states. In
lines 46-54 two prototypes of rules are defined, and in lines 56-69 they are used to define four different
adaptation rule instances.
At this point the A-FSM is ready to use. For instance we could use it to generate reduced state
matrices as is done in line 72. Similarly the A-FSM could be used to generate an OBDD or to create the
PDDL domain and goals files. Separate API calls are provided for all these operations.
7.1.1 From the A-FSM to State Matrices
Starting from the A-FSM, the creation of the state matrices is a an iterative process that is linear in the
number of states and exponential in the number of PCVs in that state.
For each state, all PCVs that are part of either a predicate or an action of at least one adaptation rule
are sorted and associated with an increasing index. Next all possible assignments to the indexed PCVs
are enumerated forming bit strings of all the assignments. Finally bit strings are applied to predicate of
the rules defined for the state. If a bit string triggers at least one adaptation then it is inserted in the local
state matrix along with the triggered rule(s).
As explained in the rest of this chapter, enumerative algorithms use stable PCV configurations of a
state as starting points for the verification, simulating changes in the context and looking up the rules that
are triggered by the changes in the state matrix. Stable configurations are accessed sequentially, while
the state matrices are accessed randomly.
Our Java implementation uses two data structures for better performance. State matrices are rep-
resented with HashMaps using the bit strings as indexes, and the list of triggered rules as values. An
additional HashSet is used to store all the configurations violating a constraint. Our algorithms enumer-
ates over all the possible bit strings discarding those which are in the HashSet and using the HashMaps
to quick access the triggered adaptations rules.
Detected faults are generally reported as tuples in the form (S,V, {ri, rj , ...}) where S is the state
matrix under test, V is the bit string corresponding to the faulty assignment and {ri, rj , ...} is the set
of rules triggered by V in state S. Such tuples are a compact representation of adaptations in the state
matrix. Faults caused by a missing adaptation are reported by mentioning that an expected tuple is
missing. Faults involving a sequence of adaptations are reported with the sequence of tuples representing
such adaptations. This representation has the advantage of being readable. Developers can use it without
any additional computation. One fault is reported for each assignment in V that can trigger the fault.
We notice that in certain situations, several assignments may produce the same fault, causing it to be
reported several times. Although this is formally correct, it makes it hard for developers to distinguish
faults that are different from faults that have been reported multiple times. To minimize this side effect,
in our implementation we introduced in the bit strings the concept of “don’t care” (“*”) for PCVs not
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involved in the fault, hereby logarithmically reducing the number of reported tuples by the number of
unrelated PCVs. This is similar to what OBDDs do to minimize the number of internal nodes. With
this optimization the number of tuples reported for each fault is O(2v − 1) where v is the number of
PCV causing the fault. For instance, assuming PCVs A,B,C, a fault caused by A ∧ C will be reported
with one tuple containing the bitstring 1 ∗ 1. A fault cause by A ∨ C will be represented by three tuples
containing 0 ∗ 1, 1 ∗ 0 and 1 ∗ 1.
7.1.2 From the A-FSM to OBDDs
We demonstrate that OBDD-based approaches scale better as the size of the A-FSM increases, because
instead of iterating on all inputs, states and rules explicitly, such approaches group all solutions symboli-
cally using OBDDs. In this chapter we describe our two classes of OBDD-based algorithms: (1) globally
symbolic algorithms that use the global activation BDD and that computes the whole A-FSM symboli-
cally, and (2) locally symbolic (hybrid) algorithms that verify the A-FSM symbolically using the state
activation BDD when convenient and iterates otherwise.
We call globally symbolic algorithms those algorithms using our OBDD-based representation of the
state machine which to validate the whole A-FSM symbolically by using the global activation BDD. The
benefit of this approach is that the computation is done once symbolically over an OBDD representing the
whole A-FSM. The disadvantage of this approach is that creating, using and decoding example solutions
from an OBDD all have a computational cost.
We call locally symbolic (hybrid) those OBDD-based algorithms that verify the A-FSM symboli-
cally using the state activation BDD when convenient and iterates otherwise. The base idea behind the
locally symbolic algorithms is to minimize the overhead cause d by the composition and decodifica-
tion of the OBDD by iterating on the states instead. The intuition is that, since the number of states is
relatively small, it would be feasible to explore them iteratively and also, since state activation BDDs
strongly differ from each other then composing and using the global activation BDD should be com-
putationally more expensive than simply iterating on few states. In other terms the locally symbolic
algorithm represent an attempt to minimize the overhead of using a symbolic approach by applying a
symbolic computation only when computationally convenient.
In our implementation we start from our Java representation of the A-FSM, and we generate five
sets of Boolean variables as explained in Section 6.2. Then we compute the state activation BDD used by
the locally symbolic algorithms by means of Algorithm 3. For the globally symbolic algorithms we also
need to compute the global activation BDD by merging all the state activation BDD with the formula
presented at the end of Section 6.2 Our implementation is based on JavaBDD [Wha07] which is a Java
wrapper for the popular BuDDy [Coh04] package for OBDDs.
Both the locally and globally symbolic algorithms reports faults as OBDDs, which need to be
decoded into a more comprehensible representation to be used by developers. The locally symbolic
approach reports one OBDD for each state containing all the faults detected in that state. Such faults are
then extracted from the OBDD. The method of extraction changes from fault class to fault class and thus
cannot be generalized. In our implementation each fault detection algorithm also extracts and reports
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faults at the end of the computation. The globally symbolic approach encodes all the faults of the whole
A-FSM in a single OBDD. To extract them, faults are first divided state by state and then are decoded
as for the locally symbolic approach. In the rest of this chapter we show the computational cost of such
operations.
7.1.3 From the A-FSM to PDDL
The PDDL-based approach differs from the previous ones because the validation is not performed se-
quentially rather than exhaustively.
Unlike the previous approaches, which employ our custom algorithms, the PDDL solution uses
third-party planners to perform the verification. The domain and goal extractor compile the A-FSM
model into a domain containing actions and predicates representing the A-FSM, as described in Sec-
tion 6.3.1, and into a set of goals. Each goal represents a possible instance of a fault the planner can
detect. The number of generated goals increases with the number of states and rules, but notice that each
goal is independent, and therefore goals can be explored in parallel.
The generated goals can be divided into two categories: (1) those that when achieved show a fault,
and (2) those that when achieved imply that the application is correct. For testing purposes the former
are more useful than the latter because the produced plan is an execution trace showing how to trigger
the discovered fault. In the latter case, if the goal cannot be reached, it means that there is a fault but
no output is produced. Out of the four patterns of fault described in Section 5.1.2, rule liveness and
reachability fault are revealed when no plan is found, while determinism and state invariant faults are
revealed when a plan can be found.
Since the verification is performed by third-party components, the details of the results may de-
pend on the actual planner being used. In particular, if a certain planner has limitations in the size of
the goals that can be analyzed, the planner may terminate with an error. We ran our experiments using
MIPS-XXL [EJN06] and SGPlan [CwHW04]. The PDDL 3.0 language specification does not allow dis-
junction in goal definitions. However, in certain goals we had to check if a certain predicate, containing
a disjunction, was satisfiable. This issue can be addressed by applying De Morgan’s laws, but this results
in an increase of the goal files beyond 1024 bytes of PDDL code, which seems to be the upper limit for
certain planners, and thus care must be taken in their choice.
When a fault is found, planners report the sequence of changes in the context and of adaptations
from the initial state to the violation. Although a single fault is reported for each goal, the error report is
clear and contains a counterexample for the detected fault.
Listing 7.2: Extracted Domain for PhoneAdapter
1 ( d e f i n e ( domain PhoneAdapte r )
2 ( : r e q u i r e m e n t s : s t r i p s : t y p i n g : e q u a l i t y : d i s j u n c t i v e−p r e c o n d i t i o n s : f l u e n t s )
3 ( : t y p e s c o n t e x t )
4
5 ( : p r e d i c a t e s
6 ( i s t r u e B b t ? c − c o n t e x t )
7 ( i s t r u e E b t ? c − c o n t e x t )
8 ( i s t r u e D g p s ? c − c o n t e x t )
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9 ( i s t r u e B g p s ? c − c o n t e x t )
10 ( i s t r u e A g p s ? c − c o n t e x t )
11 ( i s t r u e D b t ? c − c o n t e x t )
12 ( i s t r u e A b t ? c − c o n t e x t )
13 ( i s t r u e A t ? c − c o n t e x t )
14 ( i s t r u e B t ? c − c o n t e x t )
15 ( i s t r u e C b t ? c − c o n t e x t )
16 ( i s t r u e E g p s ? c − c o n t e x t )
17 ( i s t r u e C g p s ? c − c o n t e x t )
18 )
19 ( : f u n c t i o n s ( s t a t e ) ( p r i o r i t y ) )
20
21 ( : a c t i o n r u l e A c t i v a t e O u t d o o r
22 : p a r a m e t e r s ( ? c − c o n t e x t )
23 : p r e c o n d i t i o n ( and
24 (= ( s t a t e ) 0 )
25 (= ( p r i o r i t y ) 5 )
26 ( i s t r u e A g p s ? c )
27 ( n o t ( i s t r u e B g p s ? c ) )
28 ( n o t ( i s t r u e C g p s ? c ) )
29 )
30 : e f f e c t ( and
31 ( a s s i g n ( s t a t e ) 1 )
32 ( a s s i g n ( p r i o r i t y ) 0 )
33 )
34 )
35 ( : a c t i o n r u l e D e a c t i v a t e O u t d o o r
36 : p a r a m e t e r s ( ? c − c o n t e x t )
37 : p r e c o n d i t i o n ( and
38 (= ( s t a t e ) 1 )
39 (= ( p r i o r i t y ) 5 )
40 ( n o t
41 ( and
42 ( i s t r u e A g p s ? c )
43 ( n o t ( i s t r u e B g p s ? c ) )
44 ( n o t ( i s t r u e C g p s ? c ) )
45 )
46 )
47 )
48 : e f f e c t ( and
49 ( a s s i g n ( s t a t e ) 0 )
50 ( a s s i g n ( p r i o r i t y ) 0 )
51 )
52 )
53 ; Omi t ted a c t i o n s . . .
54 ( : a c t i o n s a t i s f y D g p s
55 : p a r a m e t e r s ( ? c − c o n t e x t )
56 : p r e c o n d i t i o n ( and
57 (= ( p r i o r i t y ) 10)
58 ( i s t r u e A g p s ? c )
59 ( n o t ( i s t r u e E g p s ? c ) )
60 ( n o t ( i s t r u e D g p s ? c ) )
61 )
62 : e f f e c t ( and
63 ( i s t r u e D g p s ? c )
64 ( a s s i g n ( p r i o r i t y ) 0 )
65 )
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66 )
67 ( : a c t i o n u n s a t i s f y D g p s
68 : p a r a m e t e r s ( ? c − c o n t e x t )
69 : p r e c o n d i t i o n ( and
70 (= ( p r i o r i t y ) 10)
71 ( i s t r u e D g p s ? c )
72 )
73 : e f f e c t ( and
74 ( n o t ( i s t r u e E g p s ? c ) )
75 ( n o t ( i s t r u e D g p s ? c ) )
76 ( a s s i g n ( p r i o r i t y ) 0 )
77 )
78
79 )
80 ; Omi t ted a c t i o n s . . .
81 ( : a c t i o n s e t p r i o r i t y 1
82 : p a r a m e t e r s ( ? c − c o n t e x t )
83 : p r e c o n d i t i o n ( and
84 (= ( p r i o r i t y ) 0 )
85 ( o r
86 (= ( s t a t e ) 0 )
87 (= ( s t a t e ) 1 )
88 (= ( s t a t e ) 2 )
89 ( and
90 (= ( s t a t e ) 3 )
91 ( n o t
92 ( and
93 ( i s t r u e A g p s ? c )
94 ( i s t r u e E g p s ? c )
95 )
96 )
97 )
98 ( and
99 (= ( s t a t e ) 4 )
100 ( i s t r u e A g p s ? c )
101 ( i s t r u e E g p s ? c )
102 )
103 (= ( s t a t e ) 5 )
104 (= ( s t a t e ) 6 )
105 (= ( s t a t e ) 7 )
106 (= ( s t a t e ) 8 )
107 )
108 )
109 : e f f e c t ( a s s i g n ( p r i o r i t y ) 1 )
110 )
111 ; Omi t ted a c t i o n s . . .
112 )
Listing 7.2 contains part of the PDDL domain extracted automatically from the A-FSM model of
PhoneAdapter. The whole domain is composed by 905 lines of PDDL code of which here we report only
some fragments. The comments in Line 53, Line 80 and Line 111 indicate where we cut the generated
document.
The concepts of state and priority have been represented in Line 19 with two fluents state and prior-
ity. These fluents are reassigned by adaptation actions and are read by trigger predicates. Alternatively,
instead of using fluents it would have been possible to encode both state and priority as variables, to read
94 7.2. Detecting Nondeterministic Activations
their value with predicates and to set them with actions. We adopted the fluent notation because it is
more compact and because both planners we used in our experiments support fluent calculus.
In Line 2 the context is represented with a single variable “context”. This variables encodes the
current assignment of all PCVs. The truthfulness of a single PCV can be checked by using a variable-
specific predicate. In Lines 5-18 we have defined a PDDL predicate for each PCV in the model.
Starting from the initial state with priority 0, the planner tries to apply an adaptation. If no adap-
tation can be applied in the current state with the current priority level then the planner can trigger a
PDDL action to increase the priority. Lines 81-110 show an example of such actions. The planner loops
on all the priority levels until it reaches priority 10. If an adaptation rule is applied, the state changes to
the target state of the adaptation, the context changes according to the rule, the priority is reset to 0, and
the planner restarts looping over the priority levels in the new state with the new context. The priority
level 10 represents a level of priority lower than the levels 0 to 9 with which the adaptation rules have
been defined. The planner uses priority level 10 to apply changes in context. Contextual changes have
been modeled at priority level 10 with the assumption that rule predicates react more quickly than sensed
changes in the context. After a contextual change has been applied the priority is reset to 0 and the loop
starts over with the new context. The assumption stating that the application has enough time to check all
the rule predicates in between contextual changes is normally satisfied due to the refresh rate of sensors
which is longer than the time that the application needs to check the predicates. Software developers in
need of validating contextual changes that are faster than the adaptation logic can prioritize such changes
by increasing their priority level.
The planner can apply an adaptation by means of PDDL actions. Lines 21-52 show two such
actions, each one representing a single adaptation rule. The planner can apply such actions if the state
and the priority match with the ones for which the adaptation rule’s trigger predicate is satisfied. The
trigger predicate is encoded as a composition of PDDL predicates. Lines 23-29 show the precondition
for the action “rule ActivateOutdoor”. It can only be applied if the state is 0, the priority is 5, and if the
trigger predicate is satisfied.
Lines 54-77 show an example of two contextual changes that set and unset the GPS location. In
PhoneAdapter changes in the GPS location affects various PCVs whose values are restricted by certain
global constraints. These global constrains are encoded as PDDL preconditions and affect the rule
actions modeling contextual changes.
7.2 Detecting Nondeterministic Activations
As explained in Section 5.2.1, nondeterministic adaptation faults happen as a violation of the determin-
ism property when two rules are satisfied for the same time and their trigger predicates are satisfied by
the same set of PCV values.
7.2.1 Detecting Nondeterministic Activations with the Enumerative Approach
Algorithm 4 detects nondeterministic adaptation faults by using the enumerative approach.
Those faults can be easily spotted by observing the state matrix. For instance in the fragment of
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Algorithm 4 Nondeterministic Activation Detection (Enumerative)
Input: AFSM M : an A-FSM.
Output: Set faults: set of detected faults.
1: for each State S in M do
2: StateMatrix stateMatrix = S.getStateMatrix()
3: for each BitString bitString ∈ stateMatrix do
4: rules = S.getSatisfiedRules(bitString)
5: if rules.count() > 1 then
6: faults = faults + {S, rules, bitString}
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
state matrix listed in Listing 6.1 there are no nondeterministic activations because none of the PCVs as-
signments triggers more than one adaptation rule. Contrarily two of the four example PCVs assignments
reported in Listing 6.2 contains a nondeterministic activation. Intuitively the state matrix allow to detect
this pattern of fault simply by iterating over all its entries and by reporting those ones with more than
one satisfied adaptation rule. This is done by Algorithm 4.
More in details Algorithm 4 identifies the existence of bit strings that satisfy the predicates of
multiple rules which would produce a nondeterministic activation. The algorithm does not have to take
in account the priorities since that has already been computed during the composition of the state matrix.
Note that nondeterministic activations could also be detected when the state matrix is derived from the
A-FSM by requiring that each input satisfies the predicate of at most one rule. However, since the state
matrices are used by several algorithms, we decided to separate their generation from their analysis.
In Line 2 of the algorithm, S.getStateMatrix() returns the local state matrix for state S, which
contains a list of pairs (bit string, satisfied rules) for S. In Line 4, S.getSatisfiedRules(bitString) the
algorithm fetches from the state matrix all the highest priority satisfied rules for the current bit string.
Finally, in Lines 5–7, if there is more than one such highest-priority rule, then the affected rules and state
are reported along with the current bit string, which can be used to diagnose and eliminate the discovered
fault.
The enumerative Algorithm 4 returns a list of all the bit strings and corresponding rules
that can lead to a nondeterministic adaptation fault. Listing 7.3 is a short fragment of the gen-
erated report. The bit-strings reported as faulty (e.g. 101 ∗ ∗0100 ∗ ∗∗) encode the PCVs
of phone adapter in the order in which they where defined in the A-FSM model which is:
Agps, Bgps, Cgps, Dgps, Egps, Abt, Bbt, Cbt, Dbt, Ebt, At, Bt. For clarity the bit-string 101 ∗ ∗0100 ∗ ∗∗
indicates that a nondeterministic adaptation occurs when Agps, Cgps and Bbt are satisfied and when
Bgps, Abt, Cbt and Dbt are not. The assignment of all the remaining PCVs, i.e. the ones indicated with
”*” do not contribute to the occurrence of this fault. The same notation will be used in all the error
reports of the enumerative approach.
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Listing 7.3: Fragment of output of Algorithm 4
============================================
N o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c A d a p t a t i o n s [ Enumera t i ve ] :
============================================
============== S t a t e : G e n e r a l ==============
101∗∗0100∗∗∗ [ A c t i v a t e O f f i c e , Act ivateHome ]
100∗∗0010∗∗∗ [ A c t i v a t e O f f i c e , A c t i v a t e O u t d o o r ]
100∗∗0110∗∗∗ [ A c t i v a t e O f f i c e , ActivateHome ,
A c t i v a t e O u t d o o r ]
[ . . . ]
Algorithm 4 has worst-case complexity O(|S| ∗ 2|V|), since for each state it potentially analyzes all
possible assignments of values to the propositional context variables.
The remaining enumerative algorithms assume that the set of rules is deterministic; therefore, non-
deterministic activation faults must be eliminated before applying the other algorithms.
7.2.2 Detecting Nondeterministic Activations with the Globally Symbolic Ap-
proach
For each state and for each rule in the global activation BDD there is a nondeterministic activation for
each boolean configuration in which the sub-tree encoding the rule’s activation overlaps with the acti-
vation sub-BDD of any other rule. This is possible because the global activation BDD already contains
for each rule in each state an activation sub-BDD in which those configurations violating a constraint or
covered by rules at higher priority have already been removed.
Algorithm 5 implements the detection of nondeterministic activations faults using a globally sym-
bolic approach. However, the creation of the activation sub-BDD and the faults report enumerates on
states and rules.
This algorithm starts from the global activation BDD (Line 2) that already encodes overlapping
adaptations and filters unnecessary information and reports faults in a comprehensible form. Interfering
rules normally have different destination states, which are also encoded in the global activation BDD. It
is necessary to collapse all the sub-graphs representing activations from the same PCV assignment inde-
pendently from their destination. In Line 3 we use the existence quantification over predicate to remove
the boolean variables representing the destination states and the rules action PCVs thereby allowing the
analysis to ignore destination states and actions. The resulting BDD contains only the variables encoding
states, rules and trigger inputs.
In the rest of the algorithm we iterate state by state and rule by rule reporting faults. This algorithm
isolates satisfying inputs for all states (Line 5), detects which rules are satisfied by those (Lines 7–
19), and if there is more than one reports a fault (Lines 15–18). In Lines 5–6 the algorithm isolates
activations of the current state and then remove state variables from the BDD. We then isolate overlaps
between a rule and all the others by iterating on all the combinations of that rule with the others. In
Lines 8–9 we restrict the activation of the current state only to the activation of a certain rule and we
remove rule variables. We obtain a BDD containing exclusively the trigger input for the current rule
in the current state. In Line 10 we compute the conjunction between the state activation and the inputs
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Algorithm 5 Nondeterministic Activation Detection (Globally Symbolic)
Input: AFSM M: an A-FSM encoded using OBDDs.
Output: Set faults: set of detected faults.
1: faults = {}
2: BDD gActivation = M .getGlobalActivation()
3: gActivation = gActivation.exist(M .getDestStateVars(), M .getActionVars())
{gActivation now contains states rules and the PCV assignments}
4: for each StateBDD S ∈M do
5: BDD activationInState = gActivation ∧ S
6: activationInState = activationInState.exist(M .getStateVars())
{activationInState contains rules and the PCV assignments for all the activations in state S}
7: for each RuleBDD R ∈ S.getActiveRules() do
8: BDD ruleActivation = activationInState ∧ R
9: ruleActivation = ruleActivation.exist(M .getRuleVars())
{ruleActivation contains PCV assignments}
10: BDD activationInStateForRule = activationInState ∧ ruleActivation
{activationInStateForRule characterizes all the inputs triggering R in S}
11: Set faultyRules = {}
12: BDD faultyInput = 0
13: for each RuleBDD R1 ∈ S.getActiveRules() - {R} do
14: BDD overlap = activationInStateForRule ∧ R1
{overlap contains PCV assignments satisfying both R and R1 in S}
15: if overlap != 0 then
16: faultyInput = faultyInput ∨ overlap
17: faultyRule = faultyRule + R1
18: end if
19: end for
20: if ( faultyRules.size() > 1) then
21: faults = faults + {S, faultyRules, faultyInput};
22: end if
23: end for
24: end for
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triggering the current rule. By looping on all the other rules in Lines 13–19 we can extract overlaps
between the current rule and any other. Note that this inner iteration is only required to report explicitly
which rules are interfering. The overlap of inputs could be computed by simply isolating which inputs
in ruleActivation are also satisfying any other rule. That can be done by replacing Lines 10–19 with
BDDoverlap = activationInState ∧ ruleActivation ∧ ¬R.getEncoding(), and then reporting any
not empty overlaps.
The complexity of this algorithm is O(|S| ∗ |R|3).1
The symbolic Algorithm 5 returns an OBDD describing the fault. An OBDD is returned for each
rule involved in a nondeterministic activation faults, along with an indication of the interfering rules.
Such OBDDs encode both inputs and rules because the nondeterminism exists among a set of rules.
Listing 7.4 is a sample fault report as it is generated by our tool. In this and in all the other error
reports generated by the symbolic algorithms all the variables are encoded as illustrated in Table 6.1. For
instance 0 : 0 means that Agps if not satisfied.
Listing 7.4: Output of Algorithm 5
N o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c A d a p t a t i o n s G l o b a l l y Symbol ic : 20ms .
Found 5 f a u l t s :
N o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c A d a p t a t i o n [
s t a t e = ’ Genera l ’
r u l e s = [ A c t i v a t e O u t d o o r −> ActivateHome , A c t i v a t e O f f i c e ]
BDD = <0:0 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 1 1 : 0 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 1 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 0 , 1 1 : 0 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 1 1 : 0 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
]
N o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c A d a p t a t i o n [
s t a t e = ’ Genera l ’
r u l e s = [ Act ivateHome −> A c t i v a t e O u t d o o r , A c t i v a t e O f f i c e ]
BDD = <0:0 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 0 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 1 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:0 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 0 , 1 1 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 1 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:0 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 1 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 0 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 1 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 0 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 0 , 1 1 : 0 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 0 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 0 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 1 1 : 0 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 0 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 0 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 1 1 : 0 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 1 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 0 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 1 1 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 1 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 0 , 1 1 : 0 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 0 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 0 , 1 1 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 1 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 1 1 : 0 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 0 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 1 1 : 0 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 1 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 1 1 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 1 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 0 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 1 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 0 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 1 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 0 , 1 1 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 1 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 1 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
]
1The complexity of the exist() operation in Line 3 of the algorithm is exponential in the number of variables quantified and thus
linear in the number of rules.
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N o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c A d a p t a t i o n [
s t a t e = ’ Genera l ’
r u l e s = [ A c t i v a t e O f f i c e −> A c t i v a t e O u t d o o r , Act ivateHome ]
BDD = <0:0 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 1 1 : 0 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 0 , 35:0>
<0:0 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 0 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:0 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 0 , 1 1 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:0 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 0 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 0 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 1 1 : 0 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 0 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 1 1 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 0 , 1 1 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 1 1 : 0 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 1 1 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 0 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 0 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 0 , 1 1 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
<0:1 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 9 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 1 , 35:0>
]
N o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c A d a p t a t i o n [
s t a t e = ’ Outdoor ’
r u l e s = [ D e a c t i v a t e O u t d o o r −> A c t i v a t e J o g g i n g ]
BDD = <2:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 1 1 : 1 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 1 , 3 4 : 0 , 35:0>
<2:1 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 1 , 3 4 : 0 , 35:0>
]
N o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c A d a p t a t i o n [
s t a t e = ’ Outdoor ’
r u l e s = [ A c t i v a t e J o g g i n g −> D e a c t i v a t e O u t d o o r ]
BDD = <2:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 1 1 : 1 , 3 2 : 1 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 0 , 35:0>
<2:1 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 3 2 : 1 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 0 , 35:0>
]
Algorithm 5 decodes nondeterministic overlaps state by state and rule by rule, therefore each over-
lap is reported once per rule. For instance in state General there are three rules interfering and the fault
is reported three times. The OBDD encoding the faults contains the PCVs assignment and the rule with
which the current rule is overlapping. Consider for instance the nondeterministic activation in state Gen-
eral between rule ActivateOutdoor with ActivateHome and ActivateOffice. The reported OBDD states
that ActivateOutdoor overlaps with ActivateOffice (encoded as < 32 : 0, 33 : 1, 34 : 1, 35 : 0 >)
when the PCVs are assigned with < 0 : 0, 3 : 0, 4 : 1, 6 : 0, 9 : 1, 11 : 0 >, with Acti-
vateHome (encoded as < 32 : 0, 33 : 0, 34 : 1, 35 : 0 >) when the PCVs are assigned with
< 0 : 1, 3 : 0, 4 : 1, 6 : 0, 9 : 0, 11 : 0 > and with both (< 32 : 0, 34 : 1, 35 : 0 >) when the
PCVs are assigned with < 0 : 1, 3 : 0, 4 : 1, 6 : 0, 9 : 1, 11 : 0 >. Also note that the OBDD reported for
the faults for rules ActivateOffice and ActivateHome are different than this one because different are the
overlaps that they identify.
7.2.3 Detecting Nondeterministic Activations with the Locally Symbolic Ap-
proach
For each state Algorithm 6 explores all pairs of rules at the same priority level (Line 4,5,7–9)
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Algorithm 6 Nondeterministic Activation Detection (Locally Symbolic)
Input: AFSM M: an A-FSM encoded using OBDDs.
Output: Set faults: set of detected faults.
1: faults = {}
2: for each S ∈M do
3: Set unexploredRules = S.getActiveRules()
4: for RuleBDD R1 ∈ S.getActiveRules() do
5: unexploredRules = unexploredRules - {R1}
6: for RuleBDD R2 ∈ exploredRules do
7: if R1.getPriority() != R2.getPriority() then
8: continue;
{Skips different priorities}
9: end if
10: BDD overlap = R1.getPredicate() ∧ R2.getPredicate()
{Only overlaps belonging to the activation BDD are faults}
11: BDD fault = overlap ∧ S.getActivation() ∧ R1.getEncoding()
12: if fault != 0 then
13: faults = faults + {(S, R1, R2, fault)}
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: end for
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and generates a fault report if their predicates can be satisfied at the same time (Line 13). This algorithm
enumerates on states and on distinct pair of rules and on Line 10 uses the symbolic representation of their
activation to detect interferences. Note that not all the overlaps between two rule predicates generate a
fault. Only those ones which happen with the higher priority level are reachable and, when triggered,
generate a fault. In Line 11 all the overlaps which are not part of the activation tree are pruned.
Note that if the predicates of three or more rules are satisfied then the algorithm generates a solution
for each pair. The complexity of this algorithm is O(|S| ∗ |R|2).
The locally symbolic Algorithm 6 does not return a single group of interfering rules, but instead
detects pairs of such rules. Faults involving three or more rules are reported as multiple faults involving
different pairs of rules, reporting more faults but with a more compact OBDDs. Listing 7.5, if compared
with Listing 7.4 , shows that the same fault is reported with a clearer and more compact notation. As for
the globally symbolic algorithm the error report use the variable codification illustrated in Table 6.1.
Listing 7.5: Output of Algorithm 6
N o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c A d a p t a t i o n s L o c a l l y Symbol ic : 0ms
Found 4 f a u l t s :
N o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c A d a p t a t i o n [
s t a t e = ’ Genera l ’
r u l e s = [ A c t i v a t e O u t d o o r , Act ivateHome ]
BDD = <0:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 11:0>
]
N o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c A d a p t a t i o n [
s t a t e = ’ Genera l ’
r u l e s = [ A c t i v a t e O u t d o o r , A c t i v a t e O f f i c e ]
BDD = <3:0 , 4 : 1 , 9 : 1 , 11:0>
]
N o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c A d a p t a t i o n [
s t a t e = ’ Genera l ’
r u l e s = [ ActivateHome , A c t i v a t e O f f i c e ]
BDD = <0:0 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 0 , 9:1>
<0:0 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 9 : 0 , 11:1>
<0:0 , 3 : 1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 9:1>
<0:1 , 4 : 0 , 9:1>
<0:1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 0 , 9:1>
<0:1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 9 : 0 , 11:1>
<0:1 , 4 : 1 , 5 : 1 , 9:1>
]
N o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c A d a p t a t i o n [
s t a t e = ’ Outdoor ’
r u l e s = [ D e a c t i v a t e O u t d o o r , A c t i v a t e J o g g i n g ]
BDD = <2:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 11:1>
<2:1 , 3 : 1 , 4:1>
]
For the same detected faults in PhoneAdapter, Algorithm 6 generates four OBDDs with an average
of 5.25 internal nodes, while Algorithm 5 reports five OBDDs with an average of 20.2 internal nodes.
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Thus, the latter are roughly four times as large as the former. From the OBDD reported by the Locally
symbolic Algorithm it can be easily inferred that the pairs [ActivateOutdoor, ActivateHome] and [Ac-
tivateOutdoor, ActivateOffice] have a single overlap while the pair [ActivateHome, ActivateOffice] has
7 different ones (because the predicate representing the reported OBDD is the disjunction of 7 conjunc-
tions). In the error report of the globally symbolic algorithm this information is not as explicit as it is
here.
Developers interested in understanding which rules are interfering can benefit from the output pro-
duced by the symbolic Algorithm 5 because it groups interfering rules. The enumerative Algorithm 4
shows faulty inputs more clearly but it does not group them by rule. Algorithm 6 lies somewhat between
these extremes by organizing faults by pair of rules.
7.2.4 Detecting Nondeterministic Activations with Planners
Nondeterministic activation faults can be detected by instructing the planner to search for solutions in
which, from a certain state two rules with the same priority can be triggered. To do so a set of goal is
extracted from the A-FSM, one for each couple of distinct rule with the same priority and in the same
state.
Listing 7.6 depicts the extracted goal to detect the nondeterministic fault between ActivateHome
and ActivateOffice in state General. Simply the goal is the conjunction between the fluent representing
the state (Line 9), the fluent representing the priority (Line 10), and the predicates of the two rules
(Lines 11-17 and Lines 18-25) Intuitively if state = 0 and priority = 5 which is the priority level of
ActivateHome and ActivateOffice then if it is possible to reach a configuration in which both their trigger
predicate are satisfied then the planner has found a plan to a nondeterministic activation. Note that the
planner only reports the first plan found.
Listing 7.6: Extracted Goal for PhoneAdapter
1 ( d e f i n e ( problem N o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c A c t i v a t e H o m e A c t i v a t e O f f i c e )
2 ( : domain PhoneAdapte r )
3 ( : r e q u i r e m e n t s : s t r i p s : t y p i n g : e q u a l i t y
4 : d i s j u n c t i v e−p r e c o n d i t i o n s : f l u e n t s )
5 ( : o b j e c t s c − c o n t e x t )
6 ( : i n i t (= ( s t a t e ) 0 ) ( = ( p r i o r i t y ) 0 ) )
7 ( : g o a l
8 ( and
9 (= ( s t a t e ) 0 )
10 (= ( p r i o r i t y ) 5 )
11 ( n o t ( and
12 ( n o t ( i s t r u e B b t c ) )
13 ( n o t
14 ( and
15 ( i s t r u e A g p s c )
16 ( i s t r u e B g p s c )
17 ) ) ) )
18 ( n o t ( and
19 ( n o t ( i s t r u e C b t c ) )
20 ( n o t
21 ( and
22 ( i s t r u e D b t c )
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23 ( i s t r u e A g p s c )
24 ( i s t r u e C g p s c )
25 ) ) ) ) )
26 ) )
If we run the goal in Listing 7.6, the planner MIPS-XXL returns the plan in Listing 7.7 containing
three environmental changes and two adaptations. Recall that in this context we are trying to reach a
state in which both rules are active, and the planner produces a path from the initial state to achieve this
goal:
Listing 7.7: Output of Algorithm 7.6
N o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c A d a p t a t i o n s
[ A c t i v a t e O f f i c e , Act ivateHome ] :
============================================
0 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C ) [ 1 ]
. . .
9 : ( SET−PRIORITY−10 C ) [ 1 ]
1 0 : ( SATISFY−A−GPS C ) [ 1 ] / / Gps v a l i d
1 1 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C ) [ 1 ]
. . .
1 5 : ( SET−PRIORITY−5 C ) [ 1 ]
1 6 : (RULE−ACTIVATEOUTDOOR C ) [ 1 ]
1 7 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C ) [ 1 ]
. . .
2 6 : ( SET−PRIORITY−10 C ) [ 1 ]
2 7 : ( SATISFY−C−BT C ) [ 1 ] / / BT = {” Off icePC ”}
2 8 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C ) [ 1 ]
. . .
3 7 : ( SET−PRIORITY−10 C ) [ 1 ]
3 8 : ( SATISFY−B−GPS C ) [ 1 ] / / GPS = {”Home”}
3 9 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C ) [ 1 ]
. . .
4 3 : ( SET−PRIORITY−5 C ) [ 1 ]
4 4 : (RULE−DEACTIVATEOUTDOOR C ) [ 1 ]
4 5 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C ) [ 1 ]
. . .
4 9 : ( SET−PRIORITY−5 C ) [ 1 ]
The plan reported above is read as follows: Starting from state General (the initial state), GPS is
enabled (possibly by the user) and the application adapts into state Outdoor (possibly because the GPS
is detecting an unknown location). From state Outdoor, the Bluetooth device detects the office laptop
(maybe because the laptop has been switched on by the user), causing no adaptation. Then the GPS
location becomes Home, and the application adapts back to General, thus returning to the initial state.
After this chain of adaptations, due to the effect of the actions following each adaptation, in state General
it becomes now possible to trigger both ActivateOffice and ActivateHome, causing a nondeterministic
activation. Note that in the fault detected in this example the planner loops initially from state General
to state General without pruning the loop. This happens because the planner considers the truthfulness
of all the predicates which is changed due to the execution of the loop.
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Table 7.1: Comparison between the Nondeterministic fault detection algorithms
Algorithm Reported faults Aggregates assignments Detects multiple overlaps Traceback Duplicated reports
Enumerative All No Yes Local violation for each couple
Globally symbolic All Yes Yes Local violation No
Locally symbolic All Yes No Local violation No
PDDL based One per pair rules Unnecessary No Trace from the initial state No
7.2.5 Comparison
There is no superior implementation among these four algorithms. They all find all the faults and they
perform similarly. They differ in the way in which the fault is reported. Table 7.1 summarizes their dif-
ferences by showing which assignments are reported, how they are aggregated, if interferences involving
more than two rules are reported and if a trace back is generated.
Once the PDDL-based algorithm has hit a fault it reports a whole trace from the initial state to the
fault. This is very useful to trace faults, and to identify the cause of each failure. However, the planner
stops as soon as a fault is found, so this algorithm only identifies a single faulty assignment and not the
whole fault space.
In contrast the enumerative algorithm not only detects all the faulty assignments but also detects
when there are more than two interfering rules. The drawback is that the enumerative algorithm reports
each single faulty assignment as a distinguished fault. In addition, faults are only reported by identifying
the faulty assignment and not a complete trace.
The OBDD-based approaches are superior in aggregating the faulty assignments and report a single
BDD for each fault space. In particular the globally symbolic one reports multiple faulty rules together,
while the locally symbolic one reports them pairwise. However neither of them reports a complete
trace but only the faulty assignments. Notice that for each rule the symbolic algorithms report all the
interferences with that specific rule. Since interferences are generated by two rules at time, faults are
reported twice, one time for each rule.
7.3 Detecting Liveness Violations
Due to the variety of possible adaptations and to number of PCVs, increasing with the introduction of
more complex applications, certain rules may not be satisfiable, and certain states may be unreachable.
This phenomenon is analogous to dead code in the source code of a program. The four algorithms in this
section detect such states and rules.
7.3.1 Detecting Liveness Violations with the Enumerative Approach
In terms of state matrices, a Dead Rule fault is indicated by the absence of bit strings that satisfy
the predicate of some rule. If for a state S all its active rules are dead, then there exists a Dead State
fault. Algorithm 7 checks, for each state, whether the predicates for all rules are satisfiable for at least
one bit string. The algorithm iterates over all states and, for each state, executes two loops, the first one
identifying the live rules, and the second one reporting any remaining dead rules. Like Algorithm 4, this
algorithm considers each state independently of the others, and so Line 2 retrieves the state matrix for
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Algorithm 7 Dead Predicate and Dead State Detection (Enumerative)
Input: AFSM M : an instance of A-FSM.
Output: Set faults: set of detected faults.
1: for each State S in M do
2: StateMatrix stateMatrix = S.getStateMatrix()
3: Set untriggered = S.getActiveRules()
4: for each BitString bitString ∈ stateMatrix do
5: if untriggered == {} then
6: break
7: end if
8: Rule R = S.getSatisfiedRules(bitString)
{Deterministic: R is unique}
9: untriggered = untriggered − {R}
10: end for
11: for each Rule R ∈ untriggered do
12: faults = faults + {S, R}
{Dead Rule}
13: end for
14: if untriggered == S.getActiveRules() then
15: faults = faults + {S}
{Dead State}
16: end if
17: end for
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Algorithm 8 Dead Rule and Dead State Detection (Globally Symbolic)
Input: AFSM M: an A-FSM encoded using OBDDs.
Output: Set deadStates, deadRules: sets of detected faults.
1: deadStates = {}
2: deadRules = {}
3: BDD gActivation = M .getGlobalActivation();
4: for each StateBDD S ∈M do
5: BDD stateActivation = gActivation ∧ S
6: if stateActivation == 0 then
7: deadStates = deadStates + {S}
8: for each RuleBDD R ∈ S.getActiveRules() do
9: deadRules = deadRules + {(S, R)}
10: end for
11: else
12: for each RuleBDD R ∈ S.getActiveRules() do
13: BDD ruleActivation = stateActivation ∧ R
14: if ruleActivation == 0 then
15: deadRules = deadRules + {(S, R)}
16: end if
17: end for
18: end if
19: end for
state S. Line 3 initializes a set with all the rules active in the current state. Line 9 removes the associated
rule of each bit string in the state matrix, and it assumes that there should be at most one such rule since,
as mentioned in Section 5.2.1, the algorithm assumes that any Nondeterministic Activation faults have
been eliminated. Line 12 reports any rules that are not satisfied after searching through the state matrix.
If all the rules in a state are not satisfiable, then in Line 15 the current state is reported as being dead.
Algorithm 7 explores potentially all the bit strings for the propositional context variables and thus has
worst-case complexity O(|S| ∗ (2|V| + |R|)).
7.3.2 Detecting Liveness Violations with the Globally Symbolic Approach
Algorithm 8 starts from the global activation BDD of the input A-FSM (Line 3), which encodes
all the information about which rules can be triggered. The algorithm then iterates over states and rules
(Line 4 and Line 12). If a state does not exist in the global activation BDD (Line 6), then the state and
all its active rules are dead and are added to the fault set in Lines 8–10. Otherwise the decoding adds as
a fault each single rule that is active in the state at the current iteration but does not appear in the global
activation BDD (Lines 14–16). The complexity of this algorithm is O(|S| ∗ |R|).
Note that the fault extraction is linear, because we aim to log faults by state and by rule. It would
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Algorithm 9 Dead Rule and Dead State Detection (Locally Symbolic)
Input: AFSM M: an A-FSM encoded using OBDDs.
Output: Set deadStates, deadRules: sets of detected faults.
1: deadStates = {}
2: deadRules = {}
3: for each StateBDD S ∈M do
4: BDD stateActivation = S.getActivation();
5: if stateActivation == 0 then
6: deadStates + = {S}
7: for each RuleBDD R ∈ S.getActiveRules() do
8: deadRules = deadRules + {(S, R)}
9: end for
10: else
11: for each RuleBDD R ∈ S.getActiveRules() do
12: BDD ruleActivation = stateActivation ∧ R;
13: if ruleActivation == 0 then
14: deadRules = deadRules + {(S, R)}
15: end if
16: end for
17: end if
18: end for
be possible to identify if there is at least one instance of a fault in the whole A-FSM by generating
one OBDD containing all the rules for each state and by verifying that its conjunction with the global
activation OBDD is not null. However the generation of such an OBDD is also linear in the number of
states and rules.
7.3.3 Detecting Liveness Violations with the Locally Symbolic Approach
Algorithm 9 detects rule and state liveness violations with the locally symbolic approach. The
algorithm loops from the state activation BDD of each state in Line 3, checking for dead states in Lines 4–
9. If the state is live, then the algorithm decodes each faulty rule from the state activation BDD (Lines 11–
16). If a rule has a null activation BDD then that rule cannot be triggered and it is reported as faulty.
Like its fully symbolic counterpart, the complexity of this algorithm is O(|S| ∗ |R|) but over a smaller
data structure.
7.3.4 Detecting Liveness Violations with Planners
Listing 7.8: Extracted Goal for PhoneAdapter
1 ( d e f i n e ( problem R u l e L i v e n e s s A c t i v a t e S y n c h )
2 ( : domain PhoneAdapte r )
3 ( : r e q u i r e m e n t s : s t r i p s : t y p i n g : e q u a l i t y : d i s j u n c t i v e−p r e c o n d i t i o n s : f l u e n t s )
4 ( : o b j e c t s c − c o n t e x t )
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5 ( : i n i t (= ( s t a t e ) 0 )
6 (= ( p r i o r i t y ) 0 ) )
7 ( : g o a l
8 ( and (= ( s t a t e ) 0 ) (= ( p r i o r i t y ) 9 )
9 ( n o t ( and
10 ( n o t ( i s t r u e B b t c ) )
11 ( n o t ( i s t r u e C b t c ) ) ) ) )
12 ) )
Planners are designed to prove the reachability of given goals where the goal is a desired configu-
ration. Planners are successful in proving that a goal is satisfiable if at least one feasible path exists that
achieves the goal. In our PDDL algorithms we use planners to detect configurations causing faults. If the
planner is able to reach the faulty configuration then the fault is reachable and therefore its existence is
proven. However, for the liveness property, faults arise if no path satisfying a certain predicate is found.
Accordingly, our implementation checks if all the rules are reachable, and reports as faulty the
unreachable ones. The drawback of this implementation is that no counterexample is reported for the
unreachable rules. Listing 7.8 shows the goal generated to validate the liveness of rule Sync from state
General of PhoneAdapter. One such goal is generated for each adaptation rule. The goal is satisfied if
from the source state and with the priority of the rule, the trigger predicate of the rule is satisfied.
States are dead if all its active rules are dead. Dead states are simply detected by validating their
outgoing rules.
7.3.5 Comparison
Table 7.3 shows a comparison between the four algorithms. In terms of reported errors all the four
algorithms behave almost identically. However, contrarily to the others, the PDDL-based one does not
directly report dead states but requires one to aggregate results from rule liveness validations.
Even if in the A-FSM a certain adaptation rule can be satisfied, it can become unreachable at runtime
if the A-FSM adapts prematurely. We call such phenomenon a static hazard [SRWE08a]. In Chapter 8
we show that the PDDL-based approach is the only one capable of detecting such faults.
7.4 Detecting Reachability Violations
The reachability property asserts that all states are reachable. To detect violations of this property,
detection algorithms have to prove that no paths reaching a certain state exists.
7.4.1 Detecting Reachability Violations with the Enumerative Approach
Detecting which states are reachable and which are not requires the exploration of the state machine
starting from the initial state and then iteratively applying all adaptations to states that have not been
Table 7.2: Comparison between the Liveness fault detection algorithms
Algorithm Reports dead rules Reports dead states Detects faults caused by hazards
Enumerative Yes Yes No
Globally symbolic Yes Yes No
Locally symbolic Yes Yes No
PDDL based Yes No Yes
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Algorithm 10 Unreachable State Detection (Enumerative)
Input: M: an A-FSM.
Output: faultsVector: vector of detected faults.
1: next = M .getInitialState()
2: toExplore = {}
3: unreached = M .getStates()
4: while next ! = {} do
5: for each S ∈ next do
6: unreached − = S
7: stateMatrix = S.getStateMatrix()
8: for each bitString ∈ stateMatrix do
9: R = S.getSatisfiedRules(bitString)
{Deterministic: R is unique}
10: toExplore + = R.getDestState() ∩ unreached
11: end for
12: end for
13: next = toExplore
14: toExplore = {}
15: end while
16: for each S ∈ unreached do
17: faultsVector + = S
18: end for
reached earlier in the exploration.
Algorithm 10 starts with a collection of unexplored states containing all states (Line 2) and a collec-
tion of states to explore that contains only the initial state (Line 1). In each iteration in Line 5 we explore
consecutively all states in the collection to explore by analyzing the state matrix and, in Line 13, by
adding to the collection to explore any additional states contained in the state matrix under consideration
that are still contained in the set of unreached states. Additionally, in Line 6 we remove the current state
from the collection of unreached states.
Intuitively, in the first iteration we explore the initial state, in the second one all the states at distance
one from the initial state, and in the i-th iteration all the states at distance i − 1 from the initial state.
The total number of iterations is equal to the maximum length of the shortest path from the initial state
to any other state. Since each state is explored at most once, the worst-case complexity of the algorithm
is O(|S| ∗ 2|V|).
We can modify this algorithm to account for the possibility that Algorithm 7 does not report any
Dead Rule faults. In such a situation, this algorithm simply can loop on all rules within each iteration
and add the destination state of the rule to the collection of states to explore, which would reduce the
complexity to O(|S| ∗ |R|).
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Algorithm 11 Unreachable State Detection (Globally Symbolic)
Input: AFSM M: an A-FSM encoded using OBDDs.
Output: Set faultsVector: set of detected faults.
1: faultsVector = {}
2: BDD toExplore = M .getInitialState().getActivation()
3: BDD unexplored = 1
{All the states}
4: BDD gActivation = M .getGlobalActivation();
5: while toExplore ! = 0 do
6: unexplored = unexplored − toExplore
7: toExplore = gActivation ∧ toExplore
8: toExplore = toExplore.exist(M .getStateVars(), M .getRuleVars(), M .getPcvVars())
9: toExplore = toExplore.swap(M .getDestStateVars(), M .getStateVars())
10: toExplore = toExplore ∧ unexplored
11: end while
12: for each StateBDD S ∈M do
13: BDD faultInstance = unexplored ∧ S
{If a state exists then it is unreachable}
14: if faultInstance ! = 0 then
15: faults = faults + {S}
16: end if
17: end for
7.4.2 Detecting Reachability Violations with the Globally Symbolic Approach
Algorithm 11 detects unreachable states using a symbolic approach. The base idea is that since the
global activation BDD already encodes all the destination states the algorithm just have to verify that
those will be connected to the initial state.
Starting from the initial state (Line 2), Algorithm 11 iterates over a set of reached states (Line 5)
until all the reached states have been explored. At each iteration the algorithm symbolically creates
from the BDD representing the set of states to explore a new BDD representing the set of states which
are reachable and which have not yet been explored (Lines 7–10). The BDD representing the set of
unexplored reachable states to visit in the next iterations is extracted from the global activation BDD by
swapping the destination states variables with the state variables (Line 9) only for adaptations which are
active in the states which are currently being explored (Line 7).
Once There are no reachable unexplored states the algorithm iterates over all the states and checks
whether any state is in the set of unexplored states (Lines 13–17). This algorithm has a worst case
complexity of O(|S| ∗ (|S|+ |R|+ 2|V|) + |S|) = O(|S|3).
7.4.3 Detecting Reachability Violations with the Locally Symbolic Approach
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Algorithm 12 Unreachable State Detection (Locally Symbolic)
Input: M: an A-FSM encoded using OBDDs.
Output: Set unreached: set of detected faulty states.
1: unreached = {M .getStates()}
2: Set toExplore = {M .getInitialState()}
3: Set toExploreNext = {}
4: while toExplore ! = {} do
5: unreached -= toExplore
6: for each StateBDD S ∈ toExplore do
7: BDD activation = S.getActivation()
8: for each StateBDD K ∈ unreached do
9: BDD reached = activation ∧K.getDestStateEncoding()
10: if reached ! = 0 then
11: toExploreNext = toExploreNext +K
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: toExplore = toExploreNext
16: toExploreNext = {}
17: end while
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Algorithm 12 detects unreachable states with a locally symbolic approach. The base idea is exactly
the one implemented by Algorithm 11 but the main iteration is performed over a set of states and not
over a BDD
Similarly to Algorithm 11, Algorithm 12 starts from a set of states to explore (Line 1) initialized
with the initial state and in Lines 8–13 iteratively explores all the states reachable from the states explored
in the current iteration. In contrast to Algorithm 11, this algorithm only uses the local activation BDDs
to check which states are reached in each iteration (Line 9). The complexity of this Algorithm is O(|S|!).
The worst case with complexity |S|! is reached when all the states are in a chain. When this happens the
algorithm explores one ring of the chain at each iteration.
7.4.4 Detecting Reachability Violations with Planners
Listing 7.9: Extracted Goal for PhoneAdapter
1 ( d e f i n e ( problem R e a c h a b i l i t y O f f i c e )
2 ( : domain PhoneAdapte r )
3 ( : r e q u i r e m e n t s : s t r i p s : t y p i n g : e q u a l i t y : d i s j u n c t i v e−p r e c o n d i t i o n s : f l u e n t s )
4 ( : o b j e c t s c − c o n t e x t )
5 ( : i n i t (= ( s t a t e ) 0 ) (= ( p r i o r i t y ) 0 ) )
6 ( : g o a l (= ( s t a t e ) 6 ) )
7 )
Listing 7.9 shows the goal generated to validate the reachability of state Office of PhoneAdapter. Simi-
larly the algorithm in Section 7.3.4 to the goal is satisfied if the state is reached, and a fault is reported if
the planner does not find any feasible plan.
7.4.5 Comparison
In terms of detected faults Enumerative, globally symbolic and locally symbolic algorithms are equiva-
lent. These algorithms consider reached each destination state of each rule which can be satisfied from
a previously reached state. However it is possible that a runtime a certain set of PCVs assignments
will never be reachable due to runtime issues that we have named Static Hazards[SRWE08a]. If such
phenomenon affects all the assignments triggering adaptations to a certain state that state, even if con-
ceptually reachable may be, in practice, unreacheable. Enumerative, symbolic and hybrid algorithms
report those states as a false positives. On the contrary, the PDDL-based algorithm, by simulating the
runtime behavior, successfully report such states as unreachable. Table 7.3 summarizes the comparison.
7.5 Detecting State Invariant Violations.
Each adaptation applies a new behavior to the application. Sequences of adaptations, may sequentially
modify the application’s internal configuration and may induce unwanted behaviors.
Table 7.3: Comparison between the Reachability Fault Detection Algorithms
Algorithm Reports unreachable states Reports partitioned A-FSM Suffers from Static Hazards
Enumerative Yes Yes No
GLobally symbolic Yes Yes No
Locally symbolic Yes Yes No
PDDL based Yes Yes Yes
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To detect such misconfigurations we have introduced in each state the concept of invariant. Simi-
larly to a contract in contract base testing, an invariant is a predicate which should be always respected
as long as the application is in a certain state.
7.5.1 Invariant Detection via the Enumerative and OBDD-Based Approaches
Detecting if the current configuration is respecting the invariant of the current state simply requires us
to test the invariant on the current PCV assignment. However, in order to verify if the invariant can be
violated it would be necessary to:
• define an exploration algorithm: The A-FSM must be explored simulating sequences of context
changes and adaptations until a fault is reached.
• define an adequacy criterion: The exploration algorithm by definition could continue looping in
the state forever. To stop it, if no faults are found, it is necessary to define a criterion by which the
exploration can be considered complete.
We decided to go no further in the enhancement of these fault detection algorithms because the
efficiency in terms of fault detection completely depends on the search algorithm and on the adequacy
criteria used. In the literature several search algorithms and adequacy criteria already exist. The imple-
mentation and the evaluation of such algorithms is out of the scope of this thesis.
7.5.2 Detecting State Invariant Violations with Planners
We initially started experimenting with planners specifically to detect invariant violations. Indeed, the
computation required to detect the violation of an invariant is close to what planners normally do to reach
a goal.
The fault is defined as a goal in which the invariant is violated, for instance with the application
being stable in the state in which the invariant is defined but the invariant being not satisfied. Starting
from the initial state the exploration algorithm applies changes to context and adaptations until a violation
is found or until the adequacy criterion for the exploration is found. This search strategy is entirely
delegated to the planner, since planners are specifically optimized for this kind of task.
Listing 7.10: Extracted Goal for PowerManager
1 ( d e f i n e ( problem S t a t e I n v a r i a n t B a t t e r y F u l l )
2 ( : domain PowerManager )
3 ( : r e q u i r e m e n t s : s t r i p s : t y p i n g : e q u a l i t y : d i s j u n c t i v e−p r e c o n d i t i o n s : f l u e n t s )
4 ( : o b j e c t s c − c o n t e x t )
5 ( : i n i t (= ( s t a t e ) 0 ) ( = ( p r i o r i t y ) 0 ) )
6 ( : g o a l
7 ( and (= ( s t a t e ) 2 )
8 ( i s t r u e G p s E n a b l e d c )
9 ( i s t r u e B t E n a b l e d c )
10 ( i s t r u e W i F i E n a b l e d c )
11 ) )
12 )
Listing 7.10 depicts a state invariant validation goal extracted from PowerManager. The goal verifies
that in state BatteryFull GPS, Bluetooth and WiFi are never active simultaneously, in order to prevent
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the battery from being drained too quickly.
If we run the planner with the goal in Listing 7.10 we obtain the plan in Listing 7.11. A detailed
description of this plan can be found on Section 8.3. From the algorithm point of view what the planner
did was first to find adaptations satisfying the goal conditions on the context then to adapt on the desired
state.
Listing 7.11: Plan generate by the goal in Listing 7.10
1 S t a t e i n v a r i a n t v i o l a t i o n [ OnBa t t e ry ] :
2 ============================================
3 0 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C ) [ 1 ]
4 . . .
5 1 0 : ( SATISFY−ONACCHARGE C ) [ 1 ] / / Charg ing
6 1 1 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C ) [ 1 ]
7 . . .
8 1 5 : ( SET−PRIORITY−5 C ) [ 1 ]
9 1 6 : (RULE−ACTIVATECHARGINGAC C ) [ 1 ]
10 1 7 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C ) [ 1 ]
11 . . .
12 2 6 : ( SET−PRIORITY−10 C ) [ 1 ]
13 2 7 : ( SATISFY−BATTERYFULL C ) [ 1 ] / / t h e b a t t e r y i s f u l l
14 2 8 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C ) [ 1 ]
15 . . .
16 3 7 : ( SET−PRIORITY−10 C ) [ 1 ]
17 3 8 : (UNSATISFY−ONACCHARGE C ) [ 1 ] / / n o t c h a r g i n g
18 3 9 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C ) [ 1 ]
19 . . .
20 4 3 : ( SET−PRIORITY−5 C ) [ 1 ]
21 4 4 : (RULE−ACTIVATEONBATTERY C ) [ 1 ]
7.6 Detecting Stability Violations
7.6.1 Detecting Stability Violations with the Enumerative Approach
If an A-FSM is deterministic, it is possible to search for adaptation races and cycles by looking for
paths of transitions among multiple states whose active rules contain predicates that are satisfied by the
same bit string. Thus, in order to detect these faults, it is necessary to consider all propositional context
variables, not just the subset relevant to the active rules of a single state.
Algorithm 13 checks, for each state S, whether a particular bit string in the state matrix of S
can trigger a path of at least two transitions out of the state. Note that this algorithm is not local to
a single state, in the sense that it iterates over paths through multiple states. Therefore the algorithm
must consider the propositional context variables relevant to all the states in the A-FSM, and thus it
constructs a state matrix over all such variables (Line 2). Line 3 selects the next bit string to be searched.
In Lines 4–5, the variable rvector is set up to store the affected rules of any detected adaptation race
or adaptation cycle, while svector is set up to store the affected states. In Line 6, the variable isCycle
is used to differentiate between adaptation races and Adaptation Cycles, and it is also used to force the
algorithm to terminate. Lines 7–8 find the destination state for the highest-priority rule of the current bit
string and store it in variable destState. Lines 10–15 set isCycle true because, after at least one iteration
of the innermost enclosing loop, at least one repeated state has been detected at that point. Line 18 looks
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Algorithm 13 Adaptation Race and Cycle Detection (Enumerative)
Input: M: an instance of A-FSM.
Output: faultsVector: vector of detected faults.
1: for each state S in M do
2: stateMatrix = S.getStateMatrix().toGlobal()
3: for each bitString ∈ stateMatrix do
4: rvector = {} {explored rules}
5: svector = {} {reached states}
6: isCycle = false
7: R = S.getSatisfiedRules(bitString)
{Deterministic: R is unique}
8: destState = R.getDestState()
9: while destState != null || !destState ∈ svector do
10: if destState ∈ svector then
11: isCycle = true
12: rvector + = R
13: svector + = destState
14: break
15: end if
16: rvector + = R
17: svector + = destState
18: R1 = destState.getSatisfiedRules(bitString)
{Deterministic: R1 is unique}
19: destState = R1.getDestState()
20: end while
21: if size(svector)>2 then
22: if isCycle then
23: faultsVector + = {S, rvector, “cycle”, bitString}
24: else
25: faultsVector + = {S, rvector, “race”, bitString}
26: end if
27: end if
28: end for
29: end for
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for highest-priority rules whose source state is destState and whose predicate is satisfied on the same bit
string under consideration, thus indicating the presence of an adaptation race or cycle. Line 19 updates
the bit string with the appropriate corresponding actions. If a sequence of two or more states is detected
after searching the bit strings for all active rules of the current state, then Lines 22–28 report the rules
that form adaptation races and adaptation cycles along with the bit strings that cause them.
The worst-case complexity of Algorithm 13 is O(|S|2 ∗ 2|V|), since it explores potentially all bit
strings for paths containing potentially all states of the A-FSM.
If we run Algorithm 13 on PhoneAdapter we obtain the results in Listing 7.12. Note that List-
ing 7.12 only contains a fraction of the reported errors. In the error report with the symbol − >
metastable adaptations occurring after the first one. In the example consider the bit-string 101∗∗∗000111.
As for the previous examples that bit-string represent the assignment of PhoneAdapter PCvs in the order
of their definition:Agps, Bgps, Cgps, Dgps, Egps, Abt, Bbt, Cbt, Dbt, Ebt, At, Bt Once that configuration
is applied it triggers a sequence of adaptations first from state Home to state General by triggering the
rule DeactivateHome, then to states Office and then Meeting. Once in state Meeting the sequence of
adaptations starts looping between Office and Meeting.
Listing 7.12: Fragment of output of Algorithm 13
=============================================
A d a p t a t i o n Races and C yc l e s [ Enumera t i ve ] :
=============================================
============== S t a t e = Home ==============
000∗∗∗01011∗ Race ( Home , Deac t iva teHome )
−>(Genera l , A c t i v a t e O f f i c e )
−>(O f f i c e , A c t i v a t e M e e t i n g )
−>Meet ing
101∗∗1001∗∗∗ Race ( Home , Deac t iva teHome )
−>(Genera l , A c t i v a t e O f f i c e )
−>(O f f i c e , A c t i v a t e D r i v i n g )
−>D r i v i n g
101∗∗∗010∗∗∗ Race ( Home , Deac t iva teHome )
−>(Genera l , A c t i v a t e O f f i c e )
−>O f f i c e
101∗11010∗∗∗ Race ( Home , Deac t iva teHome )
−>(Genera l , A c t i v a t e O f f i c e )
−>(O f f i c e , A c t i v a t e D r i v i n g )
−>(Dr iv ing , A c t i v a t e D r i v i n g F a s t )
−>D r i v i n g F a s t
101∗∗∗000111 Cycle ( Home , Deac t iva teHome )
−>(Genera l , A c t i v a t e O f f i c e )
−>(O f f i c e , A c t i v a t e M e e t i n g )
−>(Meeting , D e a c t i v a t e M e e t i n g )
−>O f f i c e
7.6.2 Detecting Stability Violations with the Globally Symbolic Approach
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Algorithm 14 Adaptation Race and Cycle Detection (Globally Symbolic)
Input: AFSM M: an A-FSM encoded using OBDDs.
Output: Set faults: set of detected faults.
1: faults = {}
2: BDD gActivation = M .getGlobalActivation()
3: BDD futureActivation = gActivation.exist(M .getStateVars(), M .getRuleVars(), M .getPcvVars())
4: futureActivation = futureActivation.swap(M .getDestStateVars(), M .getStateVars())
5: futureActivation = futureActivation.swap(M .getActionVars(), M .getPcvVars())
6: BDD fault = gActivation ∧ futureActivation
7: for each StateBDD S ∈M do
8: for each RuleBDD rule ∈ S.getActiveRules() do
9: StateBDD D = R.getDestState()
10: BDD stateRuleDestFilter = S ∧ R ∧ D
11: BDD faultInstance = fault ∧ stateRuleDestFilter
12: if faultInstance ! = 0 then
13: faults = faults + {(S, R, D)}
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
Algorithm 14 detects stability violations with a globally symbolic approach. The base idea is that
there is to compare the global activation BDD with one of its transpositions in which all the adapta-
tions have been applied and to isolate those configurations which are active both before and after the
adaptation.
Starting from the global activation BDD (Line 2) Algorithm 14 creates a BDD representing the A-
FSM after all the adaptations have been applied. This is done symbolically by removing all the variable
representing the current state (Line 3), by swapping present and destination state variables (Line 4) and
by swapping the action variables with input variables (Line 5).
The resulting BDD in Line 5 the disjunction of all the configuration applied after any possible
adaptation was applied in conjunction with the state in which the application adapted. In Line 6 by
computing the conjunction between the BDD in Line 5 and the global activation BDD we obtain a BDD
containing for each state those inputs which violates the stability property.
The rest of the algorithm (Lines 7–16) decodes all the detected faults and organizes them by state
and rule. The complexity of this algorithm is O(|S|+ |R|+ (|S| ∗ |R|)).
Listing 7.13 is a fragment of the error report of Algorithm 14 showing one of the 15 faults that
it detected. The reported OBDD says that in state General (< 24 : 0, 25 : 0, 26 : 0, 27 : 0 >) with
the assignment < 2 : 1, 3 : 0, 4 : 1, 6 : 0, 11 : 0 > PhoneAdapter applies rule ActivateOutdoor
(< 32 : 0, 33 : 0, 34 : 0, 35 : 0 >) and adapts in state Outdoor where the configuration < 13 : 1, 14 :
0, 15 : 1, 17 : 0, 22 : 0 > will trigger another rule.
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Algorithm 15 Adaptation Race and Cycle Detection (Locally Symbolic)
Input: AFSM M: an A-FSM encoded using OBDDs.
Output: Set faults: set of detected faults.
1: faults = {}
2: for each StateBDD S ∈M do
3: BDD activation = S.getActivation()
4: for each RuleBDD R ∈ S.getActiveRules() do
5: BDD ruleActivation = activation ∧ R
6: ruleActivation = activation.exist(M .getDestStateVars(), M .getRuleVars(), M .getStateVars())
7: ruleActivation = ruleActivation.swap(M .getActionVars(), M .getPcvVars())
{compares with the destination activation}
8: StateBDD D = R.getDestState()
9: BDD futureActivation = D.getActivation()
10: BDD faultInstance = futureActivation ∧ ruleActivation
11: if faultInstance ! = 0 then
12: faults = faults + {(S, R, D)}
13: end if
14: end for
15: end for
Listing 7.13: Fragment of output of Algorithm 14
M e t a s t a b i l i t y G l o b a l l y Symbol ic : 27ms .
Found 15 f a u l t s :
M e t a s t a b i l i t y [
s t a t e = ’ Genera l ’
r u l e = ’ A c t i v a t e O u t d o o r ’
f u t u r e S t a t e = ’ Outdoor ’
a c t i v a t i o n = <2:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 1 1 : 0 ,
1 3 : 1 , 1 4 : 0 , 1 5 : 1 , 1 7 : 0 , 2 2 : 0 ,
2 4 : 0 , 2 5 : 0 , 2 6 : 0 , 2 7 : 0 ,
2 8 : 1 , 2 9 : 0 , 3 0 : 0 , 3 1 : 0 ,
3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 0 , 35:0>
]
7.6.3 Detecting Stability Violations With the Locally Symbolic Approach
Algorithm 15 detects stability violations with a locally symbolic approach
Intuitively the algorithm iterates over the set of all states (Line 2) and for each state checks whether
any of the possible adaptations is not stable in its destination state (Line 10). If that happens an error is
reported.
In order to identify configuration leading to this stability violations the algorithm first isolates, state
by state, all the activations of the current rule(Line 5), then discard information about the future state,
the rule and the current input, which are not necessary (Line 6), then swap the action variables with the
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input variables. The resulting BDD (Line 7) contains all the inputs representing the context after rule R
has been triggered from state S and its action has been applied. If the conjunction of such input with the
activation of the destination state is not empty it means that there are metastable configurations. Such
configurations are reported in Line 12. The complexity of this algorithm is O(|S| ∗ |R| ∗ (|S|+ |R|)).
Listing 7.14 is a fragment of the error report of Algorithm 15 when applied to PhoneAdapter.
Note that Algorithm 15 computes the same BDD as Algorithm 14, but the former perform the same
computation once for each state, while the latter does is only once but on a higher number of variables.
Also note that the BDD reported by Algorithm 15 do not contain variables 22–27 because they encode
the current state which is not included in the local activation BDD.
Listing 7.14: Fragment of output of Algorithm 15
M e t a s t a b i l i t y L o c a l l y Symbol ic : 5ms .
Found 15 f a u l t s :
M e t a s t a b i l i t y [
s t a t e = ’ Genera l ’
r u l e = ’ A c t i v a t e O u t d o o r ’
f u t u r e S t a t e = ’ Outdoor ’
a c t i v a t i o n = <2:1 , 3 : 0 , 4 : 1 , 6 : 0 , 1 1 : 0 ,
1 3 : 1 , 1 4 : 0 , 1 5 : 1 , 1 7 : 0 , 2 2 : 0 ,
2 8 : 1 , 2 9 : 0 , 3 0 : 0 , 3 1 : 0 ,
3 2 : 0 , 3 3 : 0 , 3 4 : 0 , 35:0>
]
7.6.4 Detecting Stability Violations with Planners
Detecting metastabilities with planners requires once again to add a support variable to give the planner
the notion of consecutive adaptations. In our PDDL domain planners iterate through all the priority
levels until either an adaptation is triggered or the context changes, and then the priority is re-set to its
highest value and the iteration restarts.
A correct execution path would contain contextual changes between each adaptation. A metastabil-
ity happens when two or more adaptations are applied without any other contextual changes in between
them. Similar in the cause but worse in the side effects, a cycle happens when in the chain of sequential
adaptations the same adaptation is re-triggered creating a closed loop.
To detect metastability we instrumented the extracted PDDL domain with a PDDL predicate adap-
tation triggered, to trace the sequence of adaptations by flagging if the last PDDL action in the plan was
an adaptation. PDDL effects extracted from adaptation actions satisfy adaptation triggered. Similarly
adaptation triggered is negated by the PDDL effects extracted from contextual changes. During a cor-
rect execution the adaptation triggered is never satisfied twice in a row. Consequently for each rule R
we generate a goal, reporting a fault if there exists an execution path in which both adaptation triggered
and R are satisfied. Listing 7.15 shows the goal generated to detect races involving the rule Activate-
Meeting. The number of the generated goals is equals to the number of rules. These goals detect both
races and cycles without distinguishing them.
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Listing 7.15: Extracted goal to detect races involving ActivateMeeting
1 ( d e f i n e ( problem R a c e A c t i v a t e M e e t i n g )
2 ( : domain PhoneAdapte r )
3 ( : r e q u i r e m e n t s : s t r i p s : t y p i n g : e q u a l i t y : d i s j u n c t i v e−p r e c o n d i t i o n s : f l u e n t s )
4 ( : o b j e c t s c − c o n t e x t )
5 ( : i n i t (= ( s t a t e ) 0 ) ( = ( p r i o r i t y ) 0 ) )
6 ( : g o a l
7 ( and
8 (= ( s t a t e ) 6 ) ( = ( p r i o r i t y ) 4 )
9 ( i s t r u e A t c ) ( i s t r u e E b t c )
10 ( a d a p t a t i o n t r i g g e r e d )
11 ) )
12 )
It is also possible by further instrumenting the PDDL domain and by defining specific PDDL goals
to detect only cycles on a given adaptation rule. For each rule R the PDDL effect can be instrumented
by introducing a new predicate R triggered satisfied only when S is satisfied and negated every time a
contextual change is applied. Cycles on R can be detected by with a PDDL goal reporting a fault if
there exists an execution path in which both R triggered and R are satisfied. Listing 7.16 shows the goal
generated to detect cycles involving the rule ActivateMeeting.
Listing 7.16: Extracted goal to detect cycles involving ActivateMeeting
1 ( d e f i n e ( problem C y c l e A c t i v a t e M e e t i n g )
2 ( : domain PhoneAdapte r )
3 ( : r e q u i r e m e n t s : s t r i p s : t y p i n g : e q u a l i t y : d i s j u n c t i v e−p r e c o n d i t i o n s : f l u e n t s )
4 ( : o b j e c t s c − c o n t e x t )
5 ( : i n i t (= ( s t a t e ) 0 ) ( = ( p r i o r i t y ) 0 ) )
6 ( : g o a l
7 ( and
8 (= ( s t a t e ) 6 ) ( = ( p r i o r i t y ) 4 )
9 ( i s t r u e A t c ) ( i s t r u e E b t c )
10 ( a c t i v a t e m e e t i n g t r i g g e r e d )
11 ) )
12 )
Both these implementations detect one fault per rule. In certain cases developers may need to know
all the possible metastable path for a given rule. This can be done by generating a PDDL goal for each
path, in a similar way in which Wang at al. [WER07c] generate drivers for each CAPP.
For instance, assume to be interested in validating all the paths contaning a rule and all the rules in
its destination state. To do so it is possible to generate a goal for each pair. Listing 7.17 shows the goal
detecting a metastability involving both ActivateOffice and ActivateMeeting. The number of generated
goals in this case is O(R2). Once again it is important to notice that two rules may be affected by
multiple metastabilities, but only one per pair will be detected.
Listing 7.17: Extracted Goal for PhoneAdapter
1 ( d e f i n e ( problem M e t a s t a b i l i t y A c t i v a t e O f f i c e A c t i v a t e M e e t i n g )
2 ( : domain PhoneAdapte r )
3 ( : r e q u i r e m e n t s : s t r i p s : t y p i n g : e q u a l i t y : d i s j u n c t i v e−p r e c o n d i t i o n s : f l u e n t s )
4 ( : o b j e c t s c − c o n t e x t )
5 ( : i n i t (= ( s t a t e ) 0 ) ( = ( p r i o r i t y ) 0 ) )
6 ( : g o a l
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Table 7.4: Comparison between the Metastability fault detection algorithms
Algorithm Detects multiple faults per rule Detects full sequence Identifies cycle Reports full trace back Scalability
Enumerative Yes Yes Yes No Low
Globally symbolic Yes Yes No No Medium
Locally symbolic Yes Yes No No High
PDDL based No No Yes* Yes High
7 ( and
8 (= ( s t a t e ) 6 ) ( = ( p r i o r i t y ) 4 )
9 ( i s t r u e A t c ) ( i s t r u e E b t c )
10 ( a c t i v a t e o f f i c e t r i g g e r e d )
11 ) )
12 )
7.6.5 Comparison
The four algorithms to detect metastabilities differ greatly from each other, in terms of both detected
faults and performance. The enumerative algorithm is the slowest and least scalable. Its complexity is
exponential in the number of variables. On the other hand the enumerative algorithm explores all the
possible sequences of activations and reports all the possible instances of faults.
The globally symbolic and locally symbolic approaches are the fastest algorithms. In particular the
locally symbolic uses very little memory and scales well. More details on memory consumption can
be found in Chapter 8. Both these algorithms simply identify the second of each metastability without
exploring it further, therefore they are not capable of distinguishing between races and cycles.
The PDDL-based approach is the weakest in terms of detected faults. It reports one metastability
per rule (or one for each pair in the second implementation). Moreover, while the other approaches can
foresee metastabilities starting from the first adaptation of the chain the PDDL-based approach detects
faults only when the planner is applying the second adaptation. On the other hand, the PDDL-based
algorithm is superior to the others in terms of readability of error reports.
Table 7.4 summarizes the comparisons.
Chapter 8
Evaluation
In this section we explore three research questions:
• RQ1: How effective are the analysis algorithms in detecting faults? To begin answering this ques-
tion we use our algorithms to analyze two open source applications, one commercial application
and one example application that we crafted to analyze some borderline cases. In Sections 8.2
and 8.4 we provide a summary of the faults found, highlight some of the interesting faults and
their impact, and describe the reports provided by the algorithms.
• RQ2: How do the algorithms scale as the complexity of the A-FSM increases? In Section 8.6 we
again use PhoneAdapter and also a suite of synthetic A-FSMs to measure the performance of the
algorithms as we increase the number of states, rules and variables.
• RQ3: What is the memory consumption behavior of the algorithms in limited memory environ-
ments such as would be found in end-user devices? To answer this question, in Section 8.7 we use
PhoneAdapter in a series of configurations with small and gradually decreasing amounts of mem-
ory to measure the threshold under which execution aborts or performance degrades excessively.
8.1 Preliminaries
Our primary analysis artifact is PhoneAdapter, which is implemented on top of ContextNotifier, a J2ME
rule-based adaptation framework and middleware for CAAAs [SRa], and targeted for deployment on
the Nokia N95 cellphone. We ran the application and its adaptation rules within TestingEmulator, an
emulator we have built for CAAAs [SRb]. Our implementation of PhoneAdapter has nine states and 19
rules, and it uses 12 propositional context variables.
Our algorithm implementations are Java 6-compliant.1 For the fully symbolic and locally symbolic
algorithms we relied on the JavaBDD library version 2.0 and on its default Java implementation of the
OBDD library [Wha07].
In addition to running the algorithms on PhoneAdapter, PowerManager, Timeriffic and GPS-
Recorder to count and compare the number of detected faults, we also ran two performance experiments
with multiple executions of the different algorithms. The first experiment was designed to answer RQ2,
1The full code for our implementation and the models used in the evaluation are available online [Sam].
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to measure the scalability of the algorithms. The second experiment was designed to answer RQ3, to
measure the algorithms’ behavior in the presence of a limited amount of main memory (i.e., JVM heap).
Both the experiments and all the validations were executed on an Intel i7 920 equipped with 6GB of
DDR3 RAM running Ubuntu 9.04 with the OpenJDK 6 at 64 bits. We set a timeout of 30 minutes for all
analyses. For the first experiment we configured the Java virtual machine with a heap size of 4 GB. For
the second experiment we decreased the JVM heap over the range from 32 MB down to 2 MB. In all the
other executions we adopted the default JVM configuration in which the heap size is set to 256 MB.
8.2 Validating PhoneAdapter
We created PhoneAdapter in the early stages of this research to have a real application helping us to
isolate and to identify faults. During the development various versions have been deployed on a Nokia
N95, and their failures have been examined and used to identify those fault patterns discussed in Sec-
tion 5.2. We used those faults to validate the correctness of our fault detection algorithms. The version
of PhoneAdapter presented in this Thesis contains the most significant faults that we found during its
development.
Table 8.1 summarizes the number of faulty input configurations found in PhoneAdapter. The first
Table 8.1: Faulty Input Configurations Reported for PhoneAdapter
State Nondeterministic Dead Adaptation Unreachable
Adaptations Predicates Races Cycles States
General 37 1 45 13 0
Outdoor 3 0 135 23 0
Jogging 0 0 97 19 0
Driving 0 0 36 13 0
DrivingFast 0 0 58 19 0
Home 0 0 76 19 0
Office 0 0 29 1 0
Meeting 0 0 32 1 0
Sync 0 0 27 5 1
column shows the nine states of the A-FSM. The remaining columns present the number of faulty
configurations found when we apply the fault detection algorithms. In general, the enumerative, globally
symbolic and locally symbolic set of algorithms detects the same faulty configurations but reports them
in a different fashion, as described in greater detail below. The PDDL-based algorithms instead finds up
to one fault for goals, and, unless specifically instructed to do so, cannot discriminate between two faulty
PCV configurations leading to the same fault. For instance if searching for nondeterministic adaptations
between two rules on a given state, the PDDL-based technique will report a single detailed error trace to
the first faulty PCVs configuration it encounters. This happens because goals are expressed in terms of
fault definitions and not in terms of PCV assignments. The PDDL-based approach can be instructed to
report more fault instances by refining the goal definition algorithms.
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Detecting Nondeterministic Adaptations
This pattern of faults appears when predicates of multiple rules with the same priority and active in the
same state can be satisfied by the same assignments to the propositional context variables.
By applying the nondeterministic adaptation algorithms (Algorithms 4, 5 and 6) we obtain the
results shown in column “Nondeterministic Adaptations” in Table 8.1. Most of the non-deterministic
adaptations were found in state General. The analysis for this state discovered 37 different assignments
to propositional context variables for GPS and Bluetooth that simultaneously satisfy the predicates for
rules ActivateOffice, ActivateHome and ActivateOutdoor.
Although the different types of algorithms detect the same faults, the way they report they varies
enough to warrant presenting further details.
The enumerative Algorithm 4 returns a list of all the variable assignments and corresponding rules
that can lead to a nondeterministic adaptation fault. A fragment of the reported output is shown in
Listing 7.3.
The globally symbolic Algorithm 5 organizes the results in a similar but more compact way, by re-
turning an OBDD describing the faults. An OBDD is returned for each rule containing nondeterministic
activation faults, along with an indication of the interfering rules. Such OBDDs encode both inputs and
rules because the nondeterminism exists among a set of rules. The error report is listed in Listing 7.4.
The locally symbolic Algorithm 6 does not return a single group of interfering rules, but instead
detects pairs of such rules. While the same fault can involve more than one pair, the OBDDs containing
the faults are simpler because they contain only the assignments of propositional context variables that
cause the faults and not the rule variables. Faults are reported in Listing 7.5.
For the same detected faults in PhoneAdapter, Algorithm 6 generates four OBDDs with an average
of 5.25 internal nodes, while Algorithm 5 reports five OBDDs with an average of 20.2 internal nodes.
Thus, the latter are roughly four times as large as the former.
Developers interested in understanding which rules are interfering can benefit from the output pro-
duced by the globally symbolic Algorithm 5 because it groups interfering rules. The enumerative Algo-
rithm 4 shows faulty inputs more clearly but may be too verbose. Algorithm 6 lies somewhat between
these extremes.
One common way to eliminate these faults is to assign distinct priorities to the affected rules in line
with the behavior desired for PhoneAdapter. In our case, we decreased ActivateOutdoor’s priority to 6
and increased ActivateOffice’s priority to 4.
If we verify the presence of nondeterministic adaptations between ActivateOffice and Activate-
Home, the planner MIPS-XXL returns the plan in Listing 7.7 containing three environmental changes
and two adaptations; remember that we are trying to reach a state in which both rules are active, and the
planner produces a path from the initial state to achieve this goal as described in Section 7.2.4.
We can repeat the same exercise for the rules ActivateOutdoor and ActivateHome, obtaining the
plan in Listing 8.1 containing four environmental changes and two adaptations. A similar execution
pattern occurs if we look for a state in which both ActivateOutdoor and ActivateOffice can be triggered.
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Listing 8.1: Nondeterministic adaptation between ActivateOutdoor and ActivateHome
1 N o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c A d a p t a t i o n s
2 A c t i v a t e O u t d o o r , Act ivateHome ] :
3 ============================================
4 0 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C )
5 . . .
6 9 : ( SET−PRIORITY−10 C )
7 1 0 : ( SATISFY−A−GPS C ) / / GPS v a l i d
8 1 1 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C )
9 . . .
10 1 5 : ( SET−PRIORITY−5 C )
11 1 6 : (RULE−ACTIVATEOUTDOOR C )
12 1 7 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C )
13 . . .
14 2 6 : ( SET−PRIORITY−10 C )
15 2 7 : ( SATISFY−B−BT C ) / / BT = {”HomePC”}
16 2 8 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C )
17 . . .
18 3 7 : ( SET−PRIORITY−10 C )
19 3 8 : ( SATISFY−A−BT C ) / / BT = {” C a r H a n d s f r e e ”}
20 3 9 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C )
21 4 0 : (RULE−ACTIVATEDRIVING C )
22 4 1 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C )
23 . . .
24 5 0 : ( SET−PRIORITY−10 C )
25 5 1 : (UNSATISFY−A−BT C ) / / BT != {” C a r H a n d s f r e e ”}
26 5 2 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C )
27 5 3 : (RULE−DEACTIVATEDRIVING C )
28 5 4 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C )
29 . . .
30 5 8 : ( SET−PRIORITY−5 C )
One possible scenario for this case is as follows: The user goes in the garden and turns on his
laptop. The GPS reading becomes valid while the laptop is still booting and the application adapts
to Outdoor. When the laptop is detected the application keeps its current state and nothing happens.
Someone turns on the car (maybe a user’s family member), the car’s handsfree is detected and the
application immediately adapts to Driving. As the car drives away the handsfree is out of range and the
application adapts to General, in which state the fault occurs.
The same execution pattern occurs if we look for a state in which both ActivateOutdoor and Activa-
teOffice are active; in this case we obtain the plan in Listing 8.2 containing four environmental changes
and three adaptations.
Listing 8.2: Nondeterministic adaptation between ActivateOutdoor and ActivateOffice
1 N o n d e t e r m i n i s t i c A d a p t a t i o n s
2 [ A c t i v a t e O u t d o o r , A c t i v a t e O f f i c e ] :
3 ============================================
4 0 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C )
5 . . .
6 9 : ( SET−PRIORITY−10 C )
7 1 0 : ( SATISFY−A−BT C ) / / BT = {” C a r H a n d s f r e e ”}
8 1 1 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C )
9 1 2 : (RULE−ACTIVATEDRIVING C )
10 1 3 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C )
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11 . . .
12 2 1 : ( SET−PRIORITY−9 C )
13 2 2 : ( SET−PRIORITY−10 C )
14 2 3 : ( SATISFY−C−BT C ) / / BT = {” Off icePC ”}
15 2 4 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C )
16 . . .
17 3 3 : ( SET−PRIORITY−10 C )
18 3 4 : ( SATISFY−A−GPS C ) / / Gps v a l i d
19 3 5 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C )
20 . . .
21 4 4 : ( SET−PRIORITY−10 C )
22 4 5 : (UNSATISFY−A−BT C ) / / BT != {” C a r H a n d s f r e e ”}
23 4 6 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C )
24 4 7 : (RULE−DEACTIVATEDRIVING C )
25 4 8 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C )
26 . . .
27 5 2 : ( SET−PRIORITY−5 C )
The execution trace in this case is as follows: From state General the car’s Bluetooth handsfree
is detected, forcing an adaptation to Driving. While driving, the office PC is detected (because maybe
someone else turned it on) and the GPS becomes valid (as is most likely to happen). If the car’s handsfree
becomes unavailable, then the application adapts to state General again, where the nondeterministic
adaptation can now occur.
Notice how the information provided by the planner for these examples is fundamentally different
from the information provided by the State Matrix and OBDD-based approaches. In the latter cases
we are only given a state (General, in the example above) and assignments to PCVs which cause non-
deterministic activations. However, it is left to the developer to find how (and if) those particular assign-
ments are possible for that particular state, as a result of actions associated with rules.
Detecting Dead Predicates
This pattern of faults consists of predicates that cannot be satisfied by any assignments to the proposi-
tional context variables, or predicates that could be satisfied but are always preempted by predicates of
rules with higher priority.
The column “Dead Predicates” of Table 8.1 shows that one such fault was detected in rule Acti-
vateSync in state General. By examining this state, we note that it is possible for predicates of the rule
ActivateSync to be satisfied by certain assignments, but such assignments also satisfy ActivateOffice and
ActivateHome, which have higher priority, and thus ActivateSync is never triggered.
All four algorithms for identifying dead predicate faults report these errors in the same format:
affected state and rule. As this pattern of fault is caused by the absence of satisfying inputs, there is no
error trace to report for the planner apart from the actual state and rule.
Detecting Adaptation Races and Cycles
Faults associated with races and cycles result from assignments that induce sequential or cyclic adapta-
tions, where the last state of the sequence depends on how long an assignment holds.
The algorithms identified many races that produce fluctuations in the states and may disturb the user
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temporarily. For example, if a user starts to drive and accelerates quickly, the application may or may
not reach DrivingFast (a state in which all calls are diverted), depending on whether the high speed is
maintained long enough to enable the transition from General to Driving and then to DrivingFast.
There are also races generating unwanted behaviors from which the application cannot recover
quickly. For instance, while in Driving, if Bluetooth loses the connection with the handsfree system,
the phone will adapt through General to Outdoor and then Jogging, from where it is impossible to
reactivate Driving even if the handsfree system is re-detected. (The adaptation rules are defined in such
a way that the rule that activates Driving never triggers while Jogging is active.) Finally, all the detected
cycles are produced by the rules ActivateMeeting and DeactivateMeeting when the state is Office and
Time >= meeting end.
As shown in the columns “Adaptation Races/Cycles” of Table 8.1, these are the most common faults
in PhoneAdapter and in our experience some of the hardest to detect without some form of automated
support. With the enumerative Algorithm 13, faults are reported as depicted in Listing 7.12:
Note that Algorithm 13 explores all sequences to identify races and cycles, and for each race or
cycle it reports every assignment that can trigger it. The other two algorithms, the globally symbolic
Algorithm 14 and the locally symbolic A shown in Listing 7.14 Algorithm 15, report the state where
a race begins, the rule causing the race, and to which destination state and with which assignment, all
in the form of an OBDD. PhoneAdapter has 15 different sets of this kind. Developers interested in
knowing if races exist in a CAAA will find this compact output more useful than the one produced by
Algorithm 13. On the other hand, developers wanting to understand how the CAAA will race or cycle
will find the error report of Algorithm 13 more suitable.
Detecting Unreachable States
States are unreachable when all the rules of which they are a destination state are dead. Running the
unreachable state detection algorithms on an A-FSM without dead rules returns an empty set of faults.
As shown in the last column of Table 8.1, state Sync is unreachable because the only rule with state Sync
as destination state, ActivateSync, is a dead rule. All three algorithms simply return a list of unreachable
states.
8.3 Validating PowerManager and Timeriffic
In this section we describe two commercial applications: Timeriffic [tim] and Power Manager [pow].
Timeriffic
Timeriffic is a simple application aimed at muting the cellphone at night and un-muteing it during the day.
In the initial stages of its development, Timeriffic was affected by a fault causing the muting behaviour
to be reversed. The fault was caused by a bug in the code in which a developer inverted the actions of the
adaptation rules of day and night mode. The bug was introduced in revision 7 and fixed over two months
later in revision 86.
Timeriffic, in all revisions before 86, can be modeled by means of three states: Init, DayMode,
NightMode. When the application starts it immediately adapts to state DayMode or NightMode depend-
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ing on the current time, then it sequentially adapts from one to the other at the scheduled time. We can
detect this fault by imposing a state invariant in both DayMode and NightMode. In DayMode we require
that the phone should not be on silent. In NightMode, instead, we require that the ringtone cannot be
turned on. To prevent the planner from finding solutions in which the ringtone is turned on manually
the actions satisfy-sound-enabled and unsatisfy-sound-enabled have been disabled to the user. Note that
these actions are used by the adaptation actions to apply the new state. We model the concept of time
with a predicate is-true-isday, and we initialize the goals at night. As soon as ActivateNightMode is
applied if the state invariant of NightMode is violated then a fault is reported, as follows:
Listing 8.3: State invariants violation applied to NightMode
S t a t e i n v a r i a n t v i o l a t i o n [ NightMode ] :
============================================
0 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C ) [ 1 ]
. . .
4 : ( SET−PRIORITY−5 C ) [ 1 ]
5 : (RULE−ACTIVATENIGHTMODE C ) [ 1 ]
The violation of DayMode is easily spotted. At first, due to the initial goal’s configuration, Night-
Mode is applied, then it becomes day, and as soon as ActivateDayMode is applied then the fault is
reported.
Listing 8.4: State invariants violation applied to DayMode
S t a t e i n v a r i a n t v i o l a t i o n [ DayMode ] :
============================================
0 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C ) [ 1 ]
. . .
4 : ( SET−PRIORITY−5 C ) [ 1 ]
5 : (RULE−ACTIVATENIGHTMODE C ) [ 1 ]
6 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C ) [ 1 ]
. . .
1 5 : ( SET−PRIORITY−10 C ) [ 1 ]
1 6 : ( SATISFY−ISDAY C ) [ 1 ] / / I t becomes day
1 7 : ( SET−PRIORITY−1 C ) [ 1 ]
. . .
2 1 : ( SET−PRIORITY−5 C ) [ 1 ]
2 2 : (RULE−ACTIVATEDAYMODE C ) [ 1 ]
PowerManager
Power Manager is a commercial Android application available from the Android Marketplace. Out of
the box, Power Manager maximizes the battery duration by turning on and off GPS, Bluetooth, Wifi, and
by regulating the screen brightness according to the current battery level. The basic idea is to turn off
each sensor when the battery is running low and to turn them on again when the battery is full or while
the phone is recharging using the AC adapter or USB.
Like most CAAAs, Power Manager allows users to configure its adaptation logic as they please.
While we were running it on an Android G1 phone with a custom configuration we found that the battery
duration was reduced to one half of the normal duration. We thought that this problem might be related to
invariant violation problems in the customization, and we attempted to find them with our PDDL-based
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verification technique. The custom configuration had five states:
1. Initial: The initial state when the application starts.
2. ChargingAC: The phone is charging using an AC charger.
3. ChargingUSB: The phone is charging using a USB cable.
4. OnBattery: The phone is running on battery and the battery charge is above 30%.
5. BatteryLow: The phone is running on battery and the battery charge is under 30%.
In this custom configuration, adaptations to BatteryLow turn off Bluetooth, GPS and WiFi to extend
the battery life. Adaptations to ChargingUSB and ChargingAC, instead, are defined with the associated
actions of turning on all the sensors, since the phone can use them without exhausting the battery, which
is on charge. Adaptations to OnBattery do not perform any action since the battery is full and the phone
can be used as it was configured.
Since PowerManager does not have any feature representing state invariant and since our algorithms
relies on them for detecting fault we have to extend the extracted model by adding them. We added two
state invariants to the two states running on battery. When the phone is in state BatteryLow, we require
that all the sensors must be off, and the back light should be low. When the phone is in state OnBattery,
we require that at least one of the sensors should be off or the back-light should not be high, to avoid an
excessive battery consumption.
A first execution of the algorithm reports a solution in which a configuration violating the invari-
ant was caused by changes in the environment, this represents a user configuring the phone with all the
devices active on purpose, and it could not explain our observed behavior. To avoid this false positive
we changed the domain by disabling environmental actions representing a user modifying GPS, Blue-
tooth, WiFi or the back light, and we configured the device to have all of them off at startup. With this
new set-up, the planner reports an error trace for an invariant violation in state OnBattery as shown in
Listing 7.11:
The planner finds a configuration in which the device is placed on charge. The actions associated
with ChargingAC turn on all the sensors. When the battery is fully charged, the device is removed from
the AC adapter. The application then adapts to OnBattery. As no action is associated to this adaptation,
the phone keeps the previous configuration with all the sensors enabled and “forgets” its configuration
before adapting to ChargingAC, thereby violating the requirement that at least one of them should be
off. Thus, this sequence of events explains why the battery duration was reduced so dramatically.
In summary, both Timeriffic and Power Manager show how the PDDL-based technique can detect
state invariants efficiently, and that the error traces reported are immediately usable by developers to fix
the faults.
8.4 Validating GPS Recorder
In this section we introduce GPS-Recorder, a very simple application we developed to show how the
PDDL-based approach can detect more faulty conditions than ourprevious approaches. The states and
rules of the application are depicted in Figure 8.1. Essentially, this is a simple GPS-based trekking tour
recording application. Tourists can rent from a base camp a GPS-enabled device on which the recording
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Figure 8.1: Crafted GPS Recorder application
application is running. When the application starts, it enables the GPS and starts reading the current
location. As soon as the user leaves the base camp, the application starts collecting GPS information
showing them on a map, and recording statistics about the route, including position, altitudes and speed.
At the end of the tour results can be uploaded to a Web Server and stored. We model the application with
four states:
1. Init: the initial state;
2. BaseCamp: the user is still in the starting point of the route and the application is not recording;
3. Recording: the user has left the base-camp and the application is recording times and locations; and
4. EndTour: in which the user has reached the destination, the recording is terminated and the statistics
are uploaded.
We introduce a number of rules: A rule ActivateBaseCamp is triggered from Init if GPS = True
and location = “base-camp”; A rule StartRecording is triggered from Init or from BaseCamp if GPS
is providing a valid reading and if location 6= “base-camp”. The tour ends when from Recording the
application triggers ApplyEndTour, which is satisfied if GPS= True and location= “destination-camp”.
The expected behavior of this application is a first adaptation from Init to BaseCamp, a second adaptation
to Recording and a third adaptation to EndTour. However it should also be possible to adapt from Init
directly to Recording if a user turns the application on when he has left the base camp already (see
Figure 8.1).
Both the State Matrix and the OBDD-based techniques do not report behavioral faults when applied
to this scenario. On the contrary, the PDDL-based approach reports that state BaseCamp is unreachable
and that ActivateBaseCamp is a dead rule, which is actually the correct diagnosis. The reason for this
is that the State Matrix and OBDD-based techniques find that in Init a configuration GPS = True and
location = “base-camp” exists, which satisfies an adaptation to BaseCamp. However, the reachability
of this configuration from the initial state is not checked. The PDDL-based approach, instead, always
starts from a chosen initial configuration and as a consequence it is not able to find any valid path capable
of triggering ActivateBaseCamp and therefore capable of reaching the state BaseCamp.
Even in this simple crafted example it takes some time to spot that there is no direct path from a
stable and valid configuration to any configuration triggering ActivateBaseCamp; similar situations may
occur in applications with more rules and they can be very difficult to detect.
In summary, the GPS-Recording application shows how the PDDL-based technique finds dead pred-
131 8.5. Random Model Generation
icate faults that cannot be detected by the other techniques.
8.5 Random Model Generation
To further assess the algorithms’ performance, in addition to PhoneAdapter, Timeriffic, Power Manager
and GPS-Recording, we generated a set of synthetic A-FSMs of increasing complexity with various num-
bers of states, rules, and variables. To make the A-FSMs more realistic, we constrained the generation
process as follows:
1. All states are the destination state of at least one rule (with the exception of the initial state), which
avoids having unreachable states that are trivially detected. The number of active rules in each
state is between one and eight, following what we have observed in practice in publicly available
tools.
2. The active rules of each state all have different priorities in order to guarantee that the generated
A-FSM is deterministic, since determinism is a prerequisite for most of the algorithms.
3. The number of variables used in each rule predicate is less than a specified maximum, and all
variables are used in at least one predicate. In the experiment we imposed a maximum of five
variables per predicate, in order to generate predicates of a complexity that represents what we
have observed in practice.
4. The variables used in each predicate are composed using a combination of negation, conjunction
and disjunction according to the following probabilities: Each variable has a 50% probability of
being negated, and conjunctions or disjunctions are selected with a 50% probability.
We used these synthetic models in the following experiments to better evaluate the performance of
our techniques with models of different complexity.
8.6 Evaluating Performance
Table 8.2 reports the performance of the algorithms running on the A-FSM of PhoneAdapter and the
randomly generated CAAAs. The size of the random CAAAs is reported in the first column as a triple
specifying the number of states, rules and variables. Performance times are reported in milliseconds,
represent the average over 10 runs, and include the time both to detect faults and (where applicable)
to decode the generated OBDD. For each algorithm we measured the time required to generate the
model in memory, which is shown in the columns labelled “MG”. For the enumerative algorithms, the
“MG” value corresponds to the time to create the matrix. For the fully symbolic and locally symbolic
algorithms, the value corresponds to the time to compute the state activation OBDDs, plus in the fully
symbolic case, the global activation OBDD.
Note that the three parameter of this experiment are not independent. Indeed the maximum number
of rules is limited by the number of variables and the maximum number of states is limited by the number
of rules. E.g. to connect n states it necessary to have at least n−1 rules. Moreover we observed that in a
132 8.6. Evaluating Performance
Table 8.2: Performance Results for The Three Classes of Algorithms (milliseconds)
States/Rules/Variables Enumerative Globally symbolic Locally symbolic
PhoneAdapter 82 3 1 207 2 16.9 5.9 0.9 10.5 1.3 13.1 0.2 0.8 8.9 0.8
Step 1
(10,40,10) 12 6.5 4 13085 8.3 24.3 19.3 1.4 26.4 5.5 13.45 0.15 0.6 10.55 0.5
(10,40,15) 327.3 49.1 39.5 127442 131.8 130.4 109.6 9.5 240.4 37.1 18.6 0.4 1.3 17.2 0.7
(10,40,20) OUT OF MEMORY 955.2 1033.0 158.0 2654.5 369.4 24.8 0.7 2.0 11.0 1.0
(10,40,25) OUT OF MEMORY 13522.0 19179.9 2384.8 48032 6939.3 25.1 0.5 1.2 13.0 0.9
(10,40,30) OUT OF MEMORY OUT OF MEMORY 26.7 0.3 1.5 10.7 0.9
(10,40,35) OUT OF MEMORY OUT OF MEMORY 28.0 1.6 2.8 9.9 1.8
(10,40,40) OUT OF MEMORY OUT OF MEMORY 35.3 0.6 5.3 15.7 2.6
Step 2
(10,45,15) TIMEOUT 157.2 130.0 14.5 314.6 61.0 22.4 0.4 2.0 12.6 1.1
(10,60,20) OUT OF MEMORY 4343.4 2616.7 492.4 12099 1366.1 51.7 0.9 3.9 19.8 1.6
(10,75,25) OUT OF MEMORY OUT OF MEMORY 54.4 2.2 16.6 29.5 2.6
(10,90,30) OUT OF MEMORY OUT OF MEMORY 71.2 2.0 43.9 73.7 4.3
Step 3
(10,30,10) 11.0 5.4 2.7 349.5 4.6 18.2 15.9 1.8 22.3 3.7 15.7 0.3 0.6 6.2 0.8
(15,45,15) 204.1 41.6 23.6 46718 39.6 223.0 153.6 13.5 336.6 54.0 20.6 1.1 0.9 14.9 1.1
(20,60,20) OUT OF MEMORY 7737.4 4607.9 374.0 11207 1469.2 33.5 0.2 1.0 6.7 1.7
(25,75,25) OUT OF MEMORY OUT OF MEMORY 34.3 1.3 3.1 11.4 5.5
(30,90,30) OUT OF MEMORY OUT OF MEMORY 35.7 0.6 3.6 11.4 6.3
(35,105,35) OUT OF MEMORY OUT OF MEMORY 39.7 0.7 3.4 10.8 8.4
(40,120,40) OUT OF MEMORY OUT OF MEMORY 47.6 4.1 4.9 11.3 17.2
(45,135,45) OUT OF MEMORY OUT OF MEMORY 66.3 0.9 2.8 15.5 8.6
(100,300,100) OUT OF MEMORY OUT OF MEMORY 169.7 1.5 6.3 18.9 33.3
(200,600,200) OUT OF MEMORY OUT OF MEMORY 1024.6 2.6 16.8 43.9 191.8
MG: model generation, ND: Nondeterministic Activation, DR: Dead Rule, AR: Adaptation Race, US: Unreachable State.
real implementation the number of rules is always greater than the number of states and that the number
of predicates increase proportionally with the number of states.
The studied A-FSMs are meant to expose the performance of the algorithms under various config-
urations. In our study we first manipulated the number of variables while keeping the number of rules
and states constant. Second, we manipulated the number of variables and rules while maintaining the
number of states constant. Third, we manipulated all three factors.
Overall we find that the enumerative algorithms do not scale to larger CAAAs and are generally
slower than the others, especially in the detection of races and cycles. The symbolic algorithms scale
only slightly better than the enumerative ones. The locally symbolic algorithms are the fastest, which
was unexpected since it is normally assumed that “pure” symbolic approaches are more efficient than
ones including any type of enumeration like the locally symbolic one. Further study reveals two reasons
that make the locally symbolic approach faster for our particular domain.
First, the OBDDs manipulated by the locally symbolic algorithms are generally smaller than the
OBDDs manipulated by the globally symbolic algorithms, so even if the number of loops in the locally
symbolic algorithms is greater, the smaller size of the OBDDs makes the algorithms faster overall. We
can measure the complexity of the state activation OBDDs by the number of nodes and the number of
paths that satisfy the three [Bry92]. Table 8.3 reports the average number of nodes and paths for the state
activation OBDDs of PhoneAdapter (with the average taken over all states) and compares those with
the total number of nodes and paths of the global activation OBDD. We note that the globally symbolic
algorithms deal with an OBDD of almost two orders of magnitude larger than the locally symbolic ones.
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Table 8.3: Comparison of OBDD Complexity (PhoneAdapter)
State Activation OBDD Global Activation OBDD
(state average) (total)
Nodes 24.2 935
Paths 12.2 6008
Figure 8.2: Step 3: execution times of the locally symbolic algorithms.
This is due to the fact that, in the worst case, the complexity of an OBDD increases exponentially in the
number of variables used.
Second, while a globally symbolic approach can be slightly faster in detecting faults, it returns all
the faults encoded as a single OBDD, which then must be decoded; this decoding process is a further
bottleneck of the globally symbolic approach. In contrast, with the locally symbolic algorithms all the
faults are reported as soon as they are found, and despite the fact that the number of iterations is greater,
the size of the OBDDs is smaller, and there is no decoding required. More generally, note that we
evaluated our algorithms only on a single CPU core. Better results can be obtained with the locally
symbolic approach parallelizing the the exploration. For instance faults local to a single state could be
detected by exploring each state in a dedicated thread.
In the third step of the experiment in Table 8.2 we fixed the proportion between the number of rules,
states and PCVs. In particular we imposed that S = V and R = 3 ∗ V where S is the number of states,
R is the number of rules and V is the number of PCVs. Figure 8.2 shows the plot for the executions of
the locally symbolic algorithms for Step 3. The Y-axis represent the execution time in logarithmic scale.
The X-axis represent both V and the complexity of the A-FSM. From the graph we can observe that as
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Table 8.4: Performance while Testing PhoneAdapter with Limited Memory (milliseconds)
Enumerative Symbolic Hybrid
Memory (MB) MG ND DR AR US MG ND DR AR US MG ND DR AR US
32 24.6 0.6 0.4 66.5 1.1 24.8 16.25 0.85 21.2 1.15 19.8 0.25 0.65 30.3 0.7
24 26.2 0.8 0.3 67.7 1.3 20.7 23.8 0.8 17.25 1.2 23.1 0.25 0.65 31.55 0.8
18 32.3 0.7 0.6 80.6 0.7 31.6 15.4 0.85 OOM OOM 24.3 0.3 0.65 71.45 0.75
16 42.0 1.6 0.4 83.2 0.6 28.45 31.6 0.85 OOM OOM 29.05 0.45 0.7 OOM 0.7
12 63.4 0.55 0.9 87.3 0.6 41.25 OOM OOM OOM OOM 34.2 0.15 0.75 OOM 0.75
8 269.5 1.2 0.65 OOM 1.45 54.4 OOM OOM OOM OOM 44.85 0.4 0.7 OOM 0.7
4 268.1 1.65 0.55 OOM 1.65 55.6 OOM OOM OOM OOM 47.55 0.35 0.55 OOM 0.9
2 276.0 1.6 0.6 OOM 1.7 51.15 OOM OOM OOM OOM 48.7 0.15 0.65 OOM 0.65
MG: model generation, ND: Nondeterministic Activation, DR: Dead Rule, AR: Adaptation Race, US: Unreachable State.
expected the model generation grows with complexity S ∗R which in this case is equals to 3 ∗ V 2 while
the reachability grows as |S|! = |V |!. We can also observe as with the increase of the A-FSM complexity
none of the execution times remains linear.
8.7 Evaluating Memory Consumption
In the experiments described thus far, we let the algorithms use all the memory at our disposal (4GB).
To better understand the trade offs between space and speed, we next explored the performance of the
algorithms on PhoneAdapter in more constrained memory settings. Such settings are also interesting
in practice since more CAAAs are enabling end-users of limited memory devices to redefine adaptation
rules, which can also be faulty and targets of our analysis.
Table 8.4 summarizes our findings. We observe that, for all algorithms, as memory decreases the
time required to generate the model increases slightly, in part because the garbage collector is invoked
more often.
All algorithms can run successfully on PhoneAdapter with 24MB of memory. However, with less
than 18MB the globally symbolic algorithms to detect races and unreachable states (Algorithms 14
and 11) run out of memory. Since the globally symbolic algorithms use a data structure that is an order
of magnitude bigger than the one used by the locally symbolic algorithms, it was expected that they
would have run out of memory sooner. If the available memory is decreased to 16MB, then the locally
Algorithm 15 (the only locally symbolic algorithm that operates on multiple states) runs out of memory
as well. If the memory is further reduced, all globally symbolic algorithms fail. With the exception of
Algorithm 15 and Algorithm 13, all the other locally symbolic and enumerative algorithms manage to
run with just 2MB of memory. Overall, the enumerative approach with its small data structures seems
to be a better fit for constrained settings. This result seems to contradict the one reported in Table 8.2
in which the enumerative approach had the largest footprint. The obtained results can be explained
in terms of memory footprints for the single data structure. An instance of OBDD is a complex data
structure, which contains several support structures which are needed during the computation but which
are initialized at startup. Contrarily the enumerative approach uses only data structures provided by the
Java framework such as HashMaps or ArrayLists. The results of this experiment show that for a model
of the size of PhoneAdapter the simpler data structures used by the enumerative approach have a smaller
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memory footprint than OBDDs. Therefore developers willing to validate a small model in a strictly
limited memory environment should prefer the enumerative approach.
Note that we run this second experiment in the same machine of the previous one, therefore the ob-
tained performances will out stand any execution on an handset. Similarly our code and all the included
libraries were compiled for a desktop machine, therefore they perform better but require more memory
as they would if compiled for a mobile device. Also note that we limit the memory by using the ”-Xmx”
flag of the virtual machine which only limit the heap memory and not the stack. Implementation of the
Java virtual machine running on mobile device may allocate smaller stack which may cause recursive
algorithms to throw a stack overflow exception. All of our algorithms are iterative so we do not have
stack problems.
8.8 Summary
We finalize the performance study by qualifying our findings. We observe that today’s CAAAs are
mostly of the size of PhoneAdapter, and that simpler algorithms like the enumerative ones may suffice.
Still, the growing complexity of CAAAs we are witnessing indicates that the application of more efficient
algorithms will become increasingly important. At the same time runtime validation of user defined
specifications is becoming more and more a requirement making also memory consumption a strict
constrain.
The need of having validation algorithms both scalable and memory efficient makes it necessary to
be able to measure the complexity of a CAAA. In this thesis we show how the complexity of CAAAs
depends simultaneously on the number of PCVs, rules and states and how this three parameters are
connected to each other. In particular the number of states affects the number of rules and the number of
rules affects the number of PCVs. It would possible to define a complexity index as a function combining
this three parameters altogether. Such complexity index could be used to compare the complexity of
different CAAAs.
The lesson that we have learned in the course of this thesis is that by localizing the fault as close as
possible in a state or in a rule we were able to reduce the cost of each detection algorithms. We observed
that there several source of complexity which sometimes are unnecessary and that can be avoided. For
instance a source of complexity in our algorithms was the need of decoding the detected faults in a
human readable form. This was particularly affecting the performances of the symbolic algorithms
adding a linear dependency. If the results were not supposed to be used by developers but by other
software components then it could be possible to reduce or even remove that overhead.
Similarly the complexity of the algorithm computing the state activation BDD is related to the
number of involved boolean variables. However most of the algorithms do not use all of those variables
(e.g. the from being included in the action effects, or the future states). but since we use the same
activation BDD for all the algorithms we were forced to include them. Not only those extra variables
increase the size of the BDD but also sometimes need to be removed or they will interfere with the
results. Such unused variables can be removed by means of the existential quantification function exist()
which in its worst case has exponential complexity. Developers in need of detecting only a certain class
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of fault could optimize the state activation BDD avoiding those variables from being included in the first
place.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
9.1 Contributions
In this Thesis we have investigated a modern class of applications which base part of their behavior on
readings from sensors embedded on the hardware on which they are running and which adapt according
to such sensor readings. We have called applications belonging to this class Context-Aware Adaptive
Applications, CAAAs for short. In particular we have investigated the most common faults in such
applications and how they can be prevented or detected. We fulfilled our investigation by providing five
different contributions.
9.1.1 Architecture Model and Fault Taxonomy
In Chapter 3 we have demonstrated that CAAAs have a common base architecture and that such archi-
tecture is evolving with the introduction of modern frameworks and mobile operating systems. The same
evolution that we have described has been identified also in existing applications, proving the soundness
of our intuition.
According to our architectural model, CAAAs suffer from an intrinsic problem: context values may
contain errors and are not available instantaneously. This is a direct consequence of the data processing
with which the environment is perceived, loaded and represented in the program memory. Sensors
acquire context values with a precision and with a refresh rate fixed by their manufacturer. Software
applications may try to prevent or correct such errors or to guess intermediate values in between two
readings, but if the context changes too quickly for the sensors to correctly perceive the changes then
the application will always compute incorrect data. Certain CAAAs use sensor fusion techniques to
compensate reading errors by reading from multiple sensors. However, such solutions still suffer from
reading errors plus they require the application to deal with inconsistent readings. In addition, in mobile
devices, to preserve battery, certain sensors may be turned off while needed and application developers
must remember to turn them on.
CAAA developers can benefit from our architectural model to foresee limitations and to prevent
sensor-related side effects. For instance, the Locale user support center had to inform their users of
intrinsic issues with GPS on Android, and in their user support center they added the following explana-
tions: “Why does it sometimes take a while to update my situation? For most conditions (battery, time,
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contact), Locale will update immediately. For some conditions, such as location, orientation, or some
plug-ins, it may take up to 10 minutes to detect a change in order to conserve battery life.” and “Why
does Locale only seem to change my settings when I tap on the Locale icon? For most conditions Locale
will update immediately, although certain conditions may take up to 10 minutes to update in order to
conserve battery life. What you’ve noticed is that Locale will go ahead check your conditions again
when the app is opened.”
Our architectural model also underlines to developers all the sequences of conversions and approx-
imations that are applied to contextual information before they become available as variables usable by
the different layers of the application. Being aware of the stack of transformations is crucial for devel-
opers in order to understand and eliminate bugs. To further help developers in identifying, classifying
and fixing bugs we have presented a fault taxonomy. Our taxonomy is meant to be used as an extension
to existing bug reporting and tracking tools to better classify the severity and the source of each bug. To
prove the usability of our taxonomy we have applied it successfully to the faults we detected in our case
studies.
9.1.2 A-FSM Model
According to our architectural model, and according to the applications that we have examined the com-
ponent on which developers should focus the most is the application logic. With the support of modern
operating systems and context-awareness frameworks, most of the components are already available and
developers have just to focus in writing the application logic. Moreover, in modern applications the
adaptation logic is designed by end users with a GUI, and developers have very little control over the
logic itself.
To help developers in improve the design of their application logic or to give them a better repre-
sentation of the logic designed by their users, we have proposed the A-FSM model. The A-FSM model
helps developers in focusing only in the application logic, delegating frameworks and OSs to do the
rest, by focusing them in the right abstraction level. We have used the A-FSM to represent all the case
studies of this Thesis and we have shown that it can easily represent any CAAAs without loosing any
information.
The definition of the A-FSM is a key contribution of this thesis because it is the base for the defini-
tion of our fault patterns and our validation techniques.
9.1.3 Fault Patterns
While applying the A-FSM model to our scenarios we noticed that certain faults had similar causes in
the application logic. In this thesis we isolated some of these common causes in the form of fault patterns
identifying properties which have to be respected in the model and which, if violated, lead to faults.
The definition of these fault patterns is useful to rule developers because it makes them aware of
several known issues and helps them in creating a more robust application logic right from the earliest
development stage. In applications in which users are defining their own rules, and thus in which de-
velopers cannot validate the logic, our properties can help developers in imposing limitations on what
users can and cannot define. This is similar to what Locale’s developers impose on their users. As
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discussed in the previous chapter, in Locale the rule editing GUI strongly limits the flexibility of user
defined predicates in order to limit the occurrence of faults.
In addition the formal definition of faults patterns has allowed us to design automated techniques to
expose automatically those faults in the A-FSM model.
9.1.4 Validation Techniques
Starting from our A-FSM model and built on top of the fault patterns that we have identified, we imple-
mented four automated validation techniques. We also provide an implementation of these automated
validation techniques allowing application developers to easily verify their application starting from an
A-FSM model.
The four techniques we describe use different approaches. The enumerative approach sequentially
inspects each different PCV configuration and reports anomalies at the granularity of individual con-
figurations. For faults involving a sequence of adaptations, fault detection algorithms have to take care
of tracing adaptations. Faults affecting multiple configurations have to be aggregated by the algorithms
themselves to reduce complexity. Symbolic algorithms aggregate PCV assignments using OBBDs and
reported faults are aggregated by design in the result OBDDs. The PDDL based approach delegates
planners to identify faults and reports a full trace from an initial configuration to the fault occurrence.
Among those approaches there is no superior technique: each one has its own strengths and weak-
nesses. Developers should choose the one that best fits their needs. Developers implementing a CAAA
with a certain application logic known a priori can design first an A-FSM of their application, validate it,
and prevent most of the faults at the design stage. In this case developers could perform an extensive val-
idation on a dedicated server using multiple techniques and comparing the results. For modern CAAAs
in which users define their own rules, our validation techniques could be embedded in the application
and validate the user-designed configuration at runtime.
9.2 Evaluations
We have evaluated our techniques both by applying them to our case studies and by examining their
performance in the experiments described in Chapter 8. We can compare our techniques in terms of
reported faults, error reports, performance and memory consumption.
Even if the PDDL-based technique reports at most one instance of a fault per goal we can say
that the four techniques have almost the same effectivenes in terms of detected faults. Multiple faulty
configurations are normally part of a continuous subspace of PCVs in which several assignments lead
to the same fault. The OBDD-based techniques aggregate such subspaces in the reported OBDD while
the enumerative approach reports a fault for each faulty assignment. In the PDDL-based approach,
if a goal would reveal two of those subspaces (i.e., the faulty subspace is partitioned), then only one
partition is reported. However, developers can iterate and fix such subspaces one by one. Moreover for
the Reachability property there are some borderline cases in which the Enumerative and OBDD-based
approach suffers from missing positives, while the PDDL-based approach is able to properly identify the
fault.
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Contrarily, in terms of fault reports the PDDL-based approach is superior to the others because it
generates a complete trace from an initial configuration to the fault occurrence. Such trace provides use-
ful information to understand the causes of the detected faults. The OBDD-based approaches aggregate
faults in OBDDs helping developers in understanding the severity of each fault. Among them the locally
symbolic approach is better than the globally symbolic because the OBDDs that it reports are generally
smaller than the other. In terms of reported faults the enumerative approach is slightly worst than the
others because it does not aggregate faults and does not provide a trace.
Performance of the PDDL-based approach depends on the planner used. Determining which plan-
ner is the better or faster is out of the scope of this thesis. Planning related conferences traditionally host
performance competitions in which various planners are evaluated against a set of known benchmarks.
To fulfill our validation the selected planner needs to support PDDL 3.0 and fluents. We observed that
some planners have issues with complex predicates or with predicates containing double negations. We
do not know if that is due to some bug in the implementation or to some internal optimization. To avoid
these issues our implementation automatically compacts predicates using De Morgan’s laws. Among
the planners we tried we recommend MIPS-XXL [EJN06] because it revealed itself as the most stable
one. The goal generation execution time takes a few milliseconds and the planning takes a few seconds,
depending on the detected faults. Note that planners stop searching for valid plans according to a given
heuristic function. The execution time (as well as the detected faults) are affected also by that heuristic
function. Evaluating performance and trade offs of such heuristic functions is out of the scope of this
thesis. We noticed that the default ones managed to detect faults in a reasonable time.
The scalability with respect to performance of the enumerative, globally symbolic and locally sym-
bolic approaches has been evaluated by means of the experiment in Section 8.6. CAAAs scale in three
dimensions: number of PCVs, number of rules and number of states. Note that such dimensions are not
independent from each other. Theoretically the enumerative approach is exponential in the number of
PCVs, the locally symbolic is linear in the number of states, and the globally symbolic should do all
the computation in one single symbolic computation (with a complexity depending on the computation
itself). According to our results the enumerative approach follows such expectations and does not scale
beyond a small number of PCVs. Surprisingly the locally symbolic approach scales nicely and manages
to handle even huge models with two hundred states. The globally symbolic approach does not scale as
nicely as the locally symbolic approach and can hardly handle models with more than 25 states. There-
fore, from the scalability point of view, we can claim that the locally symbolic approach is superior to
the others, and that enumerating on the states and validating them symbolically appears to be the best
solution. As explained in Chapter 8, the globally symbolic approach does not scale because its OBDDs
are two orders of magnitude bigger than the local ones generated by the locally symbolic approach. If
we look at the problem from a different perspective, states represent independent behaviors that the ap-
plication can assume. According to this it makes sense to validate them separately. Moreover it would
be possible to further improve the scalability of the locally symbolic approach by validating states in
parallel, for instance in a multi-core machine or in a cloud.
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CAAAs in which users can define their own application logic need to validate such rules before
they are applied. This need leads to the question of which approaches are better to be applied on a
memory limited device such as a smartphone. Since none of the existing planners runs on any existing
embedded device, and since if there will be a porting for embedded devices its performance will depend
on its implementation we decided to exclude the PDDL-based approach from our evaluations of memory
consumption 8.7. We were expecting this second memory consumption study to give results similar to the
scalability one. As expected, the locally symbolic approach resulted superior to the globally symbolic.
Unexpectedly, the approach which seams to run better in an environment with very limited memory is the
enumerative one. Indeed, the enumerative approach only uses hash maps to store the state matrixes and it
does not require any additional support data structure such as the nodes and indexes which are required
to create an OBDD. Therefore we can claim that the best approach to validate a small model with a
very limited memory is the one with the simplest data structure, which in our case is the enumerative
approach. According to our results the minimum required amount of memory to validate a model of the
size of PhoneAdapter is at least 10MB. Notice that our implementation was not optimized for embedded
devices, and therefore it may be possible to achieve better results with a dedicated implementation.
9.3 Future extensions
The research work presented in this Thesis can be extended in various directions. In this section we
quickly discus the ones that in our opinion are the most promising or the more useful.
Automated model extraction. Those CAAAs in which the application logic is user defined would
strongly benefit from the fault validation that we have presented in this thesis in order to prevent users
from running a faulty configuration. However in this thesis we assumed the A-FSM model to be given or
to be designed accurately by developers. This assumption is not valid for application in which the logic
is designed at runtime. To address such applications the work presented in this thesis can be extended to
include some form of runtime model extraction.
Most of the consumer market, which is at the moment the area in which this extension is needed,
is divided in two main areas: Android and iOS applications. Both Android and iOS rely on SQlite [sql]
for storing user data, meaning that all the user-designed states, rules and PCVs are stored in an internal
database. It is therefore theoretically possible to read those databases and automatically create the A-
FSM. Note that for security reasons, in both these architectures the databases are locked and only the
application owning them can read them.
Web based applications. There are various similarities between mobile embedded applications and
web-based applications. Indeed, most web based applications handle the user interaction according to a
fixed state machine and suffer from faults similar to the ones reported in this Thesis. Similarly in a SOA
(Service Oriented Architecture) composition of context-aware web services suffers from bugs related to
the way context is handled on multiple web services. We did some preliminary work in this field by
validating a set of known properties on a static composition of context-aware web services [CSRR09].
We successfully underlined the similarity between our CAAAs and context aware web services. However
our preliminary work can be extended both by exploring more exhaustively which kind of faults affect
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web service compositions and both by validating dynamic web service compositions by taking in account
also runtime issues such as context-aware service discovery.
Runtime failures (Hazards). Gates in logic circuits suffer from what is called hazard. Hazards are
those phenomena in which the output of a logic gate in which more than one of its signals changes has an
instability or “glitch”. Such a glitch can erroneously be interpreted by the circuit as the signal to perform
a certain action. Hazards happen because, when two or more inputs change simultaneously, the delay
between when they change and when the gate receives their new value depends on the number of other
gates on the path between the changes signals and the receiving gate. The time between when the gate
acknowledges the first and the last update is called a transitory. Digital circuits designers have developed
various techniques to prevent their output from being affected by hazards. We noticed that a similar
phenomenon also happens in CAAAs when a predicate is composed by PCVs over multiple context
variables and when two or more context variables change simultaneously. We did some preliminary
work in detecting hazards in CAAAs [SRWE08a], and we proved that they exist and that they can be
detected and prevented.
Appendix A
Hazards
In Chapter 5 we presented a set of properties whose violation leads to a certain category of faults.
Respecting those properties guarantees that the logic behind the behaviour represented in the model will
not be affected by faults of such categories.
In our research we came across a series of anomalies in which, even applications whose model
where respecting all the behavioural properties, were failing. Such anomalies, once identified, were
easily reproducibly by feeding the CAAA under test with a certain input (e.g. by recreating certain
condition with TestingEmulator [SRb]). We observed that those anomalies were caused by the boolean
trigger predicate of the rule in our model. We also observed that their occurrence was nondeterministic
and implementation dependent.
We named such anomalies Adaptation Hazards, as we found similarities with hazards in digital
circuits. Hazards are both related to the formula in the the rule’s trigger predicates but also to the im-
plementation of each single CAAA. Model based validation techniques applied to a phenomenon which
occurrence is implementation dependent will suffer from false positives and negatives. To prevent this
from happening the A-FSM model should be extended with low level implementation and architectural
details including information about the number of thread reading from sensors, used signals, monitors,
semaphores and any other details involving the internal scheduling of the application. Thus we consider
hazard detection a branch of this research which will lead to future works.
In the rest of this Appendix are presented some initial result that we had in hazard detection as we
presented them in one of our publications [SRWE08a]. The following results assume that the implemen-
tation uses one dedicated thread pooling over each single sensor and recomputes the trigger predicate
after each reading. This reactive architecture is very common among CAAA but is not the only possible.
A.1 What Hazards Are
Even if a set of rules for a CAAA satisfies the desired behavioral properties described in Chapter 5, they
still may suffer from faults related to the asynchronous way in which context variables are updated. We
can treat the effects of delays in asynchronous updates to context variables as hazards, similar to those
found in sequential digital circuits. Thus, hazards in a CAAA arise not as a result of the logic of the rules,
but as a result of the way physical changes to context propagate to the evaluation of rule predicates.
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Figure A.1: A Static 0-Hazard in an AND-Gate.
In Chapter 3 we described how the layered architecture of CAAAs gives rise to four different views
of the context, two of which are important for detection of context hazards—the physical context and the
sensed context [SRWE08b, SRWE10]. The physical context is the context as it exists physically in the
environment of a CAAA. The sensed context is the discretization of continuous physical context values
that results when a context-awareness middleware periodically reads the values from sensors and stores
them in the set Csensed of sensed context variables described in Chapter 5. For instance, in a physical
context in which a user is driving a car with his phone actively paired to a Bluetooth handsfree system,
the pairing would be represented by a periodically sensed context value such as “BT 00:01:A6:23:FD
paired”.
Whenever multiple changes occur to the physical context of the CAAA, the internal representation
of the sensed context will be inconsistent with the physical context, or stale, until all the relevant sensed
context variables variables have been refreshed. Evaluating rule predicates on a stale sensed context
exposes the system to hazards, namely to incorrect or unexpected adaptations. Such faults exist due to
three related reasons: (1) the predicates of rules are re-evaluated every time a sensed context variable
is updated; (2) the sensed context variables are updated asynchronously according to different refresh
rates; and (3) synchronizing the updates of the sensed context variables is difficult (because typically
they are updated by different sensor-specific run-time libraries) and undesirable (because of the resulting
degradation in performance).
For a given predicate, the occurrence of a hazard depends on the commutation order of the predi-
cate’s constituent propositional context variables. We illustrate this in Figure A.1 with the simple case of
an AND-gate that takes two inputs, B1 and B2, which are initially 0 and 1, respectively, thus producing
an output of 0. Suppose the inputs undergo a 2-commutation to the values 1 and 0, respectively, produc-
ing an output of 0 again. If B2 commutes first, then the output of the gate does not change. However, if
B1 commutes first, then the output transiently has the value 1 until B2 commutes, thereby exposing the
hazard.
In the adaptation rules of a CAAA, we can identify three different patterns of faults:
• A Hold Hazard occurs when the rules adapt to a new state in a situation when the current state
should prevail instead. This is similar to the static 0-hazard depicted in Figure A.1. From the
user’s point of view this fault produces an unwanted adaptation.
• An Activation Hazard occurs when the rules adapt to a new state before all relevant variables have
commuted during a commutation of multiple variables, and the new state is different from what is
expected.
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• A Priority Inversion Hazard is similar to an Activation Hazard and occurs when the rule that
triggers has a lower priority than the one that should have triggered. Activation Hazards and
Priority Inversion Hazards are similar to a dynamic hazard in sequential digital circuits [Ung95],
where a different output is produced before the evaluation is completed. From the user perspective
the system performs an incorrect adaptation and incorrect actions.
A.2 Detecting Hazards
Static hazards in sequential digital circuits are eliminated by introducing delays (such as a double nega-
tion) into a specific signal path [Ung95]. A solution for the adaptation rules of CAAAs could be to
introduce delays in the invocation of the actions of every triggered rule in order to make sure the des-
tination state of the triggered rule holds. Unfortunately, this would apply a fixed delay even to safe
commutations that do not create problems. Therefore, we instead focus on identifying which commuta-
tions of propositional context variables may lead to a hazard and then compute the smallest delay that
will avoid it.
For a given state, we define a stable assignment as an assignment of values to the propositional
context variables that satisfies none of the predicates of the active rules of the state. Correspondingly,
an unstable assignment is an assignment that satisfies some predicate. We define a critical path as any
sequence of commutations that starts with a stable assignment and has one or more intervening unstable
assignments. If a critical path ends in a stable assignment for the given state, then we have a Hold
Hazard. If the critical path ends in an unstable assignment, then we need to check for a Priority Inversion
Hazard. Otherwise we have an Activation Hazard. We only consider critical paths in which each variable
commutes at most once, since a critical path with multiple commutations of the same variable can be
subdivided into multiple critical paths with single commutations. In addition, we assume that multiple
propositional context variables associated with the same underlying sensed concrete variable are updated
simultaneously whenever the sensed concrete variable is updated. We can relax this assumption by
accounting for any implementation delays in the updating of the propositional context variables.
Algorithm 16 is applied in each state S and searches for hazards beginning from stable assignments,
which Line 2 identifies as the set of all bit strings satisfying no predicates of active rules of S. Lines 4–
31 explore all commutations from length two to the number of propositional context variables, with
the loop variable i indicating the current length to consider. Line 5 generates the set of permutations
of length i of indexes into the current bit string, indicating the different variables and their orderings
to consider for commutations. For each permutation, Lines 6–30 sequentially commute the variables
according to the current permutation and look for hazards under that setting. Line 15 discards a stable
path that has been processed already in a previous shorter path. Lines 16–20 detect Priority Inversion
Hazards when a rule R is discovered with higher priority than rules found before. Lines 21–27 detect
Hold Hazards and Activation Hazards. A Hold Hazard is present when there is an adaptation (indicated
by !isEmpty(rules[]) in Line 22) between stable assignments. Line 29 reports all detected critical paths
and their hazard category.
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Algorithm 16 HazardDetection
Input: M: an instance of A-FSM.
Output: faultsVector: vector of detected faults.
1: for each state S in M do
2: stableAssignments = complementBitStrings(S.getStateMatrix())
3: for each bitString in stableAssignments do
4: for i = 2 to S.numVar() do
5: indexList = permutation(S.getVars(), i)
6: for each sequence in indexList do
7: rvector = {} // selected rule in each step
8: u = bitString
9: hazard = null
10: for j = 0 to i - 1 do
11: u.flipBitAtIndex(sequence[j])
12: rules[] = S.getSatisfiedRules(u)
13: R = getHighestPriorityRule(rules[])
14: if isEmpty(rules[]) && (j != i - 1) then
15: break // reached stable assignment
16: else if (R != null) && !(rvector.contains(R)) then
17: if R.isHigherPriorityRule(rvector) then
18: hazard = “Priority Inversion”
19: end if
20: rvector.add(R)
21: else if (j == i - 1) then
22: if isEmpty(rules[]) then
23: hazard = “Hold” // may override
24: else if !R ∈ rvector.prefix(R) && hazard != “Priority Inversion” then
25: hazard = “Activation”
26: end if
27: end if
28: end for
29: faultsVector.add({hazard, S, bitString, sequence, rvector})
30: end for
31: end for
32: end for
33: end for
34: return faultsVector
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Algorithm 17 MinimumSafeDelays
Input: faultsVector: vector of detected faults.
Output: delaysVector: {state, bitString, subPath, delay}.
1: delaysVector = {}
2: for each fault in faultsVector do
3: path = fault.getCriticalPath()
4: for i = 0 to path.size() - 1 do
5: subPath[] = path.getSubPath(0, i)
6: delay = 0
7: for each Variable v in path do
8: ContextVariable cv = v.getContext()
9: if !(cv ∈ subPath.getContexts()) then
10: t = cv.getRefreshRate()
11: delay = max(delay, t)
12: end if
13: end for
14: if delay > delaysVector.get(subPath) then
15: delaysVector.add({fault.getState(), fault.getBitString(), subPath, delay})
16: end if
17: end for
18: end for
19: return delaysVector
A.2.1 Fixing a Hazard
For a detected critical path, a simple solution to prevent its associated hazard would be to introduce a
delay until all the variables of the critical path have been updated by the underlying middleware. Un-
derestimating this delay may not eliminate the hazard, while overestimating it may make the application
inefficient. In any case, in the typical situation, different sensed concrete variables have different re-
fresh rates, and so additional commutations of a variable that already commuted may occur before any
introduced delay has elapsed.
To address this problem, for each unstable assignment reachable from a given initial stable assign-
ment in a given state, we can calculate the minimum safe delay, defined as the smallest interval of time
starting from the time at which the first variable of the assignment commuted, after which the assign-
ment is hazard-free. If during the unsafe period another variable commutes, then a new minimum safe
delay must be recomputed for the resulting assignment. For assignments not affected by hazards this
delay is zero. For other assignments, it is the maximum over all hazards from which the assignment
must be protected. Algorithm 17 generates the minimum safe delays for a given set of hazards, such as
those reported by Algorithm 16. For each critical path, Lines 3–5 select a subPath of the current length
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i. Lines 7–13 extract the set of context variables corresponding to context that may commute in path
but that have not commuted in subPath. The slowest refresh rate of the remaining context is stored in
Lines 10–11. Since the same subPath can be obtained from multiple paths, Lines 14–16 store only the
slowest. Engineers can use Algorithm 17’s output to force waits that prevents hazards.
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